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This thesis consists of an analytical and empirical 
investigation into. the efficiency of the South African 
foreign exchange market. 
Part 1 of the thesis consists of a review of developments in 
the South African foreign exchange market. At the time of 
the Commission of Inquiry's Interim Report in 1979, a wide 
ranging system of exchange controls was in place. The 
authorities applied a dual exchange rate system and followed 
a U.S. dollar-peg system for the Commercial rand. 
This thesis analyses in detail the significant reforms which 
were implemented in the post-Commission of Inquiry period, 
including the adoption of a flexible exchange rate system, 
the abolition of the dual exchange rate system and the 
adoption of a forward policy which was based on interest 
, differentials. ~ Steps were undertaken to integrate the spot 
and forward markets. In September 1985 the authorities 
declared a foreign debt 
' 
standstill, reintroduced the 
Financial rand system and expanded the direct controls over 
foreign exchange transactions. There remains a wide ranging 
system of exchange controls in place at the present time 
which restricts the freedom of traders to transact in 
foreign exchange. 
(ii) 
Part 2 consists of empirical tests on the efficiency of the 
South African foreign exchange market over this period of 
market reform and reversal. An efficient market is one in 
which prices fully reflect all available information. This 
definition requires the specification of testable 
hypotheses. 
The writer's review of published studies on market 
efficiency undertaken in overseas markets reflect mixed 
results. Generally, deviations from covered interest parity 
were reported when comparing securities issued in different 
political jurisdictions, and this may reflect differences 
due to varying politic al risks, capital controls or tax 
legislation. Tests for covered interest parity in Euro-
currency markets indicated that deviations were not 
sufficient to offset related transaction costs. The results 
of studies which analysed the relationship between spot and 
forward rates were generally consistent with market 
efficiency. Published studies using serial correlation 
tests generally indicated zero correlation in exchange rate 
changes. However, some studies reported significant profits 
from using filter trading rules. 
This thesis employed various methodologies to test for 
market efficiency. Firstly, market efficiency was examined 
by testing the validity of the covered interest parity 
theorem. In an efficient market risk-free covered interest 
(iii) 
profit opportunities should be quickly eliminated. The 
results df the tests were consistent with market efficiency. 
Further, market efficiency was tested by examining the 
relationship between the spot rate and the forward rate. In 
an efficient market, assuming a zero risk premium, the 
forward rate should be a weak but unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate. The results of the tests were consistent 
with market efficiency. 
The results of mean and autocorrelation tests validated the 
assumption of a zero risk premium in the pricing of forward 
exchange. ·.This thesis found a strong correlation between 
movements in the spot rate and movements in the 
contemporaneous forward rate. The addition of lagged 
forward rates to the regression equation, which examined the 
relationship between . the spot rate and the corresponding 
forward rate, reflected coefficients which were not 
significant. The forward premium was found to be a weak 
predictor of the future change in the spot rate. These 
results are consistent with market efficiency, for if the 
current spot rate and forward rate embody all current 
information then new information which alters expectations 
should be immediately reflected in the spot and forward 
.rates. 
Further tests of market efficiency were based on specified 
information sets; weak form efficiency requires that the 
(iv) 
current spot rate reflects all information implicit in the 
past history of exchange rates, and· semi-strong efficiency 
requires that the current spot rate reflects all publicly 
.available information. 
Tests for weak form efficiency followed various 
methodologies. Using regression analysis, the spot rate was 
found to follow a random walk, which is consistent with 
market efficiency if equilibrium returns are assumed to be 
constant. Tests for serial correlation included examining 
the autocorrelation function for various currencies over· 
varying time periods. Generally, the tests reflected 
autocorrelation coefficients which were not significantly 
different from zero, thereby indicating that no linear 
trends existed in spot exchange rate changes. Tests for 
dependencies were expanded'. by testing the profitability of 
filter trading rules relative to a simple buy-and-hold 
policy. Filter trading rules were not able to outperform a 
simple buy-and-hold policy once an adjustment was m'ade for 
interest rettirns earned on securities quoted in each 
currency, and once an adjustment was made for a minimum 
level of transaction costs. 
In an efficient market, the forecasting accuracy of a 
foreign exchange advisory service should not systematically 
outperform the forward rate as a predictor of the future 
spot rate. Tests on the performance of a major South 
(v) 
African foreign exchange advisory service indicated that 
traders who used the advisory service's forecasts would have 
reported significantly smaller mean squared forecasting 
errors, and additional tests indicated that the advisory 
service outperformed the forward rate in predicting the 
directional change in the spot exchange rate. These results 
are not consistent with market efficiency. 
Further tests were employed to examine the relationship 
between changes in the spot rate and changes in macro-
economic variables. Tests indicated a statistically 
significant correlation between movements in the spot rate 
and movements in the contemporaneous Financial rand rate, 
the gold price and the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange 
reserves. As these are contemporaneous relationships, 
traders would usually not be able to use such relationshiws 
to improve their forecasts of the future spot rate. 
Regressions were applied to lagged changes in these 
variables and the coefficients ·were not. significantly 
2 different from zero, and the values of R were very close to 
zero. ·This is consistent with market efficiency as traders 
were not able to use past information of these variables to 
improve their forecasts of the future spot rate. 
Information on current and lagged money supply growth, 
relative money supplies and the balance on the current 
account were found to be not significant in explaining 
(vi) 
exchange rate changes. This is consistent with market 
efficiency as traders were not able to use publicly 
available information on these variables to improve their 
forecasts of the future spot rate. 
In general, the tests in this thesis were consistent with 
the weak form and semi-strong forms of market efficiency. 
This thesis attempts to reconcile these results to the 
existence of a wide ranging system of exchange controls. 
Tests indicated that an advisory service's forecasts 
outperformed the forward rate in predicting the future spot 
rate. Although this is not consistent with market 
efficiency, this may reflect monopolistic access to 
information. Therefore this test may reflect a test of the 
strong form level of efficiency and the results may indicate 
an absence of market efficiency in the strong form sense. 
(vii) 
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The adoption of a flexible exchange rate system in south 
Afr~ca, has led to increased interest in the deter~inants 
of exchange rate movements and the efficiency of the 
· foreign exchange market. The Commission of Inquiry into 
the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa 
(hereafter· referred to the "Commission of Inquiry"), 
indicated a move in official Reserve Bank policy toward 
market determined exchange rates. Various measures were 
introduced to expand the foreign exchange ·market to allow 
supply and demand factors to determine exchange rate 
movements. The reform process was halted with the 
declaration of the debt "stan~still" in September 1985, and 
various direct controls were reinst~ted. 
The existence of direct controls-with a flexible exchange 
rate system creates interesting scenarios and raises 
2 
several important questions. Is the foreign exchange 
market efficient? Do prices reflect the.public information 
set? Have there been opportunities to engage in profitable 
risk-free arbitrage activities? How well do forward 
exchange rates predict future spot rates? Is the forward 
rate an unbiased predictor . of the future spot exchange 
rate? Are changes in the exchange rate serially 
uncorrelated? Is it possible to devise a trading rule 
which consistently outperforms a simple buy-and-hold 
policy? Are professional ·forecasting services able to 
outperform the forward rate in predicting the future spot 
exchange 
between 
rate? Are there any significant relationships 
the exchange rate and macro-economic variables 
which can be utilised to earn abnormal returns? This study 
attempts to answer these questions. 
The dissertation is divided into 2 parts. Part 1 examines 
the technical side and recent developments in the South 
African foreign exchange market. Efficiency is evaluated 
in terms of the degree of economic freedom available to 
traders in the f6reign exchange market. Direct controls 
and Reserve Bank intervention restrict economic freedom in 
that supply and demand for foreign currency are affected, 
3 
perhaps resulting in a different rate of exchange as 
compared to that if the market was free of such direct 
controls and intervention. This may result in an 
inefficient allocation of resources. 
Part 2 of the study tests the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
in the context of the foreign exchange market. The 
development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis ( EMH) has 
had important implications for understanding security· 
pricing. The EMH implies that investors react immediately 
to take advantage of new information that has an impact on 
security prices. In overseas markets I . tests . of market 
efficiency have been documented by amongst others Levich 
(1979[a] and [b]), Frenkel (1981), Mussa (1979), Frenkel 
and Levich (1979), Cornell (1977·), and Crystal and Thornton 
( 1988). 
1.2 DEFINITIONS, CONDITIONS AND LEVELS OF MARKET 
EFFICIENCY 
An efficient market is a market in which prices "fully 
reflect" all available information (Fama, 1970). 
Therefore, traders and market. participant.s should not be 
able to earn abnormal returns. The following market 
4 
conditions reflect sufficient conditions for an efficient 
market; 
1. Trading is costless. There are no transaction costs. 
2. Information is costlessly available to all traders and 
market participants 
3. All traders and market participants have homogeneous 
expectations with respect to prices. 
These conditions, · although 
efficiency, are not indicative 
sufficient for market 
of active markets in 
that aithough these practice. Fama (1970} states 
conditions are sufficient for market efficiency, they are 
not necessary conditions. 
These conditions can be relaxed and yet still reflect an 
efficient market in that prices fully reflect available 
information. A market may be efficient if transaction 
costs are reasonable, information is available to a 
sufficient number of traders and there is no evidence that 
there are traders "who can consistently make better 
evaluations of available information than are implicit in 
market prices" (Fa~a, 1970). 
5 
To provide a framework for empirical research studies, Fama· 
( 1970) has defined market efficiency in relation to . the 
specific information sets available to traders and market 
participants. There are three levels of market efficiency; 
1. Weak form 
. . 
traders are not able to earn 
abnormal returns by using only the 
past history of exchange rates. 
Therefore, the current spot rate 
fully reflects the information 
implied in past movements in the 
exchange ·rate. 




are not able to earn 
all returns by using 
available information, 
information on money 
supplies, gold price, foreign 
exchange reserves), and included in 
the public information set is the 
past history of exchange rates. 
Therefore the current exchange rate 
reflects all publicly available 
information. 
3. Strong form 
6 
traders are not able to earn 
abnormal returns by using all 
information. Therefore, the current 
exchange rate reflects all public 
and private information so that 
traders with privileged or 
monopolistic access to any 
information are not able to use such 
information 
returns. 
to earn abnormal 
This study will examine the efficiency of the South African 
foreign exchange market by testing for weak form and semi-
strong form· efficiency. Therefore, in the context of this 
study, the · foreign exchange market is efficient if the 
exchange rate fully reflects all publicly available 
information. 
An efficient market implies that the exchange rate adjusts 
immediately to reflect new information. Currently 
available information which impacts on expectations cannot 
be used to syste~atically predict future exchange rates as 
such information has already been impounded in the current 
7 
spot exchange rate. In contrast, an inefficient market 
implies that exchange rates respond slowly to new 
· information, so that traders can utilise new information to 
·improve their forecasts of the future spot exphange rate .• 
As there is no overall test of market efficiency, tests of 
efficiency should be measured against specific alternative 
hypotheses. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
The study consists of · two major objectives. The first 
objective is to test and evaluate the . degree of economic 
efficiency in relation to the extent that technical and 
statutory factors impact on the freedom of economic choic·e 
facing investors and traders transacting in foreign 
currencies. 
The second objective of the study is to·test the EMH in the 
context of the South African foreign exchange market. This· 
general objective is divided into specific hypotheses: 
1. Covered interest arbitrage. profit opportunities 
are quickly eliminated, and, 
8 
2. The spot rate, and/or forward rate should reflect 
the foreign exchange market's best estimate of 
the future spot rate. 
The first hypothesis involves testing the covered interest 
parity theorem on a set of South African data, i.e. the 
forward premium/discount should reflect interest 
differentials between observed currencies. A regression 
model is developed to test the validity of the covered 
interest parity theorem between the rand and the U.S. 
dollar for the period 1981-1988. However, the absence of 
covered interest parity does not by itself constitute that 
the market is inefficient. Covered interest arbitrage 
profit opportunities may reflect an efficient market if 
these profit opportunities are not in excess of relevant 
transaction costs. Therefore, transaction costs result in 
arbitrage boundaries and market efficiency requires that 
observations lie within this interest parity band. 
The second hypothesis is based on the EMH, that is, the 
current exchange rate is determined by expectations and 
reflects all available information. Changes in the 
exchange rate will be due to new information which has an 
9 
impact on future expectations. We would expect the 
following conditions to exist in an efficient market: 
There should be a strong correlation between 
movements in the spot rate and movements in the 
contemporaneous forward rate. 
The forward· rate should not be a good predictor 
(although it should be an unbiased predictor) of the 
future spot rate. 
Technical trading rules should not consistently 
outperform a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
Professional forecasting services should not 
consistently outperform the forward rate in 
predicting the future spot exchange rate. 
Investors should not be able to earn abnormal 
profits from forecasts of t.he exchange rate based on 
publicly available information. 
10 
Statistical tests of the relationship'between key variables 
will be performed to measure compliance with the above 
conditions. 
1.4 OVERVIEW 
Chapter 2 reviews and analyses South African foreign 
exchange policies since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
agreement in 1971 to the Interim report of the Commission 
of Inquiry in 1979. The chapter restates the main 
conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry Interim report, 
analyses the direct controls applicable in the South 
African foreign exchange market and evaluates the effects 
that such controls have had on the freedom of traders and 
investors in the foreign exchange market. 
Chapter 3 analyses developments since 1979, that is, since 
the publication of the recommendations contained in the 
Interim report of the Commission of Inquiry. Developments 
in the spot market and forward market are reviewed to test 
that conditions in the foreign exchange market were 
conducive to allow the operation of market forces to 
determine the spot and forward exchange rates •. 
11 
Chapter 4 consists of a li~erature review of various 
studies which test covered interest parity and the 
existence of covered interest profit opportunities• In 
. . 
addition, the chapter reviews studies which test the 
efficiency of the foreign exchange market by analysing 
changes in spot rates, forward rates and other macro-
economic variables. 
Chapter 5 describes covered interest parity and covered 
interest arbitrage. A regression model is used to tesx for 
interest parity on a set of weekly observations from August 
1983 to February 1988. The same regression model is 
applied to a set of monthly observations from January 1983 
to October 1986. Transaction costs are included in the 
analysis to test for the existence of covered interest 
arbitrage profit opportunities in excess of related 
transaction costs. 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to test the second hypothesis 
by examining the time series behaviour of the spot rate and 
the forward rate. If spot and forward rates embody all 
current information, and it is new information that alters 
expectations· regarding the future spot rate, then there 
12 
should be a strong correlation between movements in the 
spot rate and movements in the contemporaneous forward 
rate. The ability of the forward rate to predict the 
futµre spot rate is tested, and analysed graphically. 
Assuming a zero risk premium, the forward rate should be an 
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. Unbiasedness 
tests are applied to the forward rate. Further tests ~re 
applied to test for the existence of a risk premium in the 
pricing of forward exchange. 
Exchange rate movements are analysed to evaluate the 
validity of the economic theories of the foreign exchange 
market. The behaviour of spot and forward exchange rates 
gives credence to the view that exchange rates are 
. . . . 
determined by expectations arid reflect at any point in time 
the public information set. Movements in exchange rates 
reflect the arrival of new information which alters 
expectations. Changes in spot rates and forward rates are 
closely related as new information will impact on both 
exchange rates immediately. No significant evidence was 
found to support the existence of a risk premium in the 




Chapter 8 states the conclusions of the various tests of 
market efficiency. The results are evaluated in terms .of 
the objectives and hypotheses set out in Chapter 1 and the 
chapter concludes with suggestions for further research. 
1.5 LIMITATIONS 
Chapters 2 and 3 document developments and restrictions on 
traders in the South African foreign exchange market. An 
implicit assumption is that a competitive market and - a 
market free of exchange control restrictions and other 
regulations would result in an efficient allocation of 
resources in the economy. However, an alternative argument 
states that an absence of exchange controls may result in 
"excessive" volatility in exchange rates and thereby hinder 
trade. An implicit assumption in this thesis is that a 
market free of exchange controls will result in an 
efficient allocation of resources. 
There is no overall test of market efficiency. The 
definition of an efficient market is of a general nature 
and requires the specification of specific and empirically 
testable hypotheses. This implies that. the results of· 
15 
tests on specific hypotheses are necessary but not 
sufficient indicators of overall market efficiency. 
Market efficiency is relevant in relation to a specified 
information set. Formally, market efficiency usually 
requires that; 
E ( S - S \I ) = 0 
t e.t t-1 
Where S is ·the one-period ahead forecast of the spot 
e.t 
exchange rate based on the information set available at 
time t-1, I 
t-1 
E is the expectations operator. This means 
that traders do not systematically make errors in setting 
forecasts of the future spot rate. 
Tests for market efficiency· require that the error term 
should consist of white noise and be serially uncorrelated. 
This, however, is a test of a. joint hypothesis, firstly 
that traders are rational in forming their expectations to 
the extent that they do not make systematic. forecasting 
errors, and that the expected market equilibrium return is 
constant. 
16 
Therefore, in an efficient market prices should follow a 
random walk with- drift. However if the equilibrium return 
is not constant and. is serially correlated, then although 
there is resulting seriar correlation in the error term, 
this does not necessarily mean the market is inefficient 
(see Levich, (1979[b]). A number of studies have tended 
. not to recognise this point (see, for example, Crystal and 
Thornton, 1988). In this study, although we use the usual 
methods to test for market efficiency, a necessary 
limitation is that the tests of efficiency implicitly 
assume a constant equilibrium returri. 
In relation to the forward market, assuming traders are 
risk neutral, an effie,ient market requires that the forward 
exchange r·ate reflects the expected future spot rate; 
S = F 
e,t t-1 
In an efficient foreign exchange market; 
s = $ + u 
t e.t t 
where S is equal to E( S \I ) and u is a white noise 
e,t t t-1 t 
error term. E is the expectations operator and I is the 
t-1 
17 
information set at time t-1. Therefore, following on from 
these equations, in an efficient market; 
·S = -~ + u 
t t-1 t 
However, this is a test of a joint hypotheses; tli.at traders 
are rational in forming their expectations, and there is a 
zero risk premium in the pricing of forward exchange. The 
market may be efficient in the sense that traders are 
rational, but require a risk premium to hold forward 
exchange. In this study, tests of efficiency are 
undertaken assuming a zero risk premium. The validity of 
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REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
POLICIES TO 1979. 
OBJECTIVE: 
The objective of this chapter is to present a background to 
developments in the South African foreign exchange market, 
to present the effects of Reserve Bank policies up to the 
time of the Interim report of the Commission of Inquiry in 
1979, and to make intuitive and tentative conclusions on 
the effects of policy changes on market efficiency in so 
far as these policies restricted the freedom of 
traders/investors to transact in foreign exchange. 
. I 
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2.1 REVIEW OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICIES TO 1979 
2.1.1 THE SPOT MARKET 
The system of fixed exchange rates as instituted under the 
Bretton Woods Agreement finally broke down in August 1971 
with the Nixon declaration. that the U.S. dollar would no 
longer be convertible into gold, at U.S. $35 per ounce. 
This occurred due to persistent deficits incurred by the 
USA which resulted in the accumulation of U.S. dollars by 
the major central banks. This led to speculation against 
the U.S. dollar on the premise that the USA would no longer 
be able to convert U.S. dollars into gold at the stated 
price. 
The realignment of currencies in terms of the Smithsonian 
Agreement in 1971 resulted in an effective devaluation of 
the u. S. dollar in terms of gold. The breakdown of the 
Smithsonian Agreement resulted in the generalised floating 
of the world's, major currencies. Most countries within the 
European Economic Community ·joined the European Monetary 
System (EMS) whereby the values of currencies within the 
EMS were maintained within narrow bands. The EMS currencies 
floated together against the U.S. dollar. 
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Most less developed countries pegged their currencies to a 
major currency such as the U.S. dollar, UK sterling and the 
. 
French franc. The rand was initially pegged to sterling 
but then became pegged to the U.S. dollar. In terms of the 
Smithsonian Agreement, the rand was devalued by 12.28 
percent. It is interesting to note the stated reasons for 
this devaluation as these same reasons_ were repeated on 
numerous occasions when the authorities undertook to alter 
the pegged value of the rand. 
The devaluation was firstly intended to improve South 
Africa's balance of payments, as devaluation was expected 
to reduce the current account deficit. It would assist to 
reverse the leads and lags effects on the Reserve Bank's 
foreign currency reserves. It was envisaged that the 
devaluation would encourage capital inflows and increase 
rand revenues due to exporters of primary commodities and 
gold. The devaluation was also expected to improve the 
competitiveness of local industry and increase government 
revenue (Commission of Inquiry Interim Report,1979 : p.5). 
The Commission of Inquiry report noted that "during the 
period following the devaluation, both the overall balance 
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of payments and the domestic economic situation improved 
considerably •.. " (Commission of Inquiry Interim Report, 
1979 para. 32). The Commission of Inquiry failed to 
report that the devaluation was combined with the 
implementation of tariffs to reduce imports and, the 
adoption by the authorities of export promotion policies. 
The argument that devaluation would encourage capital 
inflows is a short-term view; devaluation would encourage 
capital inflows if funds were committed and investors were 
concerned about timing. In relation to long-term capital 
inflows, the process . of devaluation may discourage 
investors from investing funds in South Africa. This is 
due to the impact that devaluation may have on expectations 
regarding future movements in the value of the rand. 
After a short period of being pegged to sterling, the rand 
was again linked to the U.S. dollar in October 1972. In 
February 1973, the U.S. dollar was devalued by 10 percent. 
The authorities decided not to follow this devaluation due 
to South Africa's favourable balance of payments position 
and the heal thy state of its foreign exchange reserves. 
South Africa's balance of payments and, directly related to 
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this, the level of foreign currency reserves, had an 
important_effect on official exchang~ rate policy. 
The vol a ti 1 i ty of the U.S. dollar in terms of the major 
currencies created problems for the rand. The rand/U. s. 
dollar link resulted in significant movements in the value 
of the rand in terms of other currencies. These movements 
were often not related to South Africa's own balance of 
pa'Yments position. South Africa experienced an 
appreciation in the value of the rand in a period (June 
1973-January 1974) when its foreign reserves in fact 
declined. During another period in 1974, South Africa 
experienced a depreciation in the value of the rand while 
its foreign reserves were rising (Commission of Inquiry 
Interim Report, 1979: para.36). 
In order to overcome the above "anomalies", the authorities 
implemented a. system of managed pegging, termed the 
"independent managed floating" of the rand, by the 
Commission of Inquiry. This policy retained the link to 
the U.S. dollar but the value of the rand in terms of the 
U.S. dollar would be subject to smaller and more frequent 
adjustments. 
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In view of the fact that the authorities outlined the 
disadvantages of the rand/U.S. dollar peg in terms of 
movements of the value of the rand against the world's 
major currencies, it is not surprising to note that the 
authorities applied a policy of maintaining a rand/U. S. 
dollar link but effectively followed a policy of pegging 
the rand to a weighted basket of currencies. Therefore, 
the value of the rand/U.S. dollar rate would be adjusted on 
the basis of movements in the value of the rand in terms of 
a weighted basket of currencies. This policy facilitated 
the ability of traders and speculators to predict the 
future value of the rand/U.S. dollar rate and this resulted 
in significant leads and lags effects on the foreign 
exchange reserves. 
The appreciation of the U.S. dollar in 1975 resulted in 
expectations of a downward adjustment to the rand/U.S. 
dollar rate. This resulted- in importers leading payments 
for imports, thereby increasing the immediate demand for 
foreign currency. At the same time, exporters lagged their 
foreign currency receipts. The combined effects of these 
actions was to cause a significant decline in the country's 
foreign currency reserves. 
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The authorities decided to again implement a fixed u. S. 
dollar peg from June 1975, whereby the value of the rand 
would remain constant for longer periods in terms of the 
U.S. dollar. 
The further strengthening of the U.S. dollar ·and South 
Africa's weak balance of payments position led to pressures 
for a downward revision in the rand/U.S. dollar peg. South 
Africa had also experienced a material decline in the price 
of gold. These factors led to a devaluation of the rand by 
17.9 ·percent in September 1975. This devaluation resulted 
in an improvement in the Reserve Bank' s foreign exchange 
reserves due to a reversal of unfavourable leads and lags. 
~owever, South Africa's foreign exchange reserves were 
again subjected to pressure in 1976 due to political 
disturbances. During 1977 and 1978, in part due to the 
domestic recession, the current account reflected a 
substantial surplus while the capital account reflected net 
capital outflows. The rand remained linked to the U.S. 
dollar which generally depreciated against the major 
currencies over this period. 
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Therefore, until the advent of the Commission of Inquiry's 
Interim Report in 1979, the authorities had experimented 
with various exchange rate policies in relation to the spot 
rate. The state of the country's balance of payments and 
foreign currency reserves were the major factors in 
determining official exchange rate policy to 1979. 
2.1.2 THE FORWARD MARKET 
Up to 1979, the Reserve Bank provided forward cover to the 
banks in relation to commitments involving the movement of 
. - . . 
goods. The Reserve Bank would sell forward U.S. dollars to 
cover imports and purchase forward U.S. dollars to cover 
exports. In relation to imports, cover was granted up to a 
year, whereas in relation to exports, cover was normally 
restricted to six months. The Reserve Bank also granted 
forward cover to parastatal organisations on their overseas 
borrowings including interest commitments on foreign loans. 
The Reserve Bank set the cost of forward cover at one 
percent per annum on both forward sales and forward 
purchases, i.e. forward rates were based on the spot rate 
plus a charge of one percent. Therefore, forward cover 
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would be granted to importers at the spot rate (indirectly 
quoted) less one percent per annum. Forward cover would be 
granted to exporters at the spot rate plus one percent per 
annum. The Reserve Bank's forward exchange policy resulted 
in a material difference between forward buying and selling 
rates. 
2.1~3 EXCHANGE CONTROL 
The authorities fmplemented · a wide range of ·exchange 
controls over residents and non-residents in order to 
reduce the demand for foreign currency. A major component 
of exchange control for limiting capital outflows is 
dependent upon applying a dual exchange rate system (which 
is explained below). An important exchange control ruling 
is Regulation 3(1)(f) which sets limits on local borrowings 
. by foreign controlled companies. 
2.1.4 THE SECURITIES RAND 
The Sharpeville disturbances in 1960 led to large capital 
outflows. To protect the- country's foreign exchange 
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reserves, the authorities introduced measures to block the 
repatriation of assets held by non-residents. Capital 
repatriation by non-residents could be effected by 
purchasing scrip (shares) on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange and selling the same scrip on the London Stock 
Exchange, normally at a discount to the quoted official 
exchange rate. Blocked rands could also be used to 
purchase non-resident bonds, and government, municipal and 
parastatal corporation stocks. (see C.R. Freemantle, 1977: 
p. 9). Al though officially not recognised; a secondary 
market arose whereby non-residents traded blocked rands at 
a discount to the quoted rate (Gidlow,. 1976 p.87). 
Official recqgnition was granted to this secondary market 
for blocked rands and these rands became known as 
securities rands in 1976. (Gidlow, 1979: p.255). 
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2.2. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO THE MONETARY SYSTEM AND MONETARY POLICY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Commission of Inquiry was appointed in August 1977 
under the chairmanship of Dr. G.P.C. de Kock to inquire and 
make recommendations in respect to the monetary system and 
monetary policy in South Africa with special reference to 
various factors, one factor being "exchange rate and 
forward exchange pol~cies and practices, and the 
development of a foreign exchange market in South Africa". 
(Commission of Inquiry Interim Report, 1979 : p.(iii)). 
Due to the turmoil experienced in the world's foreign 
currency markets and a depreciating U.S. dollar, the 
Commission was requested to present an Interim Report on 
foreign exchange management. 
The Interim Report was published in early 1979. Exchange 
rate policy was seen in the · broad context of monetary 
policy. As ~he Commission states in its report, 
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II in Short-term economic Stabilisation policy in 
South Africa the main emphasis should be placed 
upon conservative monetary and fiscal 
and· on general financial discipline. 
policies 
Exchange 
rate policy can never be a substitute for such 
policies and discipline. Exchange rate 
adjus.tments cannot by themselves solve the 
problems of either slow economic growth, balance 
of payments disequilibrium or inflation" 
(Commission of Inquiry, 1979 : para. 8) 
However, the importance of exchange rate policy was 
recognised in lieu of the fact that South Africa is an open 
economy where the total value of foreign exchange 
transactions is significant in relation to the country's 
gross domestic product. 
The Commission concluded that there were serious 
deficiencies with various aspects of the South African 
foreign exchange market. 
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2.2.2 THE SPOT MARKET 
The spot market reflected certain weaknesses. The 
Commission concluded that the most important deficiency was 
the policy of maintaining a relatively fixed rand/U.S. 
dollar peg. Changes to the rand/U. S. dollar peg were 
implemented infrequently and also tended to be material 
(for example, the 17.9 percent devaluation in 1975). The 
maintenance of the rand/U.S. dollar link had the advantage 
of instilling stability in relation to the most important 
foreign currency (i.e. the U.S. dollar) from the aspect of 
trade and other transactions. Stability facilitated 
forward planning by South African traders in the foreign 
exchange market. 
However, .maintaining the rand/U. S. dollar link had serious 
drawbacks. The rand was forced to follow the value of the 
U.S. dollar in terms of the major currencies. A 
depreciation in the value of the U.S. dollar, and therefore 
the rand, implies that South Africa will be subject to 
' 
inflationary pressures due to the effective depreciation of 
the rand. This may occur in a period ·when the balance of 
payments position is favourable and the domestic economy is 
experiencing a relatively high level of employment. 
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Alternatively, if the U.S. dollar appreciates in a period 
when South Africa is experiencing balance of payments 
difficulties and the domestic economy is in a recessionary 
phase, then the effective appreciation of the rand will 
exacerbate the pressures on the local economy, as exports 
become less competitive and the cost of imports are 
reduced. Reduced exports and increased imports will result 
in further pressures on South Africa's balance of payments. 
A major problem with a fixed pegged exchange rate is that 
any economic adjustment due to changed circumstances flows 
through ·the domestic economy and not through the exchange 
rate. The maintenance of a fixed exchange rate .becomes a 
major policy objective, and this may be at the expense of 
the domestic economy, which bears the brunt of the required 
adjustment. 
For example, if South Africa is experiencing a balance of 
payments surplus the Reserve Bank, to protect a fixed 
exchange rate, will need to purchase U.S. dollars and sell 
rands. The effect is that the balance of payments surplus 
is translated into an increase in the money supply with · 
resultant inflationary effects. Therefore, the domestic 
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economy bears the adjustment via an increase in prices 
rather than an increase in the value of the rand. 
If South Africa is experiencing a balance of payments 
deficit, the Reserve Bank is obliged to sell U.S. dollars 
at a fixed rate rather than allow the rand to depreciate. 
The purchase of rands by the Reserve Bank to defend the 
pegged exchange rate, means that the required adjustment 
occurs in the domestic economy, as the reduction in the 
money supply will translate into reduced levels of economic 
activity and employment. 
The sale of U.S. dollars will also result in a decline in 
the Reserve Bank's foreign currency reserves. The Reserve 
Bank will only be able to afford a temporary decline in 
foreign reserves; if the Reserve Bank experiences a 
continual reduction in its foreign currency reserves, it 
will eventually be compelled to devalue the rand against 
the U.S. dollar. 
Therefore, a continual decline in foreign reserves will 
lead to speculative capital outflows that will exacerbate 
pressures on the Reserve Bank to deva'l ue. This is due to 
the fact that private operators would be able to predict 
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with some accur§lCY when it will be necessary for the · 
authorities to alter a fixed exchange rate (Rees, 1979: 
p. 93). 
Leads and lags effects occur which will further reduce the 
Reserve Bank's foreign currency reserves. Importers will 
lead payments as the rand is expected to devalue and 
therefore will wish' to pay their foreign currency 
obligations before any devaluation occurs to the value of 
the rand. This will result in an increase in demand for 
spot U.S. dollars. 
Exporters on the other hand will hold back on foreign 
currency receipts until devaluation, in order to earn 
higher rand revenues. This results in a reduction of 
foreign currency being supplied to the market. The actions 
of importe~s and exporters will result in a decline in the 
Reserve Bank's foreign currency reserves. A pegged 
exchange rate therefore implies opportunities by firms to 
make relatively risk-free speculative profits. 
The Commission concluded that a more frequent adjustment to 
the rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate would still have a 
serious drawback in that it would be. diffi.cul t for the 
--------- _j 
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authorities to determine what the "equilibrium rand-U. s. 
dollar exchange rate really was" (Commission of Inquiry, 
Interim Report, 1979 : para. 87). 
It would be preferable to allow the rand to find its own 
value in an open and competitive market. 
Another serious drawback to a fixed rand/U.S. dollar peg is 
that the government is seen as directly responsible for any 
adjustment to the rand/U.S. dollar peg. As a downward 
adjustment tends to be perceived as a result of government 
failure, devaluation is resisted until absolutely 
necessary. 
At the time the Commission prepared its report, the spot 
market did not represent an efficient and competitive 
market. This was due to the fact that the R~serve Bank set 
the exchange rate, and· any adjustment to tbe rand/U. S. 
dollar peg was determined by the Reserve Bank. 
Further, the buying and selling rates of the authorised 
dealers ~ere set by the Reserve Bank and the fixed bid-ask 
spread was material in relation to other relatively 
competitive . foreign exchange markets. The fixed bid-ask 
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spread was 0.5 percent (Commission of Inquiry Interim 
Report, 1979 : para 74, see also, R.M. Gidlow, 1980i p.15) 
and this compared to spreads of 0.09-0.18 percent which 



















to maintain open 
level in foreign 
currency; any foreign currency exposures were required to 
be eliminated at the close of each day. This restriction 
limited the ability of South African banks to transact on 
the Euro-dollar market and give depth to the foreign 
exchange market. 
If the banks were permitted to hold positions in foreign 
currencies, then this would result in more active trading 
by the banks in foreign currencies, as' positions would be 
taken based on expectations of future movements in currency 
values. 
Due to the fact that the, Reserve Bank handled the sale of 
gold bullion, and paid the gold mining industry in rands, 
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it acquired large holdings of U.S. dollars directly. This 
created a serious imbalance in the foreign exchange market 
as the banks were net buyers of foreign exchange. 
This is due to the fact that the demand for foreign 
currency to pay for imports was channeled through the banks 
while an important part of export proceeds, the proceeds on 
gold bul'lion sales, Krugerrands and diamonds did not flow 
through to the banks. 
The Reserve Bank was therefore a net seller of foreign 
currency in the market and was therefore in a powerful 
position to strongly influence the rand/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate. The direct flow of u. s. dollars to the 
Reserve ·Bank resulted in lower volumes traded in the 
foreign exchange market and this reduced the depth of the 
market. A precondition for an efficient forward market is 
a competitive and efficient spot market. At the time of 
the Commission of Inquiry' s Interim Report a competitive 
spot market did not exist. 
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2.2.3 THE FORWARD MARKET 
At the time of the Commission of Inquiry's Interim Report 
in 1979, the forward exchange market was a highly regulated 
market. Reserve Bank policy was to provide forward cover 
on transactions involving the movement of goods. The 
Reserve Bank would purchase forward U.S. dollars from 
exporters; however the foreign currency receipts should 
normally accrue within six months. 
The forward rate was set by the Reserve Bank in relation to 
the spot value of the rand. Importers and exporters paid a 
fixed commission of one· percent per annum. Therefore, 
forward rates were not determined by market factors and did 
not normally reflect covered interest parity. In an 
efficient market covered interest parity should hold, so 
that risk-free profit opportunit~es are quickly eliminated. 
The covered interest parity theory states that the forward 
premium/discount should reflect the interest differential 
between observed currencies so that opportunities to 
undertake covered interest arbitrage transactions are 
quickly eliminated. In Chapter 5 the valid! ty of the 
covered interest parity theory is tested in the South 
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African foreign exchange market for the post-Commission of 
Inquiry period. 
A fixed commission of one percent per annum resulted ~n two 
prices for forward U.S. dollars. Apart from a small spread 
between buying and se~ling rates, there is usually one 
price for forward currency in an efficient and competitive 
market. 
The tendency of the authorities to implement adjustments to 
the rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate based on the state of 
the balance of payments and the Reserve Bank's foreign 
exchange reserves led to speculation not only in the spot 
market but also in the forward market. A fixed rand/U.S. 
dollar peg and a persistent decline in the Reserve Bank's 
foreign exchange reserves will lead to general expectations 
of a downward adjustment to the pegged rand/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate. This impacts on the forward market, for if 
general expectations are that a devaluation is imminent, 
only importers will normally take out forward cover. 
Exporters will have no incentive to take out forward cover 
as devaluation will result in an increase in rand revenues. 
41 
This resulted in an imbalance in the forward market due to 
the increase in demand for forward U.S. dollars from 
importers but a reduction in the . supply of forward U.S. 
dollars by exporters. The Reserve Bank was a net seller of 
forward U.S. dollars, and was therefore subject to huge 
foreign exchange losses on its forward exchange account if 
a devaluation occurred. 
The structural imbalance· in the spot market was due to the 
fact that the U.S. dollar proceeds on· gold bullion ·sales 
flowed directly to the Reserve Bank, and this was matched 
( 
by a similar imbalance in the forward market. In the spot 
market the banks were net buyers of U.S. dollars to sell to 
their clients. The banks were also net buyers of forward 
U.S. dollars to meet client demand for forward cover 
against future foreign currertcy obligations. 
The Reserve Bank would be able to avoid exposure on forward 
sales of U.S. dollars if it deposited the necessary U.S. 
dollars in the Euro-dollar market until the maturity date 
of its forward cover obligations. However, the state of 
the Reserve Bank' s foreign reserves did not al low it to 
avoid exposure to losses on its forward account (Ross, 1980 
: p.11). 
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The Reserve Bank on behalf of the government granted 
forward cover to the parastatal organisations on foreign 
borrowings, not only in U.S. dollars but also in the other 
major currencies. The government created an incentive for 
parastatal organisations such ·as ESCOM and SATS to borrow 
in "hard" currencies such as the deutschemark as these 
loans carried lower interest rates. Foreign exposure to a 
likely appreciation in the value of these currencies was 
carried by the Reserve Bank, and ultimately by the 
taxpayer. 
Parastatal organisations would eliminate exposure to 
foreign exchange losses by purchasing forward foreign 
currency at a low fixed cost ( i • e. one percent) • The 
imbalance in the Reserve Bank's forward account resulted in 
the incurrence of foreign exchange losses amounting to 
billions of rands (see, Foreign Exchange Desk, 1980 and 
Gidlow~ 1986[b] : p.252). 
The -losses on the forward account, which represented cash 
flow items, were offset against -revaluations of the Reserve 
Bank's gold reserves, which represented a book entry 
_(Gidlow, 1986[b] : p.252). This practice was limited to 
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the extent that there were upward movements in the gold 
price. The practice of offsetting forward exchange losses 
against the revaluation of the Reserve Bank's gold reserves 
reflect'ed an effective reduction in the net value of the 
country's gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
The valuation of the Re.serve Bank's gold reserves at a 
nominal figure was replaced by the valuation of the gold 
reserves at an amount that was close to market value. 
However, due to the set-off of forward exchange losses, the 
change in net book value was insignificant, though in 
reality, the net value of the Reserve Bank's gold reserves 
declined. Further, the valuation of the Reserve Bank's 
gold reserves at ma.rket value implied that the reported 
value of the gold reserves were subject to movements in the 
market price of gold bullion. 
The fixed commission charge of one percent per annum did 
not reflect covered interest pari.ty. Deviations from 
interest parity resulted in changes to financing policies 
and created risk-free profit opportunities for firms to 
enter into covered interest arb~trage transactions. 
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In order to protect its foreign exchange reserves, the 
Reserve Bank was able to encourage South African importers 
to make use of foreign trade credits rather than use 
domestic borrowings to finance imports. If domestic. 
interest rates were higher than foreign interest rates, 
then by setting a forward premium which is less than the 
interest differential, the Reserve Bank was able to 
influence importers to use foreign trade credits as this 
resulted in an effective minimisation of financing costs. 
For example, if domestic interest rates were 12 percent, 
foreign interest rates· were 8 percent and the cost of 
forward cover was one percent, then importers would prefer 
to make use of foreign trade credit finance with an 
effective cost of about 9 percent per annum, which ··at>Inpared 
favourably to a cost of 12 percent per annum if importers 
undertook domestic finance to pay t'or imports. The Reserve 
Bank's policy of setting the cost of forward cover at less 
than the interest differential had positive effects for the 
Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves but further 
accentuated the imbalance in the forward account. 
In an efficient market covered interest parity should 
occur; however the adoption of a pol icy to al low forward 
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rates to reflect interest differentials would result in 
adverse effects on the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange 
reserves. This would be due to a switch from the use of 
foreign trade credits to domestic borrowings. 
Another serious deficiency with the forward exchange market 
was due to the limitations that the Reserve Bank placed on 
providing forward cover on foreign currency transactions. 
For instance, private sector investors were not able to 
obtain forward cover on capital repayments of foreign 
loans, on interest payments, and on royalties and dividends 
due in foreign currency. This acted as a serious 
disincentive for foreign investment as currency exposure 
could not be avoided. The encouragement of foreign 
investment was seen to be of importance in relation to the 
objectives of promoting economic growth and employment. 
The Commission therefore recommended that the provision of 
forward cover be extended to foreign loans (Commission of 
Inquiry Interi~ Report, 1979 : para. 221). 
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2.2.4 EXCHANGE CONTROL 
The Currency and Exchanges Act, No. 9 of 1933 formed the 
statutory auth9ri ty for the adoption of exchange control 
regulations. The authorities ·implemented a wide ranging 
system of exchange controls in 1961. The objective of the 
various direct and other controls was simply to reduce the 
demand for foreign currency and remove the "destabilising" 
effects of capital flows from the balance of payments. 
Exchange controls would be expected to result in a more 
favourable exchange rate and alleviate the pressures upon 
the Reserve Bank's foreign currency reserves. 
The Commission found that the exchange control regulations 
were not always effective in protecting the foreign 
currency reserves. This may be reflected by the 
significant unrecorded short-term capital outflows within 
the balance of payments statistics. The "errors and 
unrecorded short-term capital flows" item in the balance of 
payments, which reconciles changes in reserves to recorded 
transactions, amounted to R585m in 1977 as compared to the 
Reserve Bank's total reserves of R837m at the time (Kantor, 
1978 : p. 67). 
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This implied that exchange control led to an effective 
redistribution of. weal th as certain parties were able to 
circumvent exchange control. Therefore, -"exchange control 
harms some individuals for the benefit of others" (Kantor, 
1978 : p. 66). 
The ordinary investor was not able to obtain the benefits 
of international diversification. For instance, Mutual 
Funds were not permitted to deposit . funds off shore.· Some 
measure of indirect international diversification could be 
obtained by investing in local companies with overseas 
operations. The Commission found that the exchange control 
regulations acted to discourage foreign investment 
(Commission of Inquiry Interim Report, 1979 : p.17). 
2.3 RESTRICTIONS IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
The system of direct controls repre$ented a direct 
interference in the market mechanism and reflected a major 
departure from . market efficiency in terms of the effect 
that such controls had on economic freedom. 
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The following represents a list of the major controls that 
restricted the freedom of economic choice at the time of 
the Commission report: 
1. The Reserve Bank placed restrictions on the number 
of dealers that were permitted to transact in foreign 
exchange. Authorised dealers comprised major South African 
banks. There were no foreign exchange brokers. Therefore, 
the Reserve Bank limited the number of parties in the 
market. 
2. The Reserve Bank set the buying and selling rates 
to the public. The authorised dealers were obliged to 
quote the Reserve Bank's prescribed foreign exchange rates 
to the public. At the time of the Commission Report the 
pegged bid-offer rates quoted to the.corporate sector and 
the public was $1.1471-$1.1529. This represents a spread 
of 0. 5 percent( 58 points) which is wide iri. relation to 
other major foreign currency markets. The wide spread 
represented a major transaction cost imposed on parties 
trading in the market. 
3. Authorised dealers were able to obtain preferential 
rates from the Reserve Bank for the purchase and sale of 
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U.S. dollars. The Reserve Bank quoted a spread of O. 25 
percent to the authorised dealers. This policy enabled the 
dealers to earn 0.125 percent on U.S. dollars purchased 
from(sold to) the Reserve Bank and sold to (purchased from) 
the public. The fact that a limited number of parties were 
able to obtain preferential rates represented an 
inefficiency in the foreign exchange market. 
4. The authorised dealers were not permitted to 
maintain open foreign currency positions. Dealers were 
required to cover positions at the end of each working day. 
This regulation had a. negative affect on the economic 
freedom of the dealers to manage their portfolio of foreign 
currencies based on 
exchange rates. 
expectations of future movements in 
5. Dealers were not permitted to hold foreign exchange 
assets unless permission was obtained from the Reserve 
Bank. This regulation also applied to other South African 
residents. The Reserve Bank would normally, by 
arrangement, allow the dealers and other South African 
residents to hold limited amounts of foreign currency as 
working balances. 
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6. South African exporters and residents were required 
to sell foreign currency proceeds within seven days of 
receipt. 
7. The foreign currency proceeds on the sale of gold 
bullion, Krugerrands and diamonds did not enter the foreign 
exchange market directly. Mining companies were not 
permitted to receive the U.S. dollar proceeds of gold and 
diamond sales. These U.S. dollar proceeds flowed directly 
to the Reserve Bank who then paid the mining companies in 
rands. This policy created an imbalance in the foreign 
exchange market. The authorised dealers experienced strong 
demand for foreign currency from importers and other 
parties. However, the market did not receive directly the 
U.S. dollar proceeds from gold sales. 
Dealers found themselves short· of U.S. dollars and were 
therefore net buyers of U.S. dollars from the Reserve Bank. 
This policy enabled the Reserve Bank to exercise a strong 
influence in the market. It also impacted on· the economic 
freedom of the mining houses as they were obliged to accept 
the exchange rate set by the Reserve Bank. In a free 
market the mining houses would have been able to off er 
their U.S. dollars to several buyers and would therefore be 
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in a position to negotiate a more favourable rand/U. S. 
dollar exchange rate. Dealers were obliged to be net 
buyers of foreign currency and therefore were obliged to 
accept the U.S. dollar offer rates set by the Reserve Bank. 
8. The Reserve Bank pegged the value of the rand to 
the U.S. dollar. This meant that changes in conditions or 
expectations would be reflected as changes to the Reserve 
Bank's foreign currency reserves rather than as changes to 
the exchange rate, as would occur in a free and efficient 
market. A persistent decline in reserves led to a general 
expectation that the authorities would be obliged to alter 
the rand/U.S. dollar peg. This resulted in leads and lags 
and other speculative capital flows. An effective 
redistribution of wealth occurred as only exporters, 
importers and other transactors in foreign exchange were in 
a position to undertake leads and lags and other relatively 
risk-free speculative activities. 
9. The provision of forward cover was limited to 
transactions involving the movement of goods. Therefore, 
no forward cover was provided on foreign loan repayments, 
interest, royalties and dividend payments. 
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10. The Reserve Bank set the forward margins at 
arbitrary levels. The cost of forward cover was set at one 
percent per annum and this applied to exporters and 
importers. In an efficient market the cost of forward 
cover should reflect covered interest parity. This did not 
apply in the South African forward market. 
11. Public corporations were granted forward cover on 
foreign loans at a cost of one percent per annum. This 
policy reflected an ec6nomic inefficiency and. resulted in 
an effective redistribution of wealth. Public corporations 
minimised their interest costs(by borrowing in strong 
currencies) while the Treasury was liable for the resultant 
major losses incurred on the forward account. 
12. The Reserve Bank did not lay off the exposure on 
its forward account by purchasing foreign currency spot to 
cover forward sales. This placed the Treasury("the 
taxpayer") at risk 'to exchange rate fluctuations. Dealers 
were permitted to hold only limited foreign currency 
balances and therefore were not prepared to carry exposure 
to losses on forward transactions. 
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13. The dual exchange rate system resulted in two 
exchange rates. The significant financial rand discount · 
created incentives for traders to undertake "roundtripping" 
operations. 
14. The Reserve Bank restricted the degree of local 
borrowing by foreign controlled companies. This was in 
terms of Regulation 3(1)(f) of the Exchange Control 
Regulations. This policy had a significant effect on the 
financial management of foreign controlled companies due to 
the wide definition given to local borrowing(" financial 
assistance"). 
15. In terms of the Exchange Control regulations 
direct equity investment (in unlisted securities) occurred 
via the Commercial rand while divestment occurred via the 
Financial rand. The large Financial rand discount 
discouraged foreign direct equity investment. This ruling 
created an unfair advantage for listed investments (which 
were invested via the Financial rand) in relation to 
unlisted investments. 
16. The extensive system of exchange control 
regulations impacted on the economic freedom of ~~sidents. 
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Strict limits were placed upon the allocation of foreign 
currency for purposes such as travel and studies abroad by 
South African residents. Strict limits were placed on the 
amount of assets that could be transferred by emigrants. 
17. Applications for foreign currency required for 
specific transactions were submitted directly to the 
exchange control authorities. Each application was 
considered on its own merits. This policy resulted in the 
Reserve Bank allocating foreign currency on an ad hoc 
basis. Therefore, discretion became an important factor in 
determining foreign currency allocations. Individuals 
entrusted with the administration of exchange control 
wielded significant levels of power and this created 
opportunities for the misuse of such discretion which is a 
basic tenet of Exchange Control. This also resulted in 
high administration costs. 
18. The operation of Exchange Control resulted in 
significant information costs. This is due to the fact 
that the public were not given free access to the Exchange 
Control regulations. Amendments to the Exchange Control 





Therefore access to the regulations was 
19. Companies, banks and other institutions were not 
permitted to invest in foreign securities. This prevented 
South African investors from achieving the benefits · of 
international diversification. 
20. Residents involved in the production of goods and 
services could obtain permission to extend their operations 
overseas via direct investments. However, the Reserve Bank 
placed stringent preconditions before granting residents 
permission to undertake foreign direct investments. 
21. Exchange control resulted in high transaction 
costs for firms involved in 'normal foreign operations. An 
extensive system of import permits impacted upon the normal 
operations of importers. Importers needed to provide 
documentary evidence to an authorised dealer that the goods 
were received in South Africa. The e~port of goods is 
subject to approval by an authorised dealer. Exporters 
were required to complete an export declaration. Exchange 
control permission was required for the raising of foreign 
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loans. The proceeds of export sales must be received in 
South Africa within six months after date of shipment. 
These rulings restil ted · in economic . inefficiencies due to 
the fact that they inhibited the normal flow of trade and 
capital. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
South Africa experimented with various exchange rate 
policies in the post Bratton Woods period to 1979. The 
Commission of Inquiry found that maintenance of a rand/U.S. 
dollar peg was inefficient due to the fact that this policy 
resulted in speculative pressures and tied the South 
African economy to the performance of the U.S. dollar on 
the world's foreign currency markets. The Commission of 
Inquiry recommended a managed floating exchange rate system 
for the rand. 
In addition, in the long term, The Commission of Inquiry 
recommended a unitary exchange rate· system for the rand 
with no exchange control over non-residents. The 
Commission. concluded that the dual exchange rate system 
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resulted in economic inefficiencies while exchange control 
measures were not able to protec:t the country's foreign 
exchange reserves when the rand came under pressure. 
At the time the Commission Interim Report was published in 
1979, South African companies, foreign controlled firms, 
residents and non-residents were subject to an extensive 
system of exchange controls that significantly impacted on 
their economic freedom to undertake foreign trade, 
investment and borrowings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 
SINCE 1979 : REFORM AND REVERSAL 
OBJECTIVE 
In its Interim Report published in 1979, the Commission of 
Inquiry reached an overall recommendation that South Africa 
should adopt a unitary exchange rate system with market 
determined spot and forward rates for the rand. In order 
to meet certain objectives the Reserve Bank would intervene 
in the market as a buyer or seller of foreign currency. 
The period subsequent to 1979 represented a period of major 
reforms which resulted in participants in the market 
achieving significantly higher degrees of economic freedom. 
The deqlaration of the partial debt standstill and the 
reintroduction of major direct controls in. September 1985 
signified the end of the reform process. The objective of 
this chapter is twofold; firstly, to analyse developments 
and changes in the past Commission of Inquiry era and to 
measure the effects that these developments have had on the 
economic freedom pf market partic~pants, and ~econdly, to 
list the restrictions in place so as to provide a 
background to the statistical tests of efficiency 
undertaken in Part 2 of the thesis. Economic efficiency 
and an efficient. market, for the purpose of this chapter, 
is measured and defined as a market that is free of 
exchange controls and restrictions on traders to transact 
in foreign exchange. 
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3.1. ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS TO THE DEBT STANDSTILL IN 
1985 
3.1.1 THE SPOT MARKET 
The first steps in the reform process materialised when the 
Reserve Bank continued to quote bid and ask rates to the 
authorised dealers but varied these rates more frequently. 
The authorised dealers were no longer obliged to quote 
prescribed bid-offer rates set by the Reserve Bank. The 
immediate effect of this policy was a significant narrowing 
of the bid-ask spread. 
The previous fixed spread of 0. 5 percent narrowed to O. 1 
percent for amounts greater than R2000. (Gidlow, 1980[b] 
p .15). This reflected increased competition amongst the 
authorised dealers to offer clients competitive rates. The 
significant reduction in the transaction co'sts incurred by 
firms dealing in foreign exchange reflected an improvement 
in economic efficiency. 
' In September 1979, the Reserve Bank ceased quoting a 
dealing rate on the Reuter's monitor. Instead, a dealing 
rate would be quoted to dealers on individual enquiries or 
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transactions. _The Reuter' s monitor merely reflected the 
last transaction's dealing rate by the Reserve Bank. 
· This represented an essential step by the Reserve Bank in 
disengaging from the foreign exchange market and encouraged 
the independent quoting of rates by the authorised dealers. 
However, at this stage the Reserve Bank did not use the new 
flexible arrangements to alter the value of the rand as 
frequently as would be expected to occur in an efficient 
market. The dealers were also allowed, subject to limits, 
to trade for their own account. The interbank market was 
however limited by the· open position restrictions placed 
upon the deal~rs as a consequence of the Exchange Control 
regulations. 
In order to create a more balanced spot market, and as a 
further step in the disengagement process by the Reserve 
Bank from the spot market, the U.S. dollar proceeds of 
Krugerrand and diamond sales by the mining sector · would 
flow through directly to :the market rather than to the 
Reserve Bank (Commission of Inquiry Final Report, 1984 
para. 11.11). This had the effect of improving the rates 
obtained by the mining companies as the U.S. dollars were 
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offered to dealers providing the most competitive bid U.S. 
dollar rates. 
The Reserve Bank decided to reduce the transaction costs in 
rela'tion to transactions with the authorised dealers by 
reducing the bid-ask spread from 29 points to 20 points. 
The reduced spread was still significantly wider than the· 
bid-ask spread of approximately 10 points found in the 
interbank market. 
The inconsistent spreads resulted in economic 
inefficiencies due to the fact that firstly, if .the Reserve 
Bank's mid-rate was close to the mid-rate in the market, 
then this would result in dealers not trading with the 
Reserve Bank as better rates were available in the 
interbank market. Secondly, if the Reserve Bank quoted 
either a bid or ask rate which was close to that quoted in 
the interbank market and the Reserve Bank maintained a 20 
point spread, then this would lead to one way business with 
the Reserve Bank(Gidlow,1980[b] : p.15). 
In paragraph 152 of the Commission of Inquiry Interim 
Report, the commission states that market forces should be 
allowed to determine the rand/U. S. dollar exchange rate 
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subject to Reserve Bank intervention. . This implies that 
intervention should be subordinate to market factors in the 
determination of the exchange rate. Intervention was seen 
as necessary to smooth out short-term fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. Although there is ambiguity in the Interim 
Report on the objectives of intervention, the overqll 
conclusion is that market factors should be the major 
determinant of the exchange rate(Geldenhuys, 1980 : p.415). 
In contrast to the system of quoting fixed bid-ask rates, 
the Commission envisaged a system whereby the Reserve Bank 
influenced the exchange rate only by intervening in the 
market.as a buyer or seller of foreign currency. 
The Reserve Bank was however reluctant to intervene 
directly in the market during the course of 1979. It was 
easier to alter the exchange rate by adjusting the quoted 
bid-ask rates than by altering rates through the mechanism 
of intervention (Gidlow[b],1980 p.17). When it did 
intervene the Reserve Bank matched intervention with 
measures which were economically inefficient (Gidlow, 
1980[b] : p.17). 
The imbalance in the spot market reflected the fact that a 
large share of the country's export proceeds, namely the 
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U.S. dollar proceeds from gold bullion sales, flowed 
directly to the Reserve Bank. Therefore, the authorised 
dealers were obliged, on a net' basis, to purchase U.S. 
dollars from the Reserve Bank. The dealers would have 
pref erred direct intervention in the market by the Reserve 
Bank undertaking sales of U.S. dollars at market rates 
rather than being obliged to purchase U.S. dollars directly 
from the Reserve Bank at the unfavourable offer rates (due 
to the large bid-ask spread). 
When the Reserve Bank did decide to intervene by selling 
U.S. dollars ·in the market, . this was accompanied by the 
·Reserve Bank immediately raising its dealing rates which 
implied that dealers who purchased U.S. dollars from the 
Reserve Bank and then proceeded to sell U.S. dollars back 
to the Reserve Bank would incur a loss. This policy 
resulted in economic inefficiencies as the Reserve Bank 
misused its position of rec'ipient of U.S. dollars (due to 
direct controls) to earn risk-free profits at the expense 
of the dealers. 
Intervention fueled expectations that the Reserve Bank 
would alter its dealing rates. This created uncertainty in 
the market and the dealers incurred co"sts in moni taring 
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Reserve Bank interventions due to the effects this would 
have on th~ Reserve Bank's bid-ask rates. Large flows of 
U.S. dollars into the market would result in an absence of 
buyers due to the expected upward revision in Reserve Bank 
rates. 
Although the Commission recommended a market related 
exchange rate system, the exact objectives of the proposed 
system were not clear. In paragraph 149 the Commission 
proposes a "system with a managed, market determined rate 
for an independent and flexible Commercial rand". This 
represents a contradiction of terms as a market determined 
rate cannot represent a managed rate. A market determined 
exchange rate implies a free floating exchange rate system. 
However, the Commission in its longer term recommendation 
did not .propose a free floating exchange rate system. 
Therefore, the Commission proposes that the market will 
provide the signals for movements in the exchange rate, and 
the Reserve Bank would influence the exchange rate by 
selling or buying U.S. dollars in the market. 
The Reserve Bank expanded the Securities rand mechanism, 
which became known as the Financial rand, and non-residents 
were now able to undertake direct equity investments and 
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acquire the proprietor's interest in South African assets 
at the Financial rand rate. Non-residents were however 
required to obtain Reserve Bank approval in the case of 
direct equity investments. This change in the use of the 
Financial rand encouraged foreign investment and economic 
efficiency as direct equity investment and divestment 
occurred via the Financial rand. This was in contrast to 
the previous system whereby investment occurred via the 
Commercial rand and divestment occurred via the Securities 
rand. 
Al though the Reserve Bank started adjusting its dealing 
rates daily, this policy still reflected a form of varia_ble 
U.S. dollar pegging. The Reserve Bank preferred to simply 
adjust rates rather than influence rates via intervention 
in the market. The Reserve Bank however did apply a more 
flexible system in quoting its bid-ask rates. On 13 July 
1981, for instance, the Reserve Bank made approximately 25 
changes to its spot bid~ask rates (Gidlow,1982[a] : p.36). 
In 1983 the authorities implemented significant reform 
measures. The Minister of Finance announced on 5 February 
1983 that exchange control would be lifted on non-resident 
assets on 7 February 1983. This had the immediate effect 
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of eliminating South Africa's dual exchange rate system and 
satisfying the longer term recommendation of the Commission 
of Inquiry Interim Report, namely the institution of a 
unitary exchange rate system. The lifting of exchange 
control over non-residents eliminated a major inefficiency 
in the country's foreign exchange market. As the editorial 
I 
in the Investment Analysts Journal (1983, p.5) stated: 
"The removal of exchange control in respect of 
non-residents in February was an important step 
towards the establishment in South Africa of an 
efficient foreign exchange market.~ 
The dual exchange rate system implied that the authorities 
had by the imposition and administration of regulations 
divided the market for foreign currency into two separate 
markets. This arbitrarily created welfare gains for 
certain groups and carried welfare costs for other groups. 
Due to the significant discount on the Financial. rand vis-
a-vis the Commercial rand, a unitary exchange rate would 
have historically if!1plied a lower exchange rate. 
Therefore, the Financial rand system resulted in, ceteris 
paribus, welfare losses for exporters and welfare gains for 
importers. 
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The dual exchange rate system created profit opportunities 
for parties to undertake transac~ions which would result in 
leakages to occur from one market to the other. It also 
resulted in the incurrence of high policing costs by the 
exchange control authorities and dealers to try and prevent 
market leakages. 
In March 1983, the Reserve Bank raised the overall limit on 
foreign currency balances held by the authorised dealers to 
R600 million. This measure added depth to the market as it 
enabled dealers to maintain positions and transact in 
foreign currency for their own account. A few foreign 
exchange brokers entered the market al though . their 
operations were subject to rules set by the Reserve Bank. 
In late August 1983 the authorities decided that from 5 
September, the gold mines would be paid the proceeds on the 
sale of gold bullion in U.S. dollars, and would therefore 
be regarded as any other exporter. This implied that the 
gold mines would have to exchange their U.S. dollar 
proceeds into rands within seven days of receipt. However, 
this still represented a major reform as the market would 
r· 
receive a large supply of U.S. dollars directly and 
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therefore overcome a major structural weakness in the 
market, that is, the imbalance between the supply and 
demand for U.S. dollars. 
The gold mines were able to negotiate more competitive 
of fer rates in the market as compared to the of fer rates 
quoted by the Reserve Bank. This reform went further than 
the recommendations set out in the Commission Interim 
Report. In paragraph 168(f) the Commission expressly did 
not recommend that the right to the U.S. dollar proceeds on 
the sale of gold bullion should be transferred from the 
Reserve Bank to the foreign exchange market. 
The Reserve Bank also ceased quoting spot bid-ask rates and 
would in future influence the spot rate, if necessary, 
through the mechanism of intervention. There£ ore, the 
Reserve Bank implemented an important recommendation of the 
Commission Interim Report, that - is, the adoption of a 
managed floating rate system for the Commercial rand. 
It has been stated that "the lack of a well developed spot 
exchange market hampered the development of an active 
forward market" ( Strydom and Dagut, 1979 p.122). The 
reverse is also true. The existence of a highly regulated 
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forward market would limit the development of a fre~ and 
competitive spot market. In an efficient market there is 
an effective integration of the spot and forward markets. 
This results in the equality of financing costs(apart from 
differences due to transaction costs and capital controls) 
as indicated by the cov,ered interest rate parity theory. 
Therefore, the. reform measures introduced by the Reserve 
Bank in the forward market (as explained further in this 
chapter) represented further steps in the development of 
the spot and forward markets into active and competitive 
markets. 
By September 1983 the spot market had developed into a 
relatively competitive market and, if not entirely 
econom,ically efficient due to the existence of the 
remaining Exchange Control regulations over residents and 
foreign controlled companies, the market compared 
favourably with many first world countries in relation to 
the degree of economic freedom available to market 
participants. 
The significant reforms in 1983 led to a major increase in 
the size of the interbank market. The Reserve Bank had 
ceased prescribing the dealers' rates to the public and and 
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ceased quoting f i_xed rates in its transactions with the 
dealers. The bid-ask spreads narrowed considerably. The 
U.S. dollar proceeds on the sales of gold bullion flowed 
directly into the foreign exchange market thereby 
correcting the previous structural imbalance in the market. 
The dealers were allowed to maintain open positions 
subject to increased limits. These measures had increased 
the economic freedom of traders to transact in foreign 
exchange. 
In the course of 1984 the rand depreciated by 38 percent 
against the U.S. dollar. Movements in the value of the 
rand became more volatile. Leads and lags effects resulted 
in a decline in the foreign exchange reserves of the 
Reserve Bank. The dramatic decline in the rand created 
political pressures on the authorities to control the 
exchange rate and thereby reverse the degree of economic 
freedom implemented in terms of the Commission of Inquiry's 
Interim Report. 
The levels of the Reserve Bank's foreign currency reserves 
did not enable the authorities to influence the exchange 
rate through the mechanism of intervention. Therefore, 
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the authorities decided to reinstate certain direct 
controls. 
The first steps in the reversal of the reform process led 
to the ruling on 30 January 1985 that the Reserve Barik 
would pay the gold mines half their proceeds on the sale of 
gold bullion in U.S. dollars and the other half would be 
paid in rands. The Commission 
policy as a "temporary" measure 
defined this change in 
(Commission of Inquiry 
Final Report, 1984 para. 12.4). The objective of the 
change in policy was to "enable the Reserve Bank to 
exercise greater influence on the exchange market on a 
continuous basis at a time of abnormal conditions in the 
world's foreign exchange markets"(Cornmission of Inquiry 
Final report,1984 : p.126). The volatile behaviour of the 
exchange rate in a floating rate system has · been 
criticized. Cloete(1986) and Holden and Holden(1985) have 
proposed a more managed exchange rate to promote price 
stability. 
The movement in the quarterly rand spot exchange 
rate(direct quotation) against the U.S. dollar, the 
Japanese yen and British sterling is depicted in Figure 
3.1. The end of the first quarter of 1979 represents the 
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base of 100. As is e.vident from Figure . 3 .1, the rand 
reported a significant decline in relation to the major 
currenci~s over the period 1979-1987. 
FIGURE 3.1 THE RAND SPOT EXCHANGE RATE 
QUARTERLY DATA (31/3/1979 = 100) 
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3.1.2 THE FORWARD MARKET 
At the time of the Commission of Inquiry's Interim Report 
the forward market represented a highly regulated market. 
The cost of forward cover was set at arbitrary levels and 
did not reflect covered interest parity. Arbitrage 
activities would ensure that interest rate parity would 
hold in a free and competitive market. ·The Reserve Bank 
also restricted the type of foreign currency transactions 
for which forward cover was available. The Reserve Bank, 
provided forward cover to the authorised dealers on an 
outright basis which indicated that forward sales/purchases 
did not affect the spot exchange rate, 
transactions would on maturity affect the 
exchange reserves. 
al though forward I 
country's foreign 
In an efficient market dealers would cover their forward 
exchange liabilities(asse~s) by purchasing(selling) foreign 
currency in the spot market. Therefore, in an efficient 
market there is an effective integration of the spot and 
forward markets. 
The fact that forward transactions did not directly affect 
the spot exchange rate represented a major inefficiency in 
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the South African foreign exchange market due to the size 
of.the forward exchange market. It has been reported that, 
for instance, in the first quarter of 1981 the total value 
of foreign exchange transactions between the Reserve Bank 
and the authorised dealers amounted to R6. 8 bi 11 ion. Of 
this amount, 59 percent or R4 billion represented forward 
transactions (Stals, 1981 : p.88). 
In the period 1979 to 1985, the Reserve Bank implemented 
major reforms in the forward market. In April 1979, the 
Reserve Bank ceased quoting a 1 p~rcent premium for both 
importers and exporters on forward cover and commenced 
quoting a 2 percent discount for importers and a 2 percent 
premium for exporters. 
The Reserve Bank therefore removed the practice of quoting 
two prices. for the same commodity. The 2 percent forward 
cost/benefit reflected the interest differential between 
South African and u. S. rates at the time (Ross, 1980. 
p. 9). 
In the period May 1979 to April 1980, the Reserve Bank set 
the three month forward rate at 2.5 percent per annum (i.e. 
the forward U.S. dollar rate was at a discount of 2.5 
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percent against the spot rate). This was despite the fact 
that the interest differential between South Africa and the 
USA had widened considerably during the same period. South 
African rates had declined while the U.S. rates had 
increased. 
This prompted importers to pay immediately for imports due 
to the low effective cost of finan9ing. Ross (1980, p.12) 
states that importers requested discounts which were; 
"pitched at a level which took into account the 
cost to the importer of financing himself in 
South Africa for this additional period, but 
nonetheless made it attractive for the foreign 
.exporter to receive cash at an .earlier stage and 
thereby reduce his (very expensive) foreign 
overdraft." 
The material difference between the cost of local and 
foreign trade finance (including the cost of forward cover) 
until March 1980 is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
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Exporters and importers "set ab6ut changing their terms of 
trade to take advantage of what. became increasingly 
attractive means of financing South African trade" 
(Ross,1980: p.11). The increase in U. S. rates and the 
decline in local interest rates, combined with a forward 
U.S. dollar discount that was substantially less than the 
difference in U.S. and South African rates meant that 
exporters were in a position to grant foreign customers 
extended credit terms at low cost. Importers .were 
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encouraged to pay for goods immediately due to low domestic 
interest rates. Foreign suppliers appreciated early 
payment due to the high cost of financing in foreign 
centres. Mutual·benefits could be apportioned through the 
pricing mechanism. 
The increase in the U.S. dollar price of gold led to a 
significant inflow of liquidity. The Reserve Bank's· 
forward policy of setting the U.S. dollar· discount at a 
rate substantially less than the interest differential had 
the counter effect of encouraging foreign currency outflows 
due to the fact that importers were encouraged to pay 
immediately while exporters were encouraged to grant 
extended credit terms. 
Although this policy may have countered to some degree, the 
inflationary effects of the liquidity inflow, it affected 
economic efficiency through its discretionary welfare 
effects. In a floating exchange rate system foreign 
currency inf lows would _be compensated by an increase in the 
exchange rate. · The Reserve Bank was unwilling to allow the 
rand to appreciate to the level required and therefore 
manipulated the forward exchange rate. The effect was that 
South African consumers did not fully benefit from the 
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potential supply of less expensive imported goods . 
Exporters benefited due to a lower exchange rate. The 
maintenance of low interest rates indicated that borrowers 
benefited at the expense of lenders. 
The imbalance in the forward market and the provision of 
forward cover to the parastatal organisations on off shore 
borrowings at low cost resulted in significant foreign 
exchange losses on the Reserve Bank's forward account. The 
Reserve Bank followed the dubious accounting procedure of 
setting off losses· on the forward account, which 
-
represented a cash flow item, against the revaluation gains 
on the Reserve Bank's gold reserves which represented a 
book entry. The Reserve Bank is estimated to have lost 
R2 billion in providing forward cover facilities to 
parastatal organisations as well as the private sector in 
the year to March 1985 (Gidlow,1986[b] : p.252). 
From December 1979 the Reserve Bank commenced quoting 
forward cover to the public sector only on the rand/U. S. 
dollar leg of foreign transactions. Forward cover on the 
U. s. dollar /third currency leg was arranged through the 
authorised dealers who obtained the required forward cover 
on overseas foreign exchange markets. This precluded the 
--
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parastatal organisations from borrowing in the hard 
currencies like the_ deutschemark and Swiss franc at an 
effectively low financing rate ( includirig the cost of 1 
percent per - annum on forward cover) while the Treasury 
carried significant losses due to the appreciation of these 
currencies. 
The change in policy led to an improvement in economic 
efficiency due to _.the fact that the -favourable forward 
cover policy granted to the parastatal organisations 
influenced the decision to obtain finance in centres 
different to that if the forward rate was set in an 
efficient market. This was due to the _fact that the major 
cost· of obtaining finance in these centres (the risk of 
currency appreciation) was borne by the Treasury (i.e. the 
taxpayer). 
In-April 1980, the Reserve Bank increased its three month 
forward cover rate from 2.5 percent to 12 percent per 
annum. As depicted in Figure 3.2, this ref 1ected, the 
interest differential between U.S. and South African 
interest rates. Therefore the costs of financing were 
equalised- over the two currencies. 
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In December 1980, the Reserve Bank commenced quoting a full 
range of forward maturities. The Reserve Bank manipulated 
forward margins for specific maturities to "encourage OJ;" 
discourage covered foreign financing in the selected 
maturities" (Commission of Inquiry Final Report, 1984 . . 
para.11.20). 
11.20 that, 
The Commission further states in paragraph 
"the rate for the forward U.S. dollar was at 
times set at a level that was more attractive to 
importers than to exporters, so that the Bank 
tended to sell more U.S. dollars forward than 
spot." 
The former statement implies that the. Reserve Bank's 
forward . margins did not reflect interest differentials 
thereby creating opportunities for parties to engage in 
profitable covered interest arbitrage activities. 
Therefore, importers and exporters would finance trade from 
either domestic or foreign sources depending on the 
relative costs of financing (including the cost of forward 
cover) in each centre. 
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The latter statement implies that the Reserve Bank followed 
a policy of setting the forward U.S. dollar discount at a 
rate greater than that indicated by interest differentials. 
Local interest rates were lower than U.S. rates at the 
time. Importers would prefer to use foreign trade credits 
and undertake a forward contract rather than borrow from 
local sources, if the forward U.S. dollar discount more 
than off set the higher foreign interest rates. This 
indicated a reversal of the previous policy during the 
course of 1979 and early 1980. of setting the forward U.S. 
dollar discount at a rate significantly less than the 
interest differential. 
The above Commission statements are incomplete. Firstly, 
the Reserve Bank would be a net seller of forward U.S. 
dollars due to the structural imbalance in the market. 
Secondly, if general expectations were that the rand would 
not appreciate to the extent indicated by the forward U.S. 
dollar discount then importers would gain by purchasing 
forward U.S. dollars at a more favourable rate. 
The Reserve Bank's forward policy reduced the immediate 
pressures on it's foreign exchange reserves. However, it 
also meant that .the increase in forward commitments may not 
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have been reflected in the spot rate. Forward sales 
affected the foreign exchange reserves at the time the 
Reserve Bank met its forward commitments rather than at the 
time of entering into the outright forward deals. If the 
market is efficient, then it can be argued that the current 
spot rate will immediately reflect the effect that forward 
sales will have on the future spot rate. However, the fact 
that the authorised dealers bought the required forward 
U.S. dollars on an outright basis and were precluded from 
purchasing the foreign currency on the spot market due to 
Exchange Control regulations, meant that the spot market 
was not directly affected by' these forward sales. 
Although the spot exchange rate is not directly influenced 
by forward transactions, changes in the Reserve Bank's 
foreign exchange reserves may lead to a revision in 
expectations about future spot rates and this would thereby 
influence the current exchange rate. In Chapter 7, we test 
the relationship between changes in the spot rate and 
changes in the Reserve Bank' s foreign exchange reserves. 
Tests indicate that a positive, statistically significant 
relationship exists between these two variables. 
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In September 1983, the authorities introduced a spot/swap 
system of forward exchange. This was in contrast to the 
previous system of the Reserve Bank granting forward cover 
to the authorised dealers on an outright basis on their net 
forward po_si tions. In terms of the spot/swap system, 
dealers were obliged to obtain forward cover on their net 
forward U.S. dollar sales commitments by purchasing the 
, 
required amount of U.S. dollars on the spot market. 
Dealers would then be obliged to arrange a swap transaction 
whereby these U.S. dollars would be sold spot and 
simultaneously purchased forward. Dealers were encouraged 
to arrange the necessary swap transactions in the market, 
however, the Reserve Bank would be prepared .to enter into 
the required swap transactions with the authorised dealers 
if this was not possible. This was the likely position due 
to the structural imbalance in South Africa's foreign 
trade, whereby most of the export sales proceeds are 
received immediately while imports are purchased on credit. 
The spot/swap system represented an .attempt to simµlate an 
efficient and competitive market without ordering the 
required dismantling of Exchange Control. Forward 
transactions had an immediate effect upon the spot exchange 
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rate. This was in contrast to the previous administered 
system whereby forward sales did not . directly affect the 
spot exchange rate. 
Further, although the authorities were able to simulate an 
efficient market by for example setting the cost of forward 
cover on the basis of interest differentials, economic 
efficiency was not fully achieved. This was due to the 
fact that the arrangements still carried the risk of loss 
to the Treasury if the Reserve Bank's forward commitments 
were not covered by the Reserve Bank depositing the 
required foreign'currency amounts in the Eurodollar .market. 
An efficient and competitive forward market "is based on 
the access of both residents and non-residents to deposit 
markets in the relevant currencies" (Gidlow, 
1984[d] . . p.249). If a bank sells $10 million six months 
forward in exchange for delivery of rands at that time, 
then in terms of this transaction the bank will be short 
$10 million and long in rands. To cover its foreign 
exchange position, ·the bank will borrow rands and purchase 
$10 million on the spot market. The bank would then 
invest $10 million in the Eurodollar market until the 
maturity date of the forward contract in six months time. 
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The difference in interest paid and interest received ~ill 
be charged to the client as the cost of forward cover. 
This explains why the cost of forward cover should reflec,t 
interest differentials. 
The Exchange Control limits on maintaining open foreign 
currency positions precluded the dealers from purchasing 
U.S. dollars spot to cover net forward U.S. dollar 
commitments and depositing ·these funds in the Eurodollar 
market. The swap facility granted by the Reserve Bank to 
the dealers, to purchase(on balance) spot U.S. dollars and 
simultaneously sell forward U.S. dollars, represented a 
major improvement in economic efficiency as forward 
transactions had a direct effect on the spot rate. 
However, the Treasury still carried losses on the Reserve 
Bank's forward account as the Reserve bank, due to the 
state of its foreign exchange reserves, was unwilling to 
cover its position by purchasing the amount of net foreign 
currency forward commitments in the spot market. 
The state of the Reserve bank's foreign exchange reserves 
played a central role in the decision by the Commission not 
to recommend the immediate creation of a developed forward 
exchange market. 
would have an 
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It was stated that such a development 
"undue strain" on the official foreign 
reserves (Commission of Inquiry Interim 
Report,1979 para. 212). However, under a free floating 
exchange rate system, the adjustment would occur through 
the exchange rate rather than through the reserves. 
Foreign exchange reserves are needed only when the rate of 
·exchange is kept above its market value 
(Rees, 1979 p. 93 r 
According to Geldenhuys (1980, p.418) the lack of 
development of a competitive forward market in South Africa 
was due to the fact that the rand was not a; 
"truly internationally accepted currency. 
Because foreign banks will not readily sell U.S. 
dollars, German marks (OM), sterling, etc., 
against rand on a· large scale, local banks are 
just not · in a position to arrange direct and 
forward cover internationally. These 
circumstances leave no alternative but for the 
Reserve Bank to be provider of forward cover 
against at least one foreign currency. The most 
efficient way in which to do this is to simulate 
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the conditions .that would prevail in a true 
forward market" 
In the period 1983 to 1985 the forward market developed 
into a more · competitive market with the. banks undertaking 
swap and forward transactions in the interbank market 
rather than the previous situation where all forward 
transactions were undertaken with the ·Reserve Bank. 
Dr R. M. Gidlow of the Reserve Bank and Mr C. Viettri of· 
First National Bank confirmed that, except for the debt 
standstill, the forward market would have developed into a 
1 "competitive" market 
The Reserve Bank entered into a quota system whereby the 
Reserve Bank would be able to disengage ·itself from the 
forward market by 31 August 1986. This would enabie the 
Reserve Bank to limit its exposure to losses on the forward 
exchange account. The Reserve Bank entered into swap quota 
agreements with the authorised dealers whereby the Reserve 
Bank would provide each dealer with forward exchange up to 
the quota limit. 
1. Private interviews with the writer in Pretoria (8/7/86) and Johannesburg 
(9/7 /86). 
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The swap quota agreements totalleq RlO billion but · this 
amount would be reduced to nil by equal amounts over three 
years. It was envisaged that after 30 September 1986 the 
Reserve Bank would no longer provide forward cover to the 
authorised dealers, and losses would be limited to 
intervention undertaken by the Reserve Bank in the forward 
market. Forward rates would be market determined. 
The reversal of the reform process occurred due to the 
dramatic decline in the rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate. In 
order to limit the pressures on the spot exchange rate the 
authorities decided to offer a dual forward exchange 
facility on the sale of U.S. dollars by the Reserve Bank. 
Authorised dealers were able to obtain forward cover either 
through a swap arrangement or else through the purchase of 
forward U.S. dollars on an outright basis. Swap 
transactions placed direct downward pressures on the spot 
exchange rate, while the outright sale of forward U.S. 
dollars did not involve the purchase of U.S. dollars in the 
spot market. 
The Reserve Bank encouraged the dealers to purchase forward 
U.S. dollars on an outright basis by setting more 
favourable forward rates on forward U.S. dollars sold on an 
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outright basis compared to forward U.S. dollars sol~ under 
the swap arrangements. The Reserve Bank by encouraging 
outright deals vis-a-vis the swap arrangements, reduced to 
some degree the downward pressure on the spot rand/U. S. 
dollar rate. 
Gidlow (1985, p.227) states that, 
"The dual exchange rate system was· partly 
justified on the grounds that leads and lags had 
depressed the rand unduly, and action was 
warranted to reverse this trertd" 
This policy represented a departure from the stated policy 
of allowing the exchange rate to be market determined. The 
Reserve Bank manipulated the price of forward cover in 
order.to increase the value of the spot exchange rate. 
This resulted in a loss in economic efficiency as the dual 
forward exchange rate policy represented a direct 
interference in the market mechanism. It precluded the 
purchase of forward U.S. dollars from directly influencing 
the spot rate. However, the increase iri forward 
commitments by the Reserve Bank could lead to expectations 
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that the rand would further depreciate in the future, and 
this could result in downward pressures on the spot rate. 
I 
For example, the fact that significant forward commitments 
were to be met within a certain time period may lead • 
importers to pay immediately while exporters would prefer 
to lag foreign currency receipts. 
The dual forward exchange rate policy also resulted in two 
prices being quoted for .the same commodity. This enabled 
the authorised dealers to undertake arbitrage transactions 
with the Reserve Bank, and thereby earn risk free profits 
(Gidlow,1985 p. 228). 
. Another inefficiency occurred ·due to the fact that the 
forward sale of U.S. dollars by ~xporters was still 
conducted by means of spot/swap transactions. Therefore, 
exporters were placed in a disadvantaged position relative 
to importers • The increased forward commitments by the 
Reserve Bank had the effect of increasing the imbalance on 
its forward exchange account. 
Due to the disadvantages of the dual forward exchange 
policy, the Reserve Bank "within a few weeks withdrew the 
privilege whereby banks could buy U.S. dollars forward from 





basis at favourable rates" 
The stated objective of the Reserve Bank to disengage from 
providing forward cover to the dealers by the September 
1986 was based on the implicit assumption that the 
necessary. swap facilities would be available in the 
interbank market. In the course of 1985 this became an 
increasingly unrealistic objective. This was due to two 
reasons; firstly, the structural imbalance in the forward 
market and secondly, the Exchange Control limits placed on 
the dealers maintaining open foreign cur:c-ency positions. 
The· imbalance. in the forward market was exacerbated by the 
Reserve Bank paying . to the mines from the end of _January 
1985 only 50 percerit of the proceeds on gold bullion sales 
in U.S. dollars. 
The total limit on dealers holding foreign ·currency 
balances amounted to R600 million. This was inadequate in 
a foreign exchange market where transactions were estimated 
to total approximately R30 billion. Therefore, the 
authorised dealers would not be in a position to grant 
forward cover to traders without Reserve Bank support. 
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The development of the forward market was hampered by the 
inability and unwillingness of the authorities to remove 
Exchange Control . The forward market had become a more 
active and efficient market in comparison to the position 
prior to the Commission of Inquiry Interim Report. The 
cost of forward cover was based upon interest 
differentials. This sho,uld occur in an efficient market. 
There were no longer two quoted prices for forward u. s. 
dollars. The parastatal organisations were precluded from 
undertaking further foreign borrowings at a low forward 
cover cost in currencies which would probably appreciate 
significantly against the rand. However, Exchange Control 
and the political pressures placed upon the authorities by 
the decline of the rand prevented the forward market from 
becoming a free and efficient market. 
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3.1.3 EXCHANGE CONTROL 
The ineffectiveness of exchange control in protecting the 
foreign exchange reserves and the fact that exchange 
control acted as a deterrent to foreign investment led the 
authorities to initiate steps in removing or amending the 
Exchange Cont'rol regulations. Economic efficiency would be 
enhanced by the market rather than the authorities 
rationing foreign exchange. The limits on capital 
transfers abroad by residents and emmigrants were raised. 
The major reform, however, constituted the lifting of 
Exchange Control over non-residents thereby effectively 
abolishing the Financial rand mechanism. The overall limit 
on the foreign currency balances held by authorised dealers 
was raised to R600 million. This was, however, still 
insufficient to enable the dealers to provide the forward 
cover required by traders in the South African foreign 
exchange market. Further, foreign assets did not qualify 
a$ "liquid assets" in terms of the Bank's Act. 
Foreign exchange brokers were allowed to operate in the 
market (subject to Reserve Bank rules). The Reserve Bank 
applied a more liberal policy in allocating foreign 
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exchange for purposes of direct foreign investment by South 
African companies. The restriction, contained in Section 
3(l)(f), on local borrowing by foreign controlled companies 
was relaxed. 
The period 1979 to ~985 reflected a period of exchange 
control relaxation in terms of 9hanges to the Exchange 
Control .regulations and application qf. existing 
regulations. The major reforms occurred in the spot and 
forward . markets, al though the author! ties pref erred to 
follow a piecemeal relaxation of exchange controls rather 
than instituting overall changes. 
The ineffectiveness of Exchange Control is suggested by.the 
large short-term capital outflows under the item "Private 
Sector Short-term Capital Flows" which includes unrecorded 
transactions! The item "Private Sector Short-term Capital 
Flows" is depicted in Figure 3.3. This item is a balancing 
figure. and may be a measure of '.'capital flight". The large 
capital outflows in_1984, particularly 1985, 1986 and 1988 
suggest that Ex.change Control has not been successful in 
restricting capital outflows. 
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3.2 THE FOREIGN DEBT STANDSTILL AND EXCHANGE CONTROL 
3.2.1 BACKGROUND TO THE FOREIGN DEBT STANDSTILL -
In the course of 1984 the rand depreciated by 38 percent 
against the U.S. dollar. This placed political pressures 
upon the Reserve Bank's policy of allowing market factors 
to determine the rand exchange rate, and added impetus for 
the re~imposition of direct controls. In 1985 the position 
was further exacerbated by widespread political· 
disturbances. The imposition of the state of emergency, 
French sanctions and the 11 Rubicon 11 speech in Durb_an had a 
materially negative impact on overseas perceptions. The 
run on the financial system was precipitated by the 
decision by w. Butler, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank to 
call in his bank's short-term loans. This led to other 
U.S. banks following suit. 
The position was 'exacerbated by the fact the South Africa 
had undertaken significant levels of short-term debt in the 
1982-1984 period. The weak state of the Reserve Bank Is 
foreign exchange reserves further complicated the 
situation. Capital flowing out of South Africa reached 
material proportions. 
100 
By August 27, the rand had depreciated to U.S. $0.35. The 
Reserve Bank and the Government decided to close the 
foreign exchange and stock markets immediately. 
On September 2, the Reserve Bank declared the foreign debt 
standstill. As Grant (1985), p.73) states; 
"South Africa unilaterally applied a freeze on 
repayments of principal on its foreign debt, for 
four months, and became the first sovereign 
debtor to renege on its short-term interbank 
lines." 
Certain forms of debt were exempt from the standstill 
including government debt and IMF loans. The total foreign 
debt was estimated to be $24 billion of which $14 billion 
fell within the standstill "net". Credi tors affected by 
the standstill could decide to either leave the loans- in 
place with the initial borrowers or transfer the loans on 
to the Reserve Bank to earn a rate of one quarter percent 
above LIBOR. 
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The Financial rand mechanism was reintroduced to ."curb .any 
possible accompanying outflow of non-resident equity funds" 
(De Kock, 1986 p .10). This was matched by the 
imposition of further direct controls to support the value 
of the rand. 
The debt problem was not due to overborrowing, but due to 
the structure of foreign · debt. In 1977, political 
disturbances did not have a significant effect on capital 
withdrawal as the major part of foreign debt constituted 
long-term loans. In 1985 short-term debt amounted to a 
significant proportion of South Africa's total foreign debt 
and this made. South Africa "vulnerable to a run ·on the 
interbank market"(Grant,1985 .. . p.68) 
Figure 3. 4 reflects the .. changing structure( in rands) of 
South African foreign debt from 198.0 to 1985. In 1980 
short-term debt constituted 49 percent of South Africa's 
total foreign debt whereas in 1985, short-term debt 
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The foreign debt standstili indicated major weaknesses in 
the South African foreign exchange market • Certain South 
• 
African banks had engaged in maturity mismatching, 
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borrowing short and lending long and had maintained 
uncovered foreign exchange positions. The sudden 
withdrawal of foreign credit lines placed these banks in 
serious financial difficulties. Overseas branches of local 
banks were closed .. The imprudent policies of the banks led 
to ·the adoption of a new banking bill which included 
capital requirements for off-balance sheet liabilities 
(i.e. banks acting as guarantors for client loans, see 
De Kock, 1985 p.12) and applied limits to banks 
maintaining open foreign exchange positions and mismatching 
maturities. 
The debt standstill and overseas political perceptions 
resulted in the absence of foreign finance and this 
represented an effective imposition of capital sanctions. 
The foreign debt situation also made it imperative that 
South Africa generate the necessary current account 
surpluses to generate the foreign currency required to 
repay the foreign debt. 
Political disturbances and economic recession placed 
pressures upon foreign companies to disinvest. In the 
three years to March 1987, the number of American firms 
with factories or offices in South Africa declined from 
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over 325 to 182 (Beatty and Harari, 1987 p. 32). 
American companies which decided to "disinvest" included 
Apple Computer, General Electric, IBM, Rank Xerox and 
General Motors. The statement by Beatty and Harari(1987) 
that direct equity investment in South Africa declined from 
$2.6 billion in 1981 to $1.3 billion in 1985 is misleading 
due to the sharp decline in the rand/U.S. dollar rate over 
that period. The fundamental fact is that new capital 
inflows have declined materially. 
3.2.2 EXCHANGE CONTROL 
The foreign debt standstill was accompanied · by the 
effective reversal of the reform process. Reforms were 
reversed and further direct controls were reimposed. The 
introduction of the various reforms had increased economic 
efficiency as measured by the degree of economic freedom 
al lowed to participants in the foreign exchange market. 
The imposition of direct controls reflected a loss in 
economic efficiency as measured by the restrictions placed 
upon traders and dealers in foreign exchange. The 
Commission of Inquiry report has become inef factual and 
perhaps irrelevant. The following reflect measures which 
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presently restrict economic freedom in transacting in 
foreign exchange. 
1. Non-residents may invest and disinvest from South 
Africa via the · Financial rand if permitted by the 
Exchange Control authorities. Permission is not 
required for investment in quoted securities. As 
income flows through the Commercial rand, returns to 
non-residents are magnified in · relation to local 
investors. The dual exchange rate system m.ay ·create 
opportunities for gain due to market leakages. 
2. The purchase of equity in non quoted companies and the 
purchase of property by non-residents with.Financial 
rands requires the permission of the Exchange Control 
authorities. The authorities have recently (August 
1989) reversed the policy of allowing non-residents to 
purchase residential property partly with Financial 
rands. In other situations, although capital may be 
transferred in freely via the Commercial rand, 
disinvestment will occur via the Financial rand. 
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3. Foreign investment by South African residents, if 
permission is granted by the authorities, will take 
place via the Financial rand. 
4. Capital transfers by e~migrants are subject to limits, 
and capital retained in South Africa is transferred 
into a blocked account. 
5. Distributions from South African estates is limited to 
RlOO 000 which must be made via the Financial rand. 
6. Capital transfers from testamentary trusts will occur 
via the Financial rand while income may be transferred 
via the Commercial rand. The restrictions upon inter~ 
vivas trusts are severe and applications must be made 
to the Exchange Control authorities to transfer 
capital and income. 
7. The declaration of dividends to non-residents may only 
be paid from revenue profits which have accrued 
subsequent to 1 January .1984. Dividends may not be 
paid out of profits of a capital nature which include 
profits on the sale of assets, or revaluation 
reserves. 
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8. All foreign debt undertaken by South African residents 
prior to 28 August 1985 is subject to the debt 
standstill arrangements. Exceptions to the standstill 
include public debt repayments, debts to international 
financial agencies and the loan commitments of the 
9. 
Reserve _Bank. If the creditor does not agree to 
extend the term of the loan with the initial borrower,, 
the amount is required to ~e paid. into a Special 
Restricted Foreign Currency Account adminis·tered by 
the Public Investment Commissioner. 
Non-resident account balances with the authorised 
dealers (prior to 2 September 1985) have been 
classified as Special Restricted Rand Accounts 
( SRRA' s). These amounts may not be transferred from 
South Africa in foreign currency. If the balances are 
of a current nature, R50 000 may be transferred 
abroad. 
10. Prior to 2 September 1985 non-residents could 
undertake direct investments either through equity 
capital or · loan account. At present, non-residents 
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are only permitted to undertake dir~ct investments by 
way of equity capital. 
11. The repayment of existing loan accounts requires the 
permission of the Exchange Control authorities. 
12. Current account balances due to non-residen.t parent 
companies by lo('.al subsidiaries may only be paid if 
the payment is in respect of goods imported into South 
Africa. Permission to transfer current account 
balances requires Exchange Control permission. If a 
current account balance remains outstanding for longer 
than a year, the Exchange Control authorities may 
define the current account as a foreign loan. The 
company would then find it more difficult to obtain 
permission to repay the account. 
13. Restrictions exist on foreign investments by South 
African residents. Exchange Control may grant 
permission for foreign direct investment if the 
investment meets stipulated criteria. The authorities 
would require that "the investment will stimulate 
South African exports, earn additional foreign 
currency for South Africa, or ·is necessary in order to 
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protect a foreign source of supply for South Africa" 
(Ernst & Young, 1989 ; p.10). 
14. Importers are required to furnish documentary proof 
that imported goods have been received in South Africa 
before the authorised dealers will - allow - the 
allocation of foreign currency. 
15. Various categories of goods require an import permit. 
Therefore importers must show that they hold a valid 
import permit if applicable to the class of goods 
imported. In addition to normal tariffs, i~porters 
are required to pay a s\,lrcharge on cost of imported 
goods. 
16. Importers are not allowed to_ pay for imported goods 
earlier than the date of shipment. Advance payments, 
up to, one third of the cost, will be allowed for 
capital imports. 
17. A firm that is both, an importer and exporter is not 
allowed to set off foreign proceeds against foreign 
remittances. Restrictions are plac~d on the-
maintenance of overseas bank accounts. 
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18. Exporters are required to complete an export 
declaration which is attested to by an authorised 
dealer. Proceeds of export sales must· be received in 
South Africa within six months of the date of 
. shipment, alt.hough credit may be granted up to twelve 
months if the exporters share of the foreign market is 
at risk. 
19. If an exporter grants trade credit to an overseas 
customer, then the proceeds must be covered forward 
for the whole period. An exporter must enter into a 
forward contr~ct within seven days rif shipment. 
20. Section 3 ( 1) ( f) of the Exchange Control regulations 
restricts the level of local borrowing (financial 
assistance) undertaken by foreign controlled 
companies. Section 3(1)(f) applies to firms where 25 
percent or more of the capital, assets or earnings 
benefit a non-resident or where 25 percent or more of 
the voting control· is vested in a non-resident. A 
section 3(1)(f) "affected" firm is required to apply 
for Exchange Control authority· for all local 
"financial ass~stance" facilities. The definition of 
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financial assistance is wide and includes overdrafts, 
leasing, and sale and leaseback. The firm is also 
required to detail all off-balance sheet finance. The 
level of local financial assistance allowed to an 
affected firm is limited to the following formula: 
[50% + % local participation/% foreign participation x 
50%] x total effective capital. 
Effective capital (shareholders' funds) includes 
issued share capital, share premium, retained 
earnings, reserves, def erred tax balances, 
shareholders' loans to the extent that the balance 
between resident and non-resident participation is 
maintained, and dividends declared but not paid. 
21. The remittance of dividends by firms which are 25 
percent or more controlled by non-residents require 
' 
Exchange Control authority. 
22. Exchange Control authority; is required for foreign 
borrowings by firms operating in South Africa. 
23. Interest payments on foreign loans are freely 
transferable; however, the interest rate must be 
24. 
112 
reasonable in comparison to local market interest 
rates. 
Royalty agreements must· be submitted to 
Control or the Department of Industries. 
Exchange 
If the 
required royalty is less than 3.5 percent of turnover, 
then the royalty payments will be permitted if 
underlying "know..:.how" is provided which benefits the 
country. Exchange Control· will not normally permit 
royalty payments for the use of patents or trademarks 
which exceed 0.5 percent of turnover. 
25. The payment of management fees to a foreign company 
requires Exchange Control authority. The applicant 
must show. that the management services are necessary 
and the fee must be reasonable in relation to the 
services provided. The authorities will not normally 
approve the payment of management fe.es by a wholly 
owned South African subsidiary to its overseas parent 
company. 
26. Emmigrants are subject to stringent limits on capital 
transfers. Capital remaining in South Africa is 
blocked and blocked funds may only be utilised for 
specified purposes. 
the Financial rand. 
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Capital transfers take place via 
27. Restrictions apply for the payment of directors' fees, 
foreign currency allocation for holidays abroad, 
business travel, and overseas studies. 
28 .. Restrictions also exist for foreign currency 
allocations for settling legal disputes in foreign 
countries, tender guarantees, alimony payments, 
advertising expenditure, . technical services and 
medical expenses. 
29. The penalty for contravention of the Exchange Control 
regulations has been increased from RlO 000 to 
R250 000. 
The above points reflect the degree to which economic 
freedom and, therefore efficiency as defined, are 
restricted by exchange control over transactions involving 
foreign currency. Further, the situation is exacerbated by 
the secrecy surrounding the exchange control regulations. 
The Exchange Control .regulations are subject to amendment 
by exchange control circulars to the authorised dealers 
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which· are not promulgated in the Government Gazette. This 
means that the regulations remain a dark mystery to persons 
outside the banking sector (Chaplin,1987 . . p. 623}. This 
policy results in high transaction costs, reflected in the 
costs of obtaining reliable information. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
In the period April 1979 to September 1985, the South 
African foreign exchange market experienced significant 
reforms which encouraged· the development of a free and ... 
competitive market". in foreign exchange. This policy was 
promoted by the disengagement policy of the Reserve Bank 
and the relaxation of Exchange Controls, particularly over 
non-residents. The effect of the reforms was to improve 
economic efficiency as.measured by the degree of economic 
freedom allowed to market participants, although such 
freedom may have increased exchange rate volatility. This 
is due to the increased freedom of market participants to 
allow· their expectations to impact on the exchange rate. 
The foreign debt standstill in September 1985 resulted in 
the effective reversal of ·· the reform process, and the 
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imposition of further direct controls. This is ~eflected 
by the wide ambit of exchange control measures which at 
this time impact on the economic freedom of firms to 
transact in foreign exchange. Exchange Contrdl affects the 
allocation of resources and if we accept that a free market 
will result in an efficient allocation of resources then 
Exchange Control by restricting market freedom has had a 
detrimental effect on economic efficiency. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW : TESTS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
OBJECTIVE 
This chapter presents methodologies employed in other 
studies to test the Efficient Market Hypothesis ( EMH) in 
·the context of the foreign exchange market. Tests of 
market efficiency are divided into tests on the existence 
of risk-free arbitrage profit opportunities, and the 
·analysis of the time series behaviour of spot rates and 





" 4.1 . INTRODUCTION 
An efficient market is a market where prices "fully 
reflect" the information set (Fama, 1970). The operational 
difficulties in this definition relate to the appropriate 
tests to be used to either acc~pt or reject the Efficient· 
Market Hypothesis in the context of the· .foreign exchange 
market. 
This chapter. represents firstly a literature review of 
methodologies used in various studies to test for Covered 
Interest Parity. This represents testing for essentially 
risk-free covered interest ar~itrage opportunities. 
Secondly, the chapter represents a literature review of 
methodologies used to test fo~ the existence of unusual 
returns in the foreign exchange market, for investments 
involving varying degrees of risk. This is more difficult, 
due to estimating the relationship between risk and return 
and the definition of "equilibrium" returns. However, 
various studies have employed a number of tests on the time 
series behaviour of spot and forward exchange rates and.the 
analysis of forecast errors. to derive tentative conclusions 
124 
on the level of market efficiency in the foreign exchange 
market. 
4.2 COVERED INTEREST PARITY 
The Covered Interest Parity Theorem states that the forward 
exchange ·premium/discount should equal the interest 
differential between two currencies divided by one plus the 




= • • f l.-l. 
l+i 
where; S = the spot exchange rate 
F = the forward exchange rate 
i = the domestic interest rate 
if = the foreign interest rate 
In the above equation, the exchange rates F and S are 
stated in terms o~ the indirect quotation system (i.e .. 
exchange rates are expressed in terms of foreign currency). 
If a country uses the direct quotation system (i.e. 
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exchange rates are stated in terms qf local currency) then 




Aliber (1973) in his seminal pap~r on the subject analysed 
reasons why the quoted forward rate deviated from its 
predicted value as indicated by the interest parity 
equation. Money market assets in two countries differ in. 
terms of currency of denomination and political 
jurisdiction. 
Differences in currency of denomination result in exchange 
rate risk while differences in political jurisdiction 
result in politic al risk. · Poli ti cal risk refers. to the 
possibility that the state authorities will apply exchange 
controls between the date a foreign investment is made and 
the date when repatri.ation of' capital and income is due. 
Forward _exchange contracts enable investors to avoid 
exchange rate risk. Therefore, deviations from covered 
interest parity may reflect political risk and other 
fa_ctors, such as transaction costs and measurement error. 
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Aliber-emphasized the role of differences in political risk 
in explaining deviations from covered interest parity. 
Transaction costs ref er to the costs of transacting in 
securities and foreign . exchange. A· covered· interest 
arbitrage transaction will involve investors . undertak,ing 
swap transactions, that~is, the purchase {sale) of foreign 
currency in the spot market and the simultaneous sale 
(purchase) of foreign currency in the forward market. 
The transaction costs in the foreign exchange market will 
constitute half the bid-ask spread in the spot market and 
half ·the bid-ask spread in the forward market. The 
purchase and sale .of securities may involve brokerage and 
tax costs. 
Measurement error refers to timing differences between 
recorded rates in two investment centres. Differences in 
the taxation of interest income and/or gains/losses from 
foreign exchange transactions, or the taxation treatment of 
the forward premium/discount may result in deviations from 
interest parity. Exchange controls may also limit the 
ability of arbitrageurs from taking advantage of deviations 
from interest parity.· 
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It is possible to estimat~ the level of transaction costs 
and·measurement.error in terms of deviations from interest 
parity when similar securities quoted in different 
cu~rencies fall under the same politi6al jurisdiction. 
Aliber does not refer to the inter-relationship of foreign 
exchange rate risk and political risk. Indeed, this is not 
referred to in· the literature. The point is that a forward 
exchange contract constitutes a separate legally binding 
contract. Therefore, if the state authorities introduce 
measures to prevent the repatriation of capital and income, 
this will result in exchange rate risk, as investors are 
still obliged to meet the terms of the forward contract. 
This means that the underlying forward transactions will 
need to be effected through off setting transactions in the 
spot market. Therefore, the probability of political 
intervention may reflect the probability of · foreign 
exchange rate risk if investors utilise forward exchange 
contracts to avoid foreign exchange exposure. 
The probability of political intervention (i.e. the level 
of p6litical ~isk) should be significantly less than the 
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probability of movements in the exchange rate and therefore 
undertaking a forward exchange contract will 'significantly 
reduce the level of foreign exchange ~xposure; however the 
level of political risk remains the common denominator, 
that is, exchange risk wiil not be eliminated but will be 
reduced to equal the level of political risk. 
Prachowny' s ( 1970) explanation that deviations from 
interest parity may be due to arbitrageurs borrowing at the 
prime rate in one country and investing at the Treasury 
bill rate in another country.is incorrect as it ignores, 
the situations whereby· arbitrageurs shift from lending in 
one country to lending in the other country, or whereby 
investors shift from borrowing in one country to borrowing 
in the other country. 
However, switching from lending (borrowing) in one country 
to lending (borrowing) in another country would· involve 
transaction costs at least to the extent that this would be 
reflected in the interest rate spread in the interbank 
market. Switching would also involve information costs .in 
terms of search costs and costs in cancelling positions if 
funds constitute term deposits. 
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Branson (1969) estimated the transaction costs of arbitrage 
to be 0.18 percent between both New York and Montreal and 
New York and ~ondo~. This estimate may be under~tated in 
terms the methodology employed as periods of "excessive 
·speculative activity" were excluded. 
Aliber (1973) used yields on U.S. dollar-denominated assets 
in London and on sterling-denominated assets issued in 
Paris to predict the forward sterling/U.S. dollar exchange 
rate. This was then compared to the qu~ted forward rate. 
Deviations from the forward rate were also calculated by 
employing the traditional m~thod, that is, by using U.S. 
and U.K. treasury bill rates. 
Aliber found that the mean deviation from interest parity 
(percent per annum) over the period January 1968 to June 
1970 using the U.S. - U.K. treasury bill rates was 1.94 
percent (S.D. = 1.93 percent) while the mean deviation from 
interest parity using the London u. S ~ dollar deposit -
Paris sterling deposit rates was only 0.273 percent (S.D. = 
0.40 percent). 
The deviations - from covered interest parity are much 
smaller when the London U.S. dollar and Paris sterling 
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deposit rates are used to predict the forward rate. Aliber 
concluded that a major explanatory factor . for the 
difference between predicted and observed forward rates is 
due to using securities which are issued in different 
political jurisdictions. . Interest parity deviations are 
primarily due to differences in political risk. 
Aliber divides investors into two classes; speculators and 
arbitrageurs. Speculators specialise in carrying foreign 
~xchange rate risk while arbitrag~urs specialise in 
carrying political risk. However, as previously mentioned, 
Aliber ignores the fact that political risk may iead to 
exchange rate risk as a 
separate legally binding 
underlying transaction 
represents a 
or not the 
forward contract 
contract whether 
is affected by political 
intervention. A forward contract without the underlying 
transaction implies · the investor is subject to · foreign 
exchange rate risk. 
Frenkel (1973) examined interest parity in terms of 
elasticities. Points off the interest parity line can be 
defined as equilibrium points if they are bounded by a 
neutral band around the traditional line from which covered 
interest arbitrage is not profitable. Boundaries around 
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the covered interest parity.line is equivalent to assuming 
that the elasticities of demand and/or ~upply are less than 
infinite. Elastic! ties were found to be low, in most -
cases, elasticities were found to be below 10. 
The covered interest parity equation should hold if the 
securities used are identical in all respects, such as· 
maturity, risk, but except for the currency of 
denomination. Non-adherence to the comparibility 
criterion, for example, due to differences in political 
risk referred to by Aliber, would be consistent with low 
elasticities. 
Frenkel and Levich (1975) examined whether deviations from 
covered interest parity implied unexploited profit 
opportunities. Transaction costs would result in a neutral 
-
band around the interest parity line. Observations within 
this band represent equilibrium points of no possible 
profitable arbitrage. 
Transaction costs consist of two elements; the ·costs of 
transacting in the foreign exchange market and the costs.of 
transacting in the securities markets. Frenkel and Levie~ 
estimate the level of tranasaction costs in the foreign 
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exchange market by using the technique of triangular 
arbitrage. 
Triangular arbitrage would keep cross-exchange rates 
consistent, therefore if transaction costs equal zero, 
then, for· example, the following would hold true: 
($/FF)t = ($/DM) (DM/FF) 
t . t 
Transaction costs are measured by the discrepancy between 
the two side~ of the equation. Frenkel and Levich's 
estimates of transaction costs represent the percentage 
deviation which bounds 95 percent of the deviations from 
triangular arbitrage. The percentage cost of transactions 
in the foreign exchange market (spot . and 90 day forward) 
amounted to a maximum of 0.131 percent. 
Frenkel and Levich point out that estimates of .transaction 
costs could also be based on the bid-ask spreads ·in the 
foreign exchange market. 
Transaction costs in the securities market consist of two 
elements; the bid-ask spread and the brokerage fee. 
Demsetz ( 19 68) estimated total costs. in transacting in 
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securities to be 2.5 times the bid-ask spread in th~ 
foreign exchange market. Frenkel and Levich applied this 
estimate to U.S., U.K. and Canadian Treasury Bills. The 
total costs in a 90-day 'covered interest arbitrage 
transaction was estimated to be 0.15 percent. This is 
close to Branson's (1969) estimate of 0.18 percent. 
Frenkel and Levich use interest rates and forward premiums 
for specific periods and point to the arithmetical problem 
of using annualised data as this would result in illusory 
profit opportunities. Estimates of transaction costs are 
also period specific, therefore data which is quoted in 
annualised t.erms have to be converted to their 90 day 
equivalents. 
Using their estimates for the costs of transacting in the 
foreign exchange markets and securities markets, Frenkel 
and· Levich computed a neutral band around the interest 
parity line. 
Treasury Bill rates in the U.S. and the U. K. (termed the 
traditional pair) and Euro-sterling deposit rates in Paris 
and Euro-dollar . deposit rates in London (termed the 
external pair) were used to measure the percentage of 
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observations bounded by the neutral band around the 
interest parity line. 
Frenkel and Levich found that for· the traditional pair, 
transaction costs 
apparent profit 
accounted for about 85 percent of the 
opportunities as indicated by the 
deviations from interest parity. 
However, for the external pair of securities, more than 99 
percent of all deviations were accounted for by transaction 
costs. It was found that the elasticities become very high 
if transaction costs are taken into account. This is 
consistent with the high level of competitiveness in these 
markets. 
The observations which are not bound~d by the neutral band 
around.the interest parity line could be due to differences 
in risk, taxation, elasticities which are less than 
infinite and a time lag between noting an arbitrage 
opportunity and undertaking an arbitrage transaction. 
Levich (1979[b]) used Clendenning's (1970) estimate of the 
level'·of transaction costs of 0. 25 percept to calculate 
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the percentage of deviations from interest parity that 
would result in profitable arbitrage transactions. 
Levich examined assets with a 3 month maturity and took 
weekly observations f<;>r the period, 1967-1975. Between 
external deposits quoted in the U.S. dollar and deposits 
quoted in the major currencies of :the Canadian dollar, 
sterling, deutschemarks and guilders, over 93 percent of 
deviations were within the transaction cost band of 0. 25 
percent. 
Using Treasury Bill rates issued in the above currencies, 
the percentage of deviations which lay within 0.25 percent 
of the interest. parity line ranged from 72 percent for 
Canada, to 44 percent for Germany. Therefore interest 
parity did not hold to the same extent when applying the 
same tests to securities issued in different legal and 
political jurisdictions. Levich's results are depicted in 
Table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.1 PERCENTAGE OF DEVIATIONS FROM INTEREST PARITY 































All countries but particularly Switzerland, Italy, France 
and Belgium show· significant differences in terms of 
adherence to covered interest parity when using . Treasury 
Bill rates as compared to using external deposit rates to 
test the interest parity thereom. Al though, Levich omits 
to emphasise the possible factors responsible for the 
differences, Aliber's study emphasised differences in 
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political risk. Capital controls should also inhibit the 
flow of funds to take advantage of deviations from interest 
parity. 
Frenkel and ·Levich ( 1977) analysed the extent that the 
efficiency of covered interest arbitrage has been affected 
by different exchange rate systems. Three periods were 
examined; 1962-67, the tranquil peg; 1968-69, the turbulent 
peg; and 1973-75, the managed float. It was found to be 
more useful to classify periods by the level of turbulence 
rather than by the legal and institutional framework of the 
exchange rate system. Transaction costs were measured by 
employing the method of triangular arbitrage. 
Frenkel and Levich divided the observations into specific 
periods by examining the ratio of the forward to the spot 
exchange rate. Under a pegged exchange rate system, a 
forward rate which was outside the support limits could 
reflect expectations that the authorities would be unable 
to maintai.n the peg. On the basis of the relationship of 
-the forward to the spot rate, Frenkel and Levich selected 
the three periods; 1962-67, 1968-69 and 1973-75 as three 
homogeneous periods. 
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The period 1968-69 reflected a period of turbulence . in 
foreign exchange markets. This period was preceded by the 
devaluation of sterling in November 1967. The managed 
float period reflected a period of volatility in exchange 
rates. Bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market tend 
to be wider during periods of uncertainty. Fieleke (1975) 
found that in the managed float period there was a positive 
relationship between the bid-ask spread and proxies 
measuring levels of uncertainty. 
Frenkel and Levich found that during the ·tranquil peg 
period (i.e. 1962-67), triangular arbitrage between· the· 
u. S. dollar and sterling using the deutschemark as the 
intermediate currency indicated the total percentage cost 
(spot and forward) of transacting in foreign exchange to be 
equal to 0.127 percent. This estimate increased to 0.262 
percent for the turbulent peg period (i.e. 1968-69) and 
then showed a further dramatic increase to 1.03 percent for 
the managed float period. 
Frenkel and Levich employed Demsetz's (1968) estimate which 
indicated the total costs of transacting in securities to 
be 2. 5 times the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange 
market. The cost of transacting in u. s. treasury bills 
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increased from the tranquil peg period through to the 
managed float period. The modal values of transaction 
costs for 90-day securities in the Euro-dollar and Euro-
sterling markets was 0.038 and 0.117 percent respectively. 
During the tranquil peg and the managed float periods, 
transaction costs accounted for· a similar proportion of 
deviations from intere~t parity. Transaction costs 
accounted for over 80 percent of deviations for the 
. traditional pair of securities (i.e. Treasury Bills} and 
over 99 percent for the external pair( i.e. Euro-currency 
deposits}. However, during the 1968-69 period the costs, of 
transactions accounted for a much smaller proportion of the 
deviations from covered interest parity in respect to the 
traditional pair of securities. 
For the external pair of securities, most observations were 
bounded by the neutral band around the interest parity 
line. This period reflected financial uncertainty and the 
results for the traditional pair may reflect a lack of 
comparibilty which ·is a necessary condition for the 
interest parity equati9n to hold. Lack of comparipility 
may be due to the assets being issued in two different 
political jurisdictions. 
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To test for unexploited profit opportunities, Frenkel and 
Levich devised a simple trading rule of using information 
at time t and acting_ upon this information at time t+l. 
During the tranguil peg and managed float periods the mean 
percentage profits are reduced to approxima~ely 0. 04 and 
0.01 percent respectively. During the turbulent peg 
period, the trading rule results in statistically 
significant profits. 
incomparibility. 
However, the securities may reflect 
McCormick (1979) adopted Frenkel and Levich's methodology 
and applied it to data· of higher quality. ·The use of 
triangular arbitrage to measure the total cost of 
transacting in the foreign exchange market requires that 
exchange rates be observed almost.simultaneously. 
The data in Frenkel al)d Levich' s study do not meet the 
sfniul tanei ty criterion, . as the New York rates used 
represent the closing mid-rates (about 4 pm New York time) 
whereas the deutschemark-sterling rates in London represent 
the mid points of the Montagu bank's. lowest bid and highest 
ask rates during the London trading day. 
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During the 1973-75 period the time difference between rates 
quoted in New York and London widened to 4-13 hours. 
Therefore the recorded rates did not represent the rates 
that were available simultaneously in the two centres. As 
rates may move significantly within a timespan of a few 
hoµrs, this represented a serious limitation in the study 
by Frenkel and Levich. 
McCormick used daily Reuters' quotations with rates quoted 
within one hour of each centre. The values of the 
discrepancies from triangular arbitrage that bounded 95 
percent of these discr~pancies reflected a transaction cost 
percentage of 0 .182 percent for the u .. S. dollar, sterling 
and deutschemark rates, for the period April 1976 to 
October 1976. Using the Montagu-IFS data source employed 
by Frenkel and Levich for the same period, McCormick 
calculated the percentage cost of transactions to be 0.664 
percent. 
The estimate of transaction costs using simultaneous data 
is less than 30 percent of the level of transaction costs 
as indicated by utilising Frenkel and Levich's data source. 
The lagging of the Reuters data for one day resulted in .a 
material - increase in the "transaction costs" estimate. 
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Therefore the time difference between ,exchange rate 
observations may ·have a material effect on the estimates of 
transaction costs (based on Frenkel and Levich's triangular. 
arbitrage methodology). 
McCormick calculated the percentage of deviations from 
interest parity that could be explained by different 
estimates of transaction costs. The estimate of 
-transaction costs using the Montagu-IFS. data explain 96 
percent of the deviations from interest parity for 
arbitrage between U.S.· and U.K. treasury bills. However, 
using the Reuters' foreign exchange data, only 58 percent 
and 38 percent of the deviations from interest parity can 
be . explained by transaction costs for the U.S. dollar, 
sterl~ng and the deutschemark ·case and the U.S. dollar, 
sterling and the Canadian dollar case respectively. 
In the case of arbitrage between the Euro-dollar and Euro-
sterling markets, the Reuters data ·does not make any 
difference to the results of Frenkel and Levich as 100 
percent of deviations from interest parity are explained by 
transaction costs. 
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McCormick indicates that the level of deviations not 
explained by transaction costs is consistent with the 
stringent capital controls imposed by the U.K. authorities 
~ 
during that period. 
This point is relevant in the South African situation and 
will be examined later in the study. McCormick's results 
add further credence to the conclusions reached by Aliber 
(1973) relating to the non-comparibility of securities 
issued in different countries due to differences in levels 
of political risk. 
Levich (1979[b]) states that risk-free profitable arbitrage 
opportunities are quickly eliminated due to arbitrage 
activities. Levich reintroduces the two most commonly used 
methods for testing the covered interest parity theorem. 
The first method is based on an analysis of the deviations 
from covered interest parity and may be stated as follows: 
d = 
F-S i-i f 




Interest parity is assumed to hold if the hypothesis of d = 
0 cannot be _rejected. 
The second method is based on applying the· following 
regression equation; 
F-S • . f 1-1 
= a + b 
s l+if 
Interest parity is assumed to apply if the hypothesis that 
a = 0 and b ~ 1, cannot be rejected. 
The above methods are not sufficient to test·the validity 
of the covered interest parity thereom. This is because 
both methods test the average relationship between the 
interest differential and the quoted forward -premium. 
Therefore it is important to examine the deviation from 
covered interest parity for every single period and compare 
.the deviations to estimates of transaction costs. An 
analysis of the· percentage.of times that covered interest 
·arbitrage will not result in profits in excess of related· 
transaction costs allows us to make valid conclusions on 
the level of market efficiency. 
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Levich restates the findings from previous studies that 
covered interest parity holds in unregulated markets such 
as the Euro-currency markets but does not readily hold for 
securities issued in different political jurisdictions. 
Dooley and Isard (1980) examined the extent that political 
risk and capital controls accounted fqr the deviations from 
interest parity. Aliber's (1973, p.1453) definition of 
political risk is used as the starting point of their 
study; political risk is defined as, 
"the probability that the authority of the state 
will be interposed between investors in o~e 
country and investment opportunities in other 
countries." 
Political risk refers to the probability of future capital 
controls rather than existing capital controls. Dooley and 
Isard examined the differential between Euro-mark deposit 
interest rates quoted in Zurich and interbank deutschemark 
denominated loan rates quoted in Frankfurt for 3 month 
maturities for the period January 1970 to December 1973. 
In this period Germany placed a number of exchange controls 
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on non-residents in an effort to stem large capital 
inflows •. 
The interest differentiai between the Euro-mark rate and 
the domestic interbank loan rate increased from close to 
zero at the beginning of 1970 to reach a difference, at an 
annual rate, of 10 percent in April 1973. The· interest 
differential was positive regarding domestic rates, that 
is, local interbank loan rates exceeded Euro-mark deposit 
rates · during that period. The interest differential 
includes transaction costs as it represents the difference 
between a loan rate and a deposit rate. 
Dooley and Isard present two arguments to explain the 
interest differential between Euro-bank deutschemark-
denominated deposit accounts, and German domestic interest 
rates. The sale of marks in the spot market by the German 
Bundesbank resulted a lower spot value of the mark; lower 
than the value that would have prevailed in a free market. 
At the same time there were speculative demands for forward 
·marks. The combination of these factors resulted in 
profitable covered interest arbitrage opportunities for 
investors moving capital into mark-denominated German bank 
deposits. Dooley and Isard state that . arbitrageurs would 
. / 
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purchase marks Spot from the Bundesbank, invest the ·marks 
.in German bank deposits and sell the marks forward to 
private speculators.. However, as non-residents increased 








risks specific to 
increasingly 
due to the 
non-resident 
claims ori the German private and. publ.ic sectors. 
Non-residents could diversify out this political risk by 
moving funds into Euro-bank mark-denominated deposit 
accounts. However, this would mean that Euro-banks would 
have to carry uncovered mark liabilities subject to 
exchange risk or carry the political risk of investing in 
mark-denominated securities in Germany. Therefore, Euro-
banks discouraged investors from investing in Euro-mark 
deposits by offering lower yields. Dooley and Isard (1980, 
p.372) conclude their first argument by stating that; 
"the difference between Euro-mark rates and the 
interest rates available on claims against_ German 
residents can b~ attributed to the reluctance of 
non-resident arbitrageurs, including Euro-banks, 
' I 
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to aquire a· larger stock of claims on German 
residents." 
The second argument employed to explain deviations from 
covered interest parity relates to the effects of existing 
capital controls. In this case deviations from covered 
. . 
interest parity are attributed to the effective tax that 
existi~g capital controls placed on interest earnings due 
to non-residents in Germany. 
The types of controls that the Bundesbank placed on non-
resident investments in Germany inc1uded the following: 
* A special bank reserve ratio was required on 
nonresident deposits with German Banks. 
* Bundesbank authorisations were required for 
interest payments on nonresident bank deposits. 
* A cash deposit of 40 pe~cent and later 50 percent 
was required on new nonresident deposit accounts. This 
deposit was held with the Bundesbank and did not earn any 
interest. 
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* Prior Bundesbank authorisation was required for the 
purchase of fixed-interest securities and the purchase of 
shares in local companies. 
In order to separate the effects of existing capital 
controls from prospective capital controls, Dooley and 
Isard ( 1980, p. 371) base their model on the assumption 
.that; 
"the pro~pect of future capital coritrols depends 
essentially on the gross supplies of ·debt 
outstanding against different governments and the 
distribution of world wealth among residents of 
different political jurisdictions." 
The results of the study indicate that most of the 
difference between the Euro-mark interest rate and the 
local interest rate was due to the tax placed on 
nonresident earnings by the capital controls impos~d by the 
Bundesbank. When the differential reached 10 percent 
between February and October 1973, Dooley and Isard 
estimated that the tax due to existing controls accounted 
for 6 percent· of the interest differential and another 2 
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• percent was <iue to the political risk involved, - while 2 
percent of the differential remained unexplained. 
The major limitation to this study, as expressed by Dooley 
and Isard (1980, p.302), is that the tax imposed by 
existing capital controls, 
"cannot be computed from microeconomic principles 
in the German case, so we are forced to be 
somewhat arbitrary in modeling and estimating 
it• II 
The study also relied on the assumption that the 
probability of future capital controls remained constant in 
the period under study. The probability of futu~e c_apital 
controls were assumed to be independent of the level of 
existing controls. 
Barr and Kantor (1984) examined interest parity and money 
- -
supply effects in the context of the South African foreign 
exchange market. The authors firstly present the interest 
parity_ relationship under free exchange rate markets and 
state that any deviation from covered interest parity would 
present opportunities for profitable covered interest 
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arbitrage transactions. If the central bank manages the 
spot and forward exchange markets then Barr and Kantor 
(1984, p.45) state that; 
"differences between local and foreign interest 
rates may not equal the exchange rate 
premium/discount as determined by the central 
bank and this quoted premium/discount may imply a 
future exchange rate which differs considerably 
from what .the market believes the exchange rate 
will be at the end of the relevant time period.". 
The study presents ·an analysis of the cost of local versus 
foreign finance by comparing local interest rates to 
foreign interest rates including.the cost of forward cover. 
Expectations are introduced into their model, so that the 
expected future spot rate can be employed to determine the 
cost of uncovered off shore finance. However, the latter 
financing option is not directly comparable to the local 
and covered offshore finance options due to differences in 
risk. 
The total cost of uncovered off shore finance may be· 




exchange losses incurred by companies in South Africa and 
other countries such as Australia points to the high level 
·of exchange risk involved in taking out uncovered offshore 
finance •. 
Therefore, the fact that the cost of uncovered finance is 
l~ss than the cost of local finance would not necessarily 
lead to firms taking out uncovered finance. 
Barr and Kantor (1984, p.47) present the situation where 
the central bank manages the forward rate to influence 
capital flows; 
"the central bank may adjust its quoted rate and 
provide forward currency at artificially low 
costs in order to increase the volume of capital 
account inflows and thus its foreign exchange 
reserves." 
The study also examines the effects that capital flows will 
have on the money supply. If the central bank sets the 
forward rate to encourage borrowing from foreign sources 
then the. incentive will be maintained for as long as the 
central bank prevents an increase in the money supply and a 
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fall in local interest rates and prevents an appreciation 
in the spot rate. 
A model is employed to measure expectations of th& future 
spot rate and compare the cost of local finance to the cost 
of covered offshore finance and uncovered offshore finance. 
The computation and comparison of the cost of each 
. financing option is carried out for the period January 1980 
to April 1983. The costs of finance are based on the New 
York three monthly bankers' acceptance rates and the local 
thre~ monthly bankers' acceptance rates. 
were annualised rates. 
All rates used 
The expectation of the future spot rate was based on the 
correlation of the spot rate to the U.S. dollar gold price 
over a moving period of twelve months. Barr and Kantor 
present the costs to local firms of each financing ?Ption 
for the period unde~ study. An adjustment was made for the 
risk involved in the uncovered offshore finance option. 
Barr and Kantor conclude that South African borrowers would 
have benefited by· undertaking uncovered offshore finance 
from August 1982 as the forward rate predicted a decline in 
the future spot rate. This deviated from the expected 
------------------------------------------
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future spot rate which was based on the fact that a 
significant increase in the gold price had taken place. 
The decline in the gold price in 1983 resulted in the cost 
of uncovered finance then becoming higher than tne cost of 
local finance. 
The study points to significant deviations from interest 
parity as there are material differences between the cost 
of local finance and the cost of covered offshore finance. 
Barr and Kantor's study is however subject to certain 
limitations. Firstly, the , data was not transformed by 
dividing by four to reflect the estimated - rates facing 
traders for each specific period. Barr and Kantor use the 
annualised three monthly data to determine deviations from 
interest parity. Frenkel and Levich (1975, p.331) state; . \ 
"Since there is no presumption that the forward 
premium on a yearly contract for foreign exchange 
should be four times th~ forward premium on a 90 
day contract, it is clear that annuf:ilizing the 
premiums might introduce noise to the data. 
Similar noise might _ be introduced by the 
annualised interest rates series since there is 
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no presumption that the interest differential on 
1-year securities should be four times the 
corresponding differential on 90-day 
securities ••• the method of annualization 
multiplies all deviations from the interest 
parity line by about four and thereby creates 
illusory profit margins." 
Secondly, the study does not take into account the effect 
that transaction costs may have on their conclusions in 
respect to switching from one financing source to another. 
Thirdly, Barr and Kantor use the approximation form of the 
covered interest parity equation, i.e. i-if = (F-S)/S 
f . f 
rather than precise form of ( i-i ) I ( l+i r = ( F-S) /$. As 
deviations from interest parity represent relatively. risk-
free profit opportunities, small deviations may lead to 
large capital flows~ Therefore, it may be of importance to 
employ the precise form of the interest parity equation to 
measure deviations rather than its approximation form. 
Fourthly, Barr and Kantor employ the covered interest 
parity equation based on a direct quotation system but use 
data quoted on an indirect quotation system. Further, the 
factors of political risk and.capital controls were ignored 
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in explaining deviations from interest parity when such 
factors are obviously important to the South African 
situation. 
Isard (1987) states that deviatiorts £rem covered interest 
parity reflect transaction costs, the effects of capital 
controls and/or the fact that the foreign and local assets 
are not directly comparable. Isard (1987, p.7-8) further 
states; 
11 deviations from CIP (covered interest parity) 
are usually neglible when Eurocurrency data are 
used as measures of interest rates. By the same 
token, however, observed deviations from CIP can 
play a central role in those empirical studies 
that emphasize that claims on the residents of 
different countries may not be comparable because 
of capital controls or different political or 
credit risks." 
Taylor (1987) tested for covered interest parity by using 
high-frequency contemporaneously sampled data from the 
London foreign exchange market. Tayl'or ( 1987, p. 429) 
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referred to a number of studies which had reported 
deviations from covered interest parity and argued that; 
"the results of such studies almost certainly 
reflect data imperfections rather than market 
inefficiencies." 
Taylor states that it is important that the data used to 
test interest parity should be contemporaneously sampled 
and reflect the rates that a trader faced. 
Taylor states (1987, p.431) that various studies have 
\ 
reported deviations from interest parity and that these 
studies; 
"have attempted to rationalize these departures 
in terms of political risk (Aliber, 1973);· 
transaction costs (Branson, 1969; Frenkel and 
Levich, 1975,1977); capital market imperfections 
(Prachowny, 1970; Frenkel, 1973)." 
Taylor states that the majority of these empirical studies 
on interest parity made use of published data which were 
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not contemporaneously sampled: For example, Taylor (1987, 
p.431) states that; 
"the exchange rate data used by Frenkel and 
Levich ( 1977) was recorded several hours later 
than the interest rate data." 
Taylor tested data recorded in the London foreign exchange 
market on 11, 12 and 13 November 1985. Taylor made use of 
a direct telephone link with brokers and re.corded rates 
every 10 minutes for the spot U.S. dollar/sterling and U.S. 
dollar/deutschemark exchange rates; the forward exchange 
U.S. dollar/deutschemark and U.S. dollar/sterling rates for 
various maturities and Euro-deposit interest rates for 
sterling, deutschemarks and U.S. dollars for various 
maturities. 
Taylor 'found that no opportunities for covered interest 
arbitrage existed at any time over the three days for the 
U.S. dollar/sterling data and for triangular arbitrage 
between sterling and. the deutschemark while the U.S. 
dollar/deutschemark data indicated .just one profitable 
arbitrage opportunity over three .days but this was 
insufficient to cover the 0.02 percent brokerage fee. 
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Although Taylor's study comes close to reflecting the 
actual data facing traders, the limited observation period 
as indicated (and recognised) by Taylor reflected a 
limitation of the study. The study reflected a further 
significant probl'em in-_ methodology; Taylor indicated that 
deviations from interest parity reported in other studies 
reflected data imperfections due to the use of published 
data which. were not sampled simultaneously. Taylor states 
that this led to writers such as Aliber and Frenkel and 
Levich to "rationalise" these departures from interest 
parity. 
Taylor's conclusions are mis-directed. The truth is that 
most studies [for example, see Aliber (1973) and McCormick 
(1979)] recognise that covered interest parity is valid for 
unregulated markets such as the Euro~currency markets while 
these same studies have reported deviations for regulated 
markets. It is the deviations reported by these studies in 
the regulated markets that have led to explanations 
("rationalisations") such as difference~ in political risk 
and the existence of capital controls. 
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Taylor states that the deviations reported in these studies 
represent data imperfections, yet Taylor tests for covered 
interest parity in the Euro-currency markets rather than 
testing for covered interest parity in the regulated 
markets. In effect, the study draws conclusions on 
regulated markets by using the results of tests on 
unregulated markets. Taylor's study does not validate his 
conclusion and does not explain reported deviations in 
regulated markets. Taylor's study merely reinforces the 
results of previous studies which reported the validity of 
the interest parity theorem in unregulated markets. 
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···,.., 
4.3 TESTS ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SPOT AND FORWARD 
MARKETS 
Fama (1970) defined an efficient market as being one where 
prices "fully reflect" available information. 
Frenkel (1976) stated that the current exchange rate 
reflects future expectations and this accounts for the 
material volatility in exchange rates. Frenkel states that 
if the foreign exchange market is efficient then the 
current exchange rate should reflect the available 
information set. 
Frenkel examined the efficiency of the foreign exchange 
market during the German hyper-inflation period. This 
reflected a period of extreme monetary disturbance. To 
test for market efficiency, Frenkel regressed the logarithm 
of the current spot rate on the logarithm of the one-month 
forward rate reported in the previous month; 
log S = a + b log F + u 
t t-1 t 
If the market is efficient then the constant term should 
not be significantly different from zero and the slope 
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coefficient should not be significantly different from 
unity. The residual term should be serially uncorrelated. 
Frenkel found that the constant term was ·not significantly 
different from zero while the beta coefficient was slightly 
above unity. The coefficient of determination (R2 ) was 98 
percent. The Durban-Watson statistic of 1.90 indicated the 
absence of serial correlation in the re·siduals, which is 
indicative of market efficiency. Frenkel indicated that a 
beta coefficient slightly higher then unity may reflect 
transaction costs. 
Frenkel examined the time series plot of the logarithm of 
the spot rate and forward rate and found that the forward 
rate will "lie below" the spot rate when there is an 
appreciation in · the spot rate and will "lie above" the 
current spot rate, during a period of depreciation in the 
spot rate. 
Frenkel examined the information content of the forward 
rate at time t-1. In. an efficien.t market, F should 
t-1 
·. reflect all information at time t-1, relating to the 
expected ·future spot rate, s . 
t 
Information available at 
time t-1 would include information at time t-2, which 
I 
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should be included in the forward rate, F 
t-2 As Ft-l' 
includes the information reflected in F , the addition of 
t-2 
F to the OLS equation should not affect the coefficient t-2 
of determination while the coefficient of F should not be 
t-2 
significantly different from zero. The result of this test 
supported the hypothesis of an efficient foreign exchange 
market. 
Frenkel also tested for purchasing power parity in the 
German hyper-inflation period and observed a high 
correlation between prices and the exchange rate. Th~ 
study concluded that purchasing parity is valid during 
periods of extreme monetary disturbance. 
A limitation of his study is that the testing of the hyper-
inflation period does not help in explaining the effects of 
real disturbances on the exchange rate. 
Giddy ( 1983) states that an efficient market is one in 
which exchange rates are determined by expectations, and 
rates react immediately to new information so that 
opportunities for profitable speculation are quickly 
eliminated. If traders do not have privileged access to 
"news", then traders will not consistently earn a return 
J 
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that is greater than a buy-and-hold policy. Giddy states 
that public information will not be useful in predicting 
future exchange rates because this information is already 
discounted in the current exchange rate. 
Giddy (1983, p. 70) states; 
"Under current floating rate conditions, exchange 
rates do appear to fluctuate in a random fashion; 
and according to recent theory and. empirical 
research, the foreign exchange market fulfills 
the conditions of an efficient market. This 
means that exchange rate forecasting models 
cannot consistently beat the market forecast". 
Giddy presents the unbia.sed forward rate theory, which 
states that the forward rate equals the market's expected 
future spot rate. If the forward rate did not equal the 
future spot rate, then traders could earn unusual returns 
by purchasing the foreign currency forward if the forward . . 
rate was quoted below the expect"ed future spot rate and 
se·11 the foreign currency forward if the forward rate was 
quoted above the expected future spot rate. 
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Giddy states that forward rates, relative interest rates 
and relative inflation rates will often not be reliable 
predictors of future spot rates. This is due to the fact 
that current exchange rates reflect current information. 
New information will impact on the exchange rate making 
past predictions unreliable. 
Bilson (1978) states that the current spot rate depends on 
expectations about future exogenous variables. Any new 
information that affects expectations about the exogenous 
variables, such as money supply growth, will be immediately 
reflected in the spot rate. Bilson refers to the 
magnification effect which relates to the situation where 
the percentage change in the exchange rate exceeds the 
percentage change in the exogenous variable. A small 
change in an exogenous variable, such as money supply 
growth, may lead to a large alteration in the spot rate if 
general expectations are that the change in money supply 
growth is permanent. 
Therefore, it is not the current change in the exogenous 
variable that matters, but rather the effect that such a 
change has on expectations. 
\ 
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Levich (1979 [b]) states that tests for market efficiency 
involve examining the availability of unusual returns. 
Investment opportunities are . divided into. risk-free and 
risky investments. Although the empirical evidence mostly 
supports the efficient market hypothesis to the extent that 
risk-free profitable covered interest arbitrage 
opportunities are quickly eliminated, the research evidence 
on risky investments has produced less substantive results. 
Market efficiency requires that unusual profit 
opportunities in risky investments are quickly eliminated. 
Levich (1979[b], p.16) states: 
" .•. it is difficult to test if investors 
efficiently set the actual spot exchange rate 
equal to its equilibrium value unless there is 
some agreement on what the equilibrium value ·is". 
Levich presents two methods of ten used to test for market 
efficiency in the spot market. 
The first method examines whether changes in the spot 
exchange rate ,are serially correlated. However, if the 
expected equilibrium return changes significantly over 
/ 
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time, then market efficiency would require actual rates to 
wonder randomly around the expected return, and over time 
serial correlation in this case would be consistent with 
market efficiency. 
Therefore, the test for serial correlation represents a 
test of a joint hypothesis; that the market is efficient 
and the equilibrium return is constant. 
The second method for testing for market efficiency in the 
spot market, is to test the profitability of using a filter 
trading rule. A filter trading rule would consist of 
buying a foreign currency denominated interest bearing 
asset when the foreign currency rises by a stated 
percentage and selling the foreign currency denominated 
interest bearing ·asset for · a local currency denominated 
interest bearing asset when the foreign currency falls by a 
stated percentage. 
If the market is efficient, then the expected profit from 
applying a filter trading rule should be zero. 
Cornell and Dietrich (1978) test for serial correlation and 
for profits from using mechanical trading rules, by 
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analysing daily rates for six currencies for the period 
March 1973 to September 1975. Cornell and Dietrich found 
that the changes in daily exchange rates were not subject 
to serial correlation. 
Cornell and Dietrich compare the profitability of a filter 
trading rule to a buy-and-hold U.S. dollars policy. An 
adjustment ls made for transaction costs and for interest 
received or paid while maintaining a foreign currency 
position. 
Cornell and Dietrich found that a filter trading rule for 
deutschemarks, Dutch guilders and Swiss francs resulted in 
significantly greater profits than the buy-and-hold option. 
Levich (1979[b]) states that the limitations of this type 
of study is that it is uncertain if, ex ante, the size of 
the filter that optimises profits can be determined. Even 
if a filter trading rule results in consistent profits over 
a period, invariably, losses are reported within specific 
time periods. This means that this trading rule may 
include a risk element which accounts for the positive 
return. 
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Levich states that as·the foreign currency rates are only 
valid for a specific volume of contracts, profits may be 
quickly eliminated after a certain value is traded. 
Another factor, ignored by Levich and Cornell and Dietrich 
is that the German and Swiss authorities applied capital 
controls during part of the sample period to limit capital 
inflows. For example, the non-interest bearing deposit 
required by the German authorities on non-reside~t deposits 
reduced ,• the yield to non-residents of deutschemark 
denominated assets which is not reflected in the local 
rates used by Cornell and Dietrich. 
These controls flowed through to the Euro-currency rates as 
Euro-banks, to cover positions, would need to increase 
their claims on German residents. 
Euro-banks therefore offered lower rates due to the 
effective tax that capital controls placed on interest 
earnings on deutschemark denominated deposits. 
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Levich (1979[b]) restates the techniques used to test for 
market efficiency in the. forward market. 















If ·the constant term, a, is not significantly different 
from zero, and the beta coefficient, b, is· not 
significantly different from unity, then we can conclude 
that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate. However, if changes in the ~pot rate are 
random, then the forward premiums/discounts ~ill explain 
only a small percentage of changes in the spot rate. This 
. means that al though, the equation may result in a low R2 , 
the forward rate may still be an unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate. 
The study restates another technique used to measure market 
efficiency, which represents the analysis of. the forecast 
error; 
e , = S - F 
t n t+n t. n 
Levich ( 1979 [a]) and Gi.ddy and Dufey ( 1975) found that over 
long periods for most of the currencies tested, the mean 
171 
errors do not differ significantly from zero. In addition, 
these forecast errors are serially uncorrelated. 
Therefore, the analysis of trends in past forecast errors 
will not result in superior forecasting results. 
Results consistent ·with the unbiasedness of the forward 
rate as a predictor of the future spot rate, have been 
interpreted as an indication of market efficiency. 
However, there are theories which are consistent with the 
existence of a forward risk premium. Grauer, Litzenberger, 
and Stehle (1976) and Cornell (1977) tested for the 
existence of a forward risk premium. 
more detail later in the chapter. 
This is examined in 
Market efficiency requires that the forward rate should 
represent the best available forecast of the future spot 
rate. Levich (1979[a]) concluded that time series 
forecasts and composite forecasts did not outperform the 
forward rate. 
· One test of semi-strong market efficiency consists of 
comparing the forward rate, to the foreign exchange 
forecasts prepared by foreign exchange advisory services. 
Levich ( 1979 [b]) analysed the forecasts for ·the Predex 
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Corporation for the period April 1975-0ctober 1977. The 
results were mixed. For the deutschemark and lira, the 
Predex forecasts were significantly better than the forward 
rate. However, for the Canadian dollar and the yen, the 
Predex forecasts were. significantly worse than the forward 
rate. 
In the case of sterling and the Fren9h franc, the forecasts 
were not significantly different from the forward rate. 
Levich refers to a study by King (1978) who found that the 
average professional forecast error was smailer than the 
average forward rate forecast error; however, only for the 
deutschemark was this difference signi·ficant. 
Levich (1980) analysed the accuracy of forecasts prepared 
by advisory services. On the basis of mean squared errors 
the study found that most forecasts we.re not as accurate as· 
the forward rate, but that for several advisory services, " 
the record of correct forecasts and percent of perfect 
information profits are too good to b~ explained by chance" 
(Levich,1980 : p.122) 
Levich (1979[c]) could not reject the hypothesis that the 
forward rate is an unbiased forecast of the future spot 
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rate. It was also found that the results reflected a low 
R
2 
and, therefore the predictive power of the model was not 
significant. 
Cornell ( 1977) examine¢! the relationship between forward 
exchange rates and subsequent spot rates. Cornell tested 
for the existence of a forward risk premium. The concept 
of market efficiency and the unbiasedness of forward rates 
as predictors of future spot rates are separated. 
In a market that is semi-strong efficient, a trader would 
be unable to use public information to earn unusual risk-
adjusted profits. This has been interpreted that market 
efficiency requires the forward rate to be an unbiased 
predictor of the spot rate, otherwise traders could use the 
bias to earn profits by undertaking speculative positions 
in the spot and forward market. 
However, the ·unbiasedness equals market efficiency argument 
ignores the risk undertaken by traders who take a position 
in foreign exchange. If this risk represents a systematic 
risk, theq the forward rate should exhibit bias, as this 
represents the only way that a risk premium can be paid. 





systematic risk as the dependence between the future spot 
price of foreign exchange and real gross world product. 
Cornell (1977) tested for the existence of a risk premium 
by examining monthly spot and one-month forward rates for 
several currencies for the period April 1973-January 1977. 
The study could not find any evidence to support th~ 
existence of a risk premium. If the risk premium is zero 
then Cornell states that in an efficient market, the 
standard deviation of the forecast errors (i.e. the· 
difference between the forward rate and subsequently 
observed spot rate [Xt] ) , should not be greater than the 
standard deviation ·of the· forecast errors from any other 
model. 
Cornell (,1977) compares the forward rate forecast errors 
(i.e. F - X ) to the fore cast errors of · employing the 
t-1 t 




The martingale model outperforms the forward rate for five 
of the seven currencies tested. Cornell estimated the 
following two additional models; 
X - x = a + a [X x ] 
t t-1 0 1 t-1 - t-2 
X - X = a + a [X ' - X ] + a [X - X ] 
t t-1 0 1 t-1 t-2 2 t-3 t-4 
These models improved . upon the martingale model, in that 
the standard error was less than the standard deviation of 
the forecast errors for sterling, the U.S. dollar and the 
yen. The study found that although the best autoregressive 
model outperf armed the forward rate for six of the seven 
currencies, the differences were too immaterial to draw 
firm conclusions about the absence of market efficiency. 
The following model was also tested; 
F ,_ x = a + a [ x - -x ] 
t-1 t 0 1 t-1 t-2 
Market efficiency would require that the forward premium is 
uncorrelated with past spot · rates and therefore the 
coefficierit a
1 
should not be significantly different from 
-, 
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zero. Cornell found that was not significantly 
different from zero for six of the seven currencies tested. 
Mussa (1979). analysed the two theories of foreign exchange 
rate determination, that is, the flow market model and the 
asset market model in the context of the empirical 
regular! ties found to exist in the foreign market. The 
asset market theory was found to be appropriate- in 
explaining the behaviour of exchange rates. 
Mussa (1979, p.10) goes on to state that if exchange rates 
are not fixed or controlled by intervention by the central 
bank, then 
"the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate 
follows approximately a random walk." 
The error term is serially uncorrelated. The study goes on 
to state that the expected change in the spot exchange rate 
betw'een two successive periods is minor relati_ve to the 
period to period variability of the spot rate. 
The study states that there is evidence of a small degree 




(1979) observes that there appear to be periods of relative 
calm which are followed "by periods of turbulence, with the 
exchange rate perhaps moving in one direction. The study 
concludes that the exchange rate could be influenced by 
policies undertaken by the central bank. 
If the central bank is able or is seen to be able· to hold 
or to maintain an exchange rate, then there will be little 
reason or motivation for traders to speculate against the 
central bank. However, when evidence reaches the market 
that the central bank is no longer able to maintain the 
exchange rate, then speculation would ensure a dramatic 
movement in the spot rate. . This would be expected to 
result in some serial correlation in exchange rate 
movements. 
Another empirical regularity in the foreign exchange market 
is that the change in the forward rate is always very close 
to the change in the contemporaneous spot rate.- Mussa 
(1979) plotted the spot rate and the contemporaneous 
forward rate for sterling on a monthly basis from 1921 
through to 1924, and plotted the U.S. dollar/sterling spot 
rate and the contemporaneous forward rate on a monthly 
basis for the period January 1973 - September 1976. 
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In addition, the study plots the deutschemark/U.S. dollar 
spot rate and contemporaneous forward rate on a monthly 
basis for the period January 1973 - September 1976. In all 
cases it was found from the observation of the time series 
plots that the spot rate and the contemporaneous forward 
rate moved very closely with one another. The difference 
between these two rates in the plots reflected the forward 
premium/discount. 
In examining the relationship be~ween the forward rate and 
the corresponding future spot rate, it was found that the 
forward exchange rate was an. unbiased predictor of the 
future spot exchange rate. However, the forward rate was 
not a good predictor of the future spot exchange rate~ 
Mussa ( 1979) plotted the spot rate and the corresponding 
forward rate for sterling on a monthly 'basis for.the period 
January 1973 - June 1976. The study concluded that the 
forward rate did not appear to be successful in predicting 
changes in th_e spot rate. 
Mussa found that the forward rate was marginally superior 





This is due to the fact that over the sample period, 
sterling was at a consistent forward discount and in that 
period sterling did in fact depreciate. 
The percentage change in the spot rate for the 
deutschemark/u.s. dollar exchange rate was plotted against 
the expected ·change in the spot rate as reflected by the 
forward premium on the U.S. dollar. It was found that the 
forward pre~ium was not able to predict the change in the 
spot rate. The variation in the spot rate was material in ' 
relation to the variation in the forward premium. 
The forward rate may deviate from the expected future spot 
rate due to the existence of a risk premium. Mussa states 
that this risk premium ·may be material during periods of 
currency crises and that a large forward discount on a 
currency expected to depreciate or expected to experience 
volatility in the exchange rate, could reflect market 
participants avoiding exposure in that currency. 
\ 
Mussa ( 1979 ) analyses the purchasing parity . theory and 
states that in the long run during periods of monetary 
disturbance, the movement in exchange rates should reflect 
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the differential in· inflation rates. However, Mussa states 
(1979, p.23); 
"month to month changes in exchange rates are not 
well correlated with month to month changes in 
relative purchasing power parities." 
The study also states that countries with· high nominal 
interest rates would tend to have depreciating currencies 
C!nd countries with material trade deficits also tend to 
have depreciating currencies. Further, countries with 
rapidly expanding money supplies tend to have depreciating 
exchange rates. 
Frenke·l ( 1981) analysed the effici.ency of · the foreign 
exchange market by testing the relationship between the 
spot and forward rates. Frenkel states (1981, p.5) that; 
"exchange rates are strongly influenced by 'news' 
which by definition is unpredictable." 
Frenkel tested the efficiency of the market by regressing 
the logarithm of the current spot ra~e on the logarithm of 
the one-month forward rate applicable in the prior month, 
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foi thiee currencies, the U.S. dollar/sterling, U.S. 
dollar/French franc and U.S. dollar/deutschemark rates, for 
the period June 1973 - July 1979. The formula used was ; 
ln S = a + b ln F + U 
t t-1 t 
The results indicated that for the deutschemark/U.S. dollar 
rate, the hypothesis that the constant term is not 
./ 
significantly different from zero and that the slope 
coefficient is not significantly different from unity,. 
could not be rejected. Although these hypotheses· are 
rejected for the· U.S. dollar/franc exchange rate and 
marginally rejected for the U.S. dollar/sterling exchange 
rate, Frenkel states (1981, p.6) that:· 
"The joint hypothesis that the constant is zero 
and that the slope coefficient is unity, cannot 
be rejected at the 95 percent level for the 
dollar/pound and the dollar/DM exchange rates and. 
at the · 99 percent level for ·the dollar/franc 
exchange rate." 
Frenkel added lagged values of the forward rate in the 
equation tested, and found that the coefficients of the 
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lagged values of the forward rate were not significantly 
different from zero. This is consistent with market 
efficiency as the forward rate includes the information 
implicit in the lagged values of the forward rate. The 
Durban-Watson statistics were found to be consistently 
close to 2, which indicates ari absence of serial 
correlation. 
Frenkel. plotted the realized percentage changes in the 
deutschemark/ U.S. dollar exchange rate and the lagged 
forward premium for the period July 1973 -· July 1979. The 
forward premium was·used to indicate the pr~dicted change 
in the spot e~change rate. It was found that the variance 
of the monthly changes in exchange rates materially 
exceeded the variance in the monthly forward premium. 
Frenkel concludes (1981, p.11) that this indicates that; 
"the bulk of exchange rate changes seem to be due 
to 'new information' which., by definition, could 
not have been anticipated and reflected in the 
forward premium or discoun:t which prevailed in 
the previous period." 
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Frenkel plotted the contemporaneous forward ·rate against 
the spot exchange rate for the three currencies. The plots 
reflected a high correlation between forward and spot 
exchange rates, and a 
between the percentage 
exchange rates. 
correlation exceeding 96 percent 
changes in the spot and forward 
Frenkel (1981, p.15) states that 
"the contemporaneous spot and forward exchange 
rates are approximately equal, thus indicating 
that the market's best forecast of the future 
spot rate is (approximately) the current spot 
.rate." 
I . 
Frenkel states that ·in general, currencies that are 
expected to depreciate, are traded at a discount in the 
forward market. 
The study explores the role of "news" in exchange rate 
movements and based on the assumption that unanticipated 
changes in interest rates reflects "news", Frenkel 
formulates the current spot rate as being a function of the 
forward rate and the unexpected change in interest rates. 
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The study found that the coefficient of the actual interest 
differential is not signif~cantly different from zero, 
while the coefficient of the expected interest differentia~ 
is positive. However, only in the case of the U.S. 
dollar/sterling exchange· rate, is the coefficient 
statistically significant. 
The expected interest differential was based on lagged 
values of the interest differential. Frenkel found that 
\ 
during the sample period, which reflected high rates of 
inflation, the same "news" that caused an increase in the 
interest differential also caused a depreciation in the 
spot exchange rate. Exchange rates were found to deviate 
materially from expected rates based on purchasing power 
parities. 
Isard (1987) in a review of empirical models of exchange 
rates states that most studies; 
"provide extensive and fairly convincing evidence 
that existing models of systematic exchange rate 
behaviour could not outperform a naive random-
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' 
walk model or the forward exchange rate in 
postsample forecasting tests .•. " 
However, a few studies have reported models that were able 
to outperform a random-walk model., · Isard states that a 
number of studies have rejected the hypothesis of uncovered 
interest parity (UIP). 
Frankel and Froot (1985) collected survey data from a few. 
hundred financial market participants and economists on the 
expected. future exchange rate <;>f the u. s. dollar against 
other currencies. The average expected future exchange 
rates of a number of currencies were compared to the 
respective forward rates and significant deviations were 
recorded. These deviations could reflect risk premiums in 
the pricing of forward exchange. 
Isard (1987) states that exchange rates may be based on a 
whole range of macro-economic and ·political factors, 
exogenous variables affecting production, and taxation 
factors. 
Goodhart (19S7) found that unanticipated changes in the UK 
money stock only affected the U.S. dollar/sterling exchange 
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on the day after the announcement. This contrasts to the 
situation in the USA, where.there was an almost immediate 
. response to money supply announcements. Goodhart also 
states that while most tests have found that the exchange 
rates movements depict a random walk, certain studies have 
found signs of positive autocorrelation. 
Goodhart -found that the forward rate was a less reliable 
predictor of the future spot rate than the current spot 
rate. The application of Fama' s ( 1984) study to UK data 
resulted in.similar conclusions; the slope coefficient of 
the regression of the · actual change in spot rates to the 
forward premium was significantly . different from unity. 
Goodhart states that in the U.K. case the foreign exchange 
market under-reacted to "news". 
Edwards ( 1983) emphasised the rc:>le that news has on the 
spot exchange rate. Using the tests for market efficiency 
developed by Frenkel and Levich, Edwards found that the 
market efficiency hypothesis was not rejected for the U.S. 
dollar/sterling and U.S. dollar/deutschemark rates. 
However, it was rejected for the French franc/U.S. dollar, 
and lira/U.S. dollar rate. 
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Edwards followed the Frenkel procedure of adding F onto· 
. t-1 
the OLS equ~tion and found that the coefficient was not 
significantly different from zero for all the currencies 
examined. Edwards modelled "news" on unanticipated changes 
in domestic and foreign money, dom~stic and foreign real 
income and unanticipated changes in real interest rates in 
both the domestic and foreign country. 
When unanticipated changes in the determinants of the 
exchange rate were taken into account it was found that the 
·1ira/U.S. dollar rate met the conditions for market 
efficiency~ However, efficiency was still rejected for the 
U.S. dollar/French franc exchange rate and Edwards 
concludes that the "news" reflected in the unanticipated 
changes in money, income and interest rates do not explain 
the total variation in exchange rates. This maybe due to a 
varying risk premium. 
Under restrictive assumptions, Kawai (i984) concluded that 
forward trading would tend to stabilise the spot exchange 
rate if trade shocks dominated the foreign exchange rate. 
However, if changes in the interest rate.differential is 
the main cause of exchange rate variability, then forward 
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trading would tend to increase the volatility in the spot 
exchange rate. 
Chrystal and Thornton (1988) used the equations developed 
by Frenkel and Levich to test for market efficiency on a 
set of data for the period March . 1973 to November 1983. 
The currencies examined were of the United Kingdom, France 
and West Germany. The joint hypothesis that the constant 
was equal to zero (a = 0) an~ the slope coefficient was 
equal to unity (b = 1) could not be rejected for Franc~ and 
the United Kingdom. However; it was rejected for West 
Germany. 
The "random walk" formulation of the equation was also· 
tested and the joint hypothesis that a .= 0 and b = 1, could 
not be rejected for the United Kingdom and France. 
However, again this was rejected for West Germany. Lagged 
values of the spot and forward rate were added to the 
equations and the authors were unable to reject the 
hypotheses that the lag coefficients were not significantly 
different from zero. The study found that the current spot 
rate was as good or even a better predictor of the future 
spot rate than the current forward rate. 
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Chrystal and Thornton (1988, p.324) add that 
"the spot rate contains more information about 
future spot rates than the forward rate does, 
because the forward market is typically thinner 
and involves higher transaction costs." 
In an efficient market asset prices would be expected to 
change instantaneously, when new information which effects 
future expectations comes onto the market. Hardouvelis 
(1988) analysed the effects of macro-economic news on the 
exchange rate. Hardouvelis analysed the immediate response 
of exchange rates to new information about various US 
macro-economic factors, including monetary news, inflation, 
the trade deficit, and other macro-economic factors. The 
sample period consisted of October 1979 to August 1984. 
Hardouvelis examined the U.S. dollar rate in relation to 
various currencies including the deutschemark, the yen, the 
Swiss franc, sterling, the French franc, the Canadian 
dollar and the Italian lira. It was found that the 
exchange rate reacts primariiy to an unanticipated change 
-in money supply (Ml) but that the exchange rate was also 
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I 
sensitive to changes in the trade deficit, inflation and 
other variable_s. 
In relation to uncovered interest parity, Frankel. ( 1986) 
conclud~d that the risk premium was very small and that 
very little of the changes in the spot exchange rate which 
were in excess of the forward premium or discount could be 
attributed to the risk premium. Frankel concludes that a 
variable risk· premium would not be able to explain the 
observed bias in:the forward·rate prediction error. 
Hsieh and Kulatilaka (1982) tested for the existence of a 
risk premium in forward prices for primary metals traded on 
the London metal exchange over the period January 1970 to 
September 1980. The authors found evidence to support the 
con6e~t of a time varying risk premium. 
Backus { 1984) analysed Canadian and US foreign exchange 
data over the 1970s. Backus concluded that exchange.rate 
movements reflected a random-walk and that this was 
consistent with monetary theory if the money supply and 
income variables also represented random-walks. However, 
money and income only explain 22.per cent of the exchange 
rate movements over the sample period. These conclusions 
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are in line with Meese & Rogoff (1983) who tested the U.S. 
dollar in terms of various currencies and found that a 
random walk produced the best post-sample predictions. 
Frankel (1982) found that the mean forward forecast error -
for the six currencies analysed in his study, was not 
significantly different from zero. Levich (1979[b]) found 
that the mean forward forecast error was not significantly 
different from zero. This was taken to conclude that the 
pricing of forward exchange did not include a risk premium. 
In Cornell (1977) although the risk premium was found to 
have a mean of zerq the study concluded that this could be 
consistent with an exchange risk premium which changed sign 
over time. Various studies have regressed the future spot 
rate on the current forward rate to test for the existence 
of a forward risk premium. If the intercept is equal to 
zero and the slope coefficient is equal to unity, then the 
conclusion maybe drawn that forward rate is an 
predictor of the future spot rate (therefore, 
premium is zero). 
unbiased 
the risk 
Frankel (1982) found that the forecast errors for several 
currencies were serially correlated. Again, this is 
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consistent with the concept of a time varying risk premium. 
Cosset (1984) ana1ysed exchange rates over the period March 
1973 to February 1980 and found that the size of the risk 
premium changes_over short periods of time and that this 
indicates that the risk premium may be on average equal to 
zero. 
Shafer and Loopesko (1983, p.21) in· analysing the 
relationship between exchange rate changes and changes in 
money supply variables, state that; 
"Changes in the exchange rate may not have a 
simple relation to monetary aggregates even when 
money supply disturbances are the underlying 
cause. Expectations concerning the future 
. behaviour of money supplies may be much more 
important than their current behaviour in 
determining the exchange rate. ·Thus poor 
correlation between contemporaneous changes in 
monetary aggregates and ·exchange rates can be 
explained." 
The authors state that the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition consists of a . joint hypothesis, firstly, that 
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identical assets denominated in different currencies are 
viewed as perfect substitutes and therefore have the same 
expected rate of return, and secondly that expectations are 
rational." Empirical evidence seems to suggest that the 
uncovered interest parity condition is not valid, however, 
researchers have been unable to determine which hypothesis 
should be rejected. 
The study goes on to state that structural models have not 
been able to outperform a simple random walk moqel. This 
is consistent with the conclusions reached by Meese and 
Rogoff (1983) who analysed structural models for the 
deutschemark/U .. S. dollar, the sterling/U. S. dollar· and 
yen/U.S. dollar exchange rates. The study concluded that 
the random walk model performed as well as the structural 
time series model~ in the sample period, December 1976 to 
June 1981. 
Shafer and Loopesk_o ( 1983), in testing the period April 
1973 to February 1983, indicate further evidence to justify 
the random walk behaviour of exchange rate movements. The 
authors found that a high percentage of the forecast error 
was not explained by disturbances in the fundamental 
factors particularly for short term periods. 
194 
The· short term volatility in· exchange rates is not 
explained by the variables emphasised in the structural 
models. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The literature review has been divided into two_ parts. It 
firstly represents a survey of studies which test the 
validity of covered interest parity, and secondly, it 
represents a survey of methodologies employed to test for 
the existence of unusual returns for risky investments. 
In respect to covered interest parity , numerous studies 
have provided extensive evidence that the interest parity 
.theorem is valid for securities issued in the Euro-currency 
markets, whilst deviations from covered _interest parity 
remain, for securities issued in regulated markets. Aliber ~ 
( 1973) emphasised differences in the level of political 
risk to explain deviations from interest parity while 
Dooley and Isard (1980) concluded that most of the 
deviations from covered interest · parity, -- in the German .) 
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case, were due to the effective tax that. existing capital 
controls placed on non-resident interest earni~gs. 
The system of capital and exchange controls in the South 
African foreign e~change market was extensively referred to 
in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 5 the validity of the 
covered interest parity theorem will be tested empirically 
for the South African foreign exchange market in the 
context of the relevant capital controls. 
In respect of risky investments, the empirical support for 
market efficiency is mixed and less well defined. The 
analysis of the time series behaviour of spot and forward 
rates generally lends credence to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis in the context of the foreign exchange market. 
Spot and contemporaneous forward rates are highly 
correlated, the forward premium/discount is not a good 
predictor of the future change· in the exchange rate and 
there is substantial empirical support for the observation 
that the spot exchange rate appears to follow a random 
walk. 
These empirical findings support the view that exchange 
rates are based on expectations and that the major factor 
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influencing exchange rate movements is new information, 
which by definition is unpredictable. The absence of 
serial correlation in exchange rate movements supports the 
concept of market efficiency to the extent that traders 
will not be able to predict the future spot exchange rate 
based on past movements in the spot rate. 
If future exchange rates are general!~ unpredictable, for 
whatever reasons, then traders should not be able to 
outperform a buy-and-hold policy. There are, however, a 
few studies which have reported varying degrees of serial 
correlation in exchange rate changes. 
Further, in respect to the uncovered interest parity 
theory, the early evidence supports the hypothesis that the 
forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
rate. This finding was employed by various studies (see, 
fq,r example, Levich ( 1979 [c]) to empirically support the 
concept of market· efficiency in the· foreign exchange 
market. 
Recently, however, other studies have provided growing 
evidence that the forward rate is a biased predictor of the 
future spot rate. This does not necessarily contradict the 
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concept of market efficiency, for. if investors are risk 
averse to holding forward exchange, then the existence of a 
risk premium can only be reflected as bias in the forward 
rate. 
.. 
This study will test in chapters 6 and 7 the time series 
behaviour of the Rand/U.S .. dollar spot and forward exchange 
rates, and will provide an analysis of the mean forecast 
errors. The uncovered interest parity theory will be 
tested. In addition, the spot rate will be regressed 
against selected macro-economic variables to determine 
whether unusual profit opportunities existed over the 
sample period. In so doing, the study will attempt to 
off er substance to the concept of market efficiency in the 
context of the South African foreign exchange market. 
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MARKET EFFICIENCY : TESTS FOR COVERED INTEREST ARBITRAGE 
* OPPORTUNITIES 
OBJECTIVE 
This chapter tests the validity of covered interest parity 
and the __ existence of covered interest arpitrage 
opportunities in the South African foreign exchange market. 
In an efficient market risk-free profit opportunities 
should be quickly eliminated, and covered interest 
arbitrage opportunitie~ should not exceed related 
transaction costs. 
* The initial findings of this chapter were published in_ 1987 with Prof. R. Knight, 
the supervisor at the time. Correia C. de J. and Knight R.F. "Covered Interest 
Arbitrage Opportunities in the South African Foreign Exchange Market." South 
African Journal of Business Management, 36, no.4: 209-14. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter tests the efficiency of the South African 
foreign exchange market to the extent that risk-free profit 
opportunities should be quickly eliminated. This 
represents testing Hypothesis 1, as set out in Chapter 1. 
Deviations from .covered interest parity imply that 
opportunities exist to undertake profitable covered 
interest arbitrage transactions. 
Interest parity deviations will not imply that the foreign 
·exchange market is inefficient if apparent covered interest 
arbitrage profit opportunities are not sufficient to offset 
related transaction costs. 
This chapter studies the period August 1983 to Febru.ary 
1988. This period is divided into two sample periods; 
August 1983 to August 1985, and September 1985 to February 
1988. The first period represent~ a period where technical 
imperfections were minimal (particularly in the spot 
market), and th• movement in the rand/U.S. doliar rate was 
dramatic. 
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The latter period represents a period which covers the 
imposition of the debt standstill, the · reintroduction of 
the Financial rpnd mechanism .and the imposition of further 
direct controls. 
The chapter defines the terms, covered interest arbitrage 
and covered interest rate parity and regression analysis 
is employed to test the relationship between the quoted 
for~ard dollar premium and its interest parity value. The 
interest parity equation is plotted against the quoted 
forward dollar premium. 
Deviations from covered interest parity are analysed and 
transaction costs are taken into account to conclude on 
covered interest arbitrage opportunities during the periods 
under review. 
~ 
The countries under study are limited to 
South Africa and the U.S.A. 
The study found that deviations from covered interest 
parity did occur during the period August 1983 to August 
1985, but these apparent risk-free arbitrage profit 
opportunities were not sufficient to offset related 
transaction costs. 
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Al though deviations from interest parity did increase in 
the period August 1985 to February 1988, except for a 
limited period, the level of these . deviations were not 
sufficiently material to allow us to conclude that risk-
free arbitrage opportunities existed over the period. 
Therefore, the study cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
South African foreign exchange market has met a basic 
requirement for market efficiency, that is, risk-free 
profit opportunities should be quickly eliminated. 
This conclusion is however· subject to the fact that the 
definition of "risk...:free" relates to the absence of 
exchange rate risk and that political risk remains. The 
validity of the conclusion rests on the assumption that 
political risk is not an.important variable. 
In general, other studies have explained that the reported 
deviations from covered interest parity in regulated 
markets are due to .such factors as political risk, capital 
controls and differences in taxation (for example, see 
Aliber, 1973, and Dooley and Isard, 1980). 
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In the South African case, the obvious political risk of 
investing in South African securities, and the extensive 
system of exchange and capital controls as reported in 
Chapters 2 and 3, are factors which would be expected to 
result in deviations from covered interest parity. 
I 
The chapter firstly presents the theory underpinning the 
covered interest parity theorem, then empirically tests for 
covered interest parity for South African and U.S.A. 
securities and evaluates the results in terms of other 
studies and the concept of market efficiency. 
5.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET 
Prior to the implementation of the Commission 
recommendations, the South African Re.serve Bank set the 
cost of forward cover at a fixed commission rate of one 
percent per annum. This applied to both purchases and 
sales of forward· foreign currency. 
The Reserve Bank's forward cover policy had an important 
effect on the movement of funds in and out of South Africa. 
If local interest rates exc~eded·foreign interest rates by 
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more than one percent, there existed an incentive for South 
African importers to obtain finance from foreign sources. 
Once this occurred however, there existed pressure on th~ 
Reserve Bank not to increase the cost of forward cover or 
reduce local interest rates as this would have an adverse 
effect on th~ Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves. 
The Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry recommend~d 
a policy of setting the forward premium/discount on the 
basis of interest ·differentials .. This would reflect an 
efficient and competitive market as covered interest 
arbitrage would ensure this relationship in a free and 
competitive market. 
Due to the material foreign exchange losses incurred on the 
forward account, the Reserve Bank set on a programme to 
disengage from the forward exchange market by September 
1986. 
The Reserve Bank introduced a spot-swap system to link the 




to economic and political developments 
from the forward market has not been / 
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5.3 COVERED' INTEREST ARBITRAGE. 
Covered interest arbitrage constitutes a swap transaction 
where parties move funds across boundaries to take 
advantage of differential interest rates. This arbitrage 
is risk-free· (apart from political ri~k) in that if a firm 
borrows U.S. dollars offshore to deposit in South African 
securities, the firm will simultaneously buy U.S. dollars 
forward. 
!f the interest rate differential between South Africa and 
the U.S.A. is materially different to the forward dollar 
premium/discount, then an incentive would exist to enter 
into a profitable arbitrage transaction. 
In an efficient market, risk-free arbitrage profit 
opportunities should be quickly eliminate.a. 
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Starting from first principles, we would expect the 
following equation to be satisfied in an efficient market: 
x(l+i) - x = - x (5.1) 
where: x = initial amount stated in Rands 
i = domestic· interest rate 
.f 
foreign interest rate 1 = 
s = spot exchange rate(indirect quotation) 
F = forward exchange rate(indirect quotation) 
If Equation 5.1 is not satisfied, there will exist 
opportunities to enter into profitable covered interest 
arbitrage transactions~ subject to the condition that the 
inequality is sufficient to offset any related t7ansaction 
costs. This situation is depicted in Figure 5.1. 
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5.4 COVERED INTEREST RATE PARITY THEOREM (CIPT) 
~he theory of covered interest rate parity states that for 
securities of similar risk, the quoted forward 
premium/discount should be equal to the interest 
differential divided by one plus the interest rate. The 
CIPT . is a restatement of Equation ·s.1 and is 
mathematically denoted as: 
S-F •. • f l.-l. 
s l+i 
(5.2) = 
Where: s = spot exchange rate(indirect quotation) 
F = forward exchange rate(indirect quotation) 
i = dqmestic· interest rate 
. f foreign interest rate . l. = 
Let: Q = (S-F)/S 
I = (i~if)/(l+i) 
5.5 FORWARD DOLLAR PREMIUM 
If Q < I, then the interest differential ·is not fully 
offset by the forward dollar premium; The effect of this 
inequality is to encourage capital flows into South 
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Africa. The demand for spot rands will increase, thereby 
increasing the value of {S) in the CIPT equation.· At the 
same time the demand for forward U.S. dollars increases, 
and (F) falls. 
This means that the forward premium, (Q) will increase and 
taking together the effects on relative ·interest rates due 
to the movement of funds, covered interest parity'will be 
reinstated. 
If Q > I, then the quoted forward dollar premium more than 
offsets th~ interest differential. This will have the 
effect of encouraging capital outflows from South Africa. 
The demand _for spot U.S. dollars will increase while the 
demand for forward U.S. dollars will decline. 
Therefore the spot rate, ( S) will fall and the forward 
rate, (F) will rise thereby reducing (Q) to a level that 
reinstates covered interest parity. The interest parity 
equation and covered interest arbitrage opportunities are 
graphically depicted in Figure 5.2. 
FIGURE 5.2 
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COVERED INTEREST PARITY THEORY 
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All observations on the line represent situations where 
the interest parity condition is satisfied, i.e. where the 
forward dollar premium/discount equals the interest 
differential divided by one plus the domestic interest 
rate. 
Observation A represents a situation where the quoted 
forward dollar premium exceeds its interest parity value 
(i.e. Q > I). In a perfect market this would result in 
capital outflows until covered interest parity is 
restored. 
Observation B represents a situation where the quoted 
forward dollar premium is· less than its interest parity 
valu~(i.e. Q < I}. Again, in a perfect world this would 
result in capital inflows to South Africa to take 
advantage of the covered interest arbitrage opportunity. 
This chapter focuses attention ~pon situations where the 
forward dollar premium deviates from its interest parity 
value. This is due to the fact that for the period under 
review the forward dollar was consistently at a premium to 
the spot rate. 
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Observations C and D reflect situations where the forward 
dollar discount deviates from _its interest parity value. 
Observation D will result in capital inflows as the 
forward discount exceeds its interest parity value. As 
the quoted forward discount is less than its interest 
parity value in observation C, t~is will result in capital 
outflows. 
Covered interes-t arbitrage will not necessarily restore 
covered interest parity due to the transaction costs 
involved in the required buying and selling operations. 
Therefore, market efficiency requires that the interest 
parity equation is satisfied to the extent that the 
observations lie within the transaction cost boundaries 
around the CIPT line. 
5.6· DATA 
A regression was run on Micro TSP (version 4. 1 ) to test 
the cover~d interest parity equation for the period August 
1983 to February 1988. Data were obtained from the 
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International Division of the Standard Bank or downl·oaded 
from the Standard Bank's CATS system. 
The data consists of 233 weekly observations of the three 
monthly South African and New York Bankers' Acceptance 
rates, the weekly spot rand/U.S. dollar rates and weekly 
three month quoted forward dollar premiums. 
The data represents.the closing rates on the l:ast business 
day of each week. The Bankers' Acceptance rates are the 
market rates quoted in the secondary market and are before 
any bank commission and stamp duty. As the data is stated 
in annualised terms it is necessary.to transform the data 
by dividing by four. Transfo.rmation is necessary 
otherwise the relationships between the variables will be 
misspecified. The division of the annualised rates by 










parity require that 
compared. Bankers ' 
Acceptance rates were selected to test for interest 
parity. It will be noted tha·t there remain differences in· 
terms .Qf political risk, taxation and capital controls. 
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interest parity was also tested by using the 
prime overdraft rates quoted in South Africa and 
predict the forward rate. The period was 
confined to the period January 1983 to October 1986, due 
to limitations in the Standard Bank's CATS data bank. Due 
to the greater degree of stickiness in prime overdraft 
rates, and· the volatility in .the foreign exchange market 
over this period, this was considered to be an important 
test of covered interest parity. 
The data consists of the month-end closing prime overdraft 
rates in South Africa and the U.S.A. and the month-end 
quoted one month forward dollar premium. The data was 
transformed by dividing by twelve to represent estimates 
of the rates facing traders. 
5.7 RESULTS 
In Figure 5. 3, the quoted forward dollar premium ( Q) is 
plotted ·against its interest parity value (I) for the 
period August 1983 to February 1988. 
___ _J 
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, The quoted dollar premium has tended to follow its 
interest parity value very closely over the period, except 
in the latter half of 1985 and for a period in 1986.' This 
may reflect the turbulence in the market in the aftermath 
of the imposition of the debt standstill, and the closure 
of the foreign exchange market for a limited period. 
It will be noted that from 1986, the quoted dollar premium 
. appears to have consistently rema.ined below its interest 
parity value. The magnitude of these deviations is 
analysed in greater detail further in the study. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 represent plots of the quoted dollar 
premium and its interest parity value over the two sample 
periods August 1983 to August 1985 and September 1985 to 
February 1988. 
The first sample period, August 1983 to August 1985, 
reflected a period of a systematic relaxation in direct 
controls, the implementation of market reforms and the 
adoption of a flexible spot exchange rate system. In this 
period the forward dollar premium appeared to follow its 
interest parity value very closely. 
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The latter period reflects increased deviations from 
covered interest parity. During' September 1985, these 
deviations are significant, perhaps reflecting the 
turbulence in the market subsequent to the debt 
standstill, political turmoil and the closure of the 
foreign exchange market. 
FIGURE 5.3 . THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST PARITY AND 
THE QUOTED FORWARD DOLLAR PREMIUM. 
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FIGURE 5.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST PARITY AND 
l/Q 
THE QUOTED FORWARD DOLLAR PREMIUM. 
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FIGU~E 5.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST PARITY AND 
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In Figure 5.6, the quoted monthly forward dollar premium 
(Q) is plotted against its interest parity value (I) which 
is determined by using the month-end prime overdraft rates 
in· South Africa and the U.S.A. for the period January 1984 
to October 1986. _ Deviations appear to be material in 
1985. · The deviations will be analysed in greater detail 
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5.8 REGRESSION EQUATION 
The following regression equation was specified: 
- where 
Q = a + bI 
Q = ( S - F)/S 
+ u 
t 
I = (i - if)/(l+i) 
u = white noise term 
t 
(5.3) 
The spot exchange rate ( S) and the forward rate (.F-) are 
stated in terms of indirect quotations. 
5.9 REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
The results of the regression equation for the period 
August 1983 to February 1988 are presented in Table 5.1. 
The covered interest parity theory requires that the slope 
coefficient should be close to unity. The regression 
results in a slope coefficient of 1.06. 
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Covered interest parity implies that the constant, a, 
should not be significantly different from ~era~ However, 
the t statistic indicates ·that the constant in the 
equation, is statistically sig~ificant and negative. 
The R2 is 94.9 percent indicating a high degree of 
correlation between the quoted dollar premium (Q) and its 
interest parity value (I). 
To correct for autocorrelation, the data has been 
transformed using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. The 
results of ·the revised · equation are also. presented in 
Table 5.1. 
The slope coefficient is 1. 04 which is not statistically 
different from unity at the 99 percent confidence level 
. 2 
and the R is 96. 8 percent. The constant term remains 
statistically significant_ after transformation. The 
Durbin-Watson (ow) statistic is now 2 .11 indicating the· 
··correction for serial correlation. 
J 
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TABLE 5.1 RESULTS OF.REGRESSION EQUATION:. Qt= a+ bit+ ut 
(t statistics in parentheses) 
























































1 = Ordinary Least Squar~s Regression 











The regression estimates for the two sample periods, 
August 1983 to August 1985, and September 1985 to February 
1988 are also present~d.in Table 5.1. This was don~ to 
analys~ differences between the two periods which in 
effect reflected two different exchange rate regimes. 
The first period reflects a unitary, "managed floating" 
exchange rate system with minimal central bank 
intervention in the spot market, 
relaxation in exchange controls. 
reflects the reimposition . and 
controls, the· reintroduction of 
and ~ continuing 
The latter period 
expansion of direct 
the · Financial rand 
mechanism and a reversal in the market reform process. 
In the sample period, August 1983 to August 1985, the 
constant term is 0.0008 and-the slope coefficient is 0.96. 
The constant term is not significantly different from zero 
which is in contrast to the value of the ·constant term 
for the period as a whole. 
, 
The slope coefficient is significantly different from 
unity and remains significantly different from unity after 
applying the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. The slope 




The latter sample period, September 1985 to February 1988, 
reflects different results. The constant term is negative 
(-0.0026) and is statistically significant; after applying 
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, the estimate for the 
constant term. is no longer significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. 
The slope coefficient is 1.125 and is. significantly 
different from unity at the 95 percent confidence level 
but not at the 99 percent confidence level. The Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation does not materially alter the slope 
coefficient (1.0813) and the coefficient is no longer 
significantly different from unity • 
• 








sample period? The 
following equation was formulated to test for the 
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existence of profitable covered interest arbitrage 
opportunities: 
D = Q - I 
I 
where: D = Deviation from interest parity 
Q = Quoted forward U.S. dollar premium 
I = Interest parity value 
FIGURE 5.7 DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED INTEREST, PARITY 
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.The summary statistics for the deviations depicted in 
Figure 5.7 are presented in Table 5.2. The mean 
deviation over the total sample period is only minus 0.09 
percentage points and the standard deviation is 0.24 
percentage points. The maximum positive deviation is 0.81 
percentage points and the largest negative deviation is 
-1.37 percentage points. 
The maximum and minimum values relate to the month of 
September 1985 which reflected a ·period of market 
turbulence, the · imposition of further exchange controls 
and the closure of the market for a limited period. The 
effect of the debt standstill and the adoption of 
stringent exchange controls is emphasised when the period 
is divided into two sample periods, August 1983 to August 
1985, and September 198~ to ~ebruary 1988. 
It will be noted that for the first period August 1983 to 
August 1985, deviations from covered interest parity did 
not exceed 0.34 percentage points. The mean deviation is 
only minus 0.02 percentage points and is not significantly 
different from zero. Two thirds of the deviations lie 
within approximately 0.14 percentage points of the mean. 
j 
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In the latter period, the mean deviation is minus 0.15 
percentage points with a .standard deviation of 0.28 
percentage points. The maximum and minimum values for the 
total period w~re recorded in September 1985 which forms 
part of this sample period. Again, al though the mean 
deviation is greater than the mean deviation for the first 
sample period, it is still not significantly different 
from zero. 
TABLE 5.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS : DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED 
INTEREST PARITY 
August 1983 - February 1988 
Mean SD 
- 0.0009 0.0024 





September 1985 - February 1988 
Mean SD 














Deviations from covered interest parity using monthly 
prime overdraft rates and monthly forward rates, are 
depicted in Figure 5. 8. The deviations from interest 
parity are significant in the latter, half of 1985 which 













DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED INTEREST PARITY 
(Using prime overdraft rates) 
January 1983 - October 1986 
1984 1985 1996 
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The summary statistics are presented in Table 5. 3. The 
mean monthly deviation is 0.027 percentage points with a 
standard deviation of .143 percent. The maximum and 
minimum deviations are 0.475 and 0.317 percent 
respectively. 
TABLE 5.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS : DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED 
INTEREST PARITY 









Deviations from covered interest parity have been 
expressed in terms of percentage points. To determine the 
covered interest arbitrage opportunity spread, it is 
necessary to translate the interest parity percentage 
deviations into exchange rate points. This is achieved by 
multiplying the percentage deviations b~ the spot exchange 
rate at each point in time. Deviations in terms of 
exchange rate points are presented in Figure 5.9. 
J 
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FIGURE 5.9 COVERED INTEREST ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITY 
SPREADS * 
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The summary statistics of covered interest parity 
deviations in terms of exchange rate points are presented 
in Table 5. 4. The mean is minus 4. 4 exchange rate ·points 
with a standard deviation of 11.2 points. The maximum and 
minimum deviations are 31 and 52 points respectively. In 
the period August 1983 to August 1985, the mean is very 
* As Figure 5.9 represents.deviations stated ori the basis of ell;change rate points. and 
the Rand has generally depreciated over the period under study. deviations in the 






close to zero. The mean deviation is less than one 
exchange rate point. For this period, two thirds of th~ 
. . . ' -
deviations are within 10 points of the mean. The maximum 
. . ,- . .:' 
arid minimum deviations are 31 and 25 exchange rate points 
respectively. In the period September 1985 to February 
1988, the mean is a minus 7.1 exchange rate points which 
is greater th~n the mean deviation of 0.8 points for the 
;, . 
. first sample period but is not significantly different 
from zero. 
TABL.E 5. 4 SUMMARY STATISTICS : DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED 
INTEREST PARITY - EXCHANGE RATE POINTS 
August 1983 - February 1988 
Mean SD Max. Min. 
--0.00044 0.00112 0.00312 -0.00521 
\ 
August 1983 - August 1985 
Mean SD Max. Min. 
.': 0.00008 0.00097 0.00310 -0.0025p 
September 1985 - February 1988 
Mean SD ·Max. Min. 
-0.00071 0.00115 0.00312 -0.00521 
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From January· 1987 to February 1988, when the forward 
dollar premium remained consistently below its interest 
parity value, the magnitude of these deviations was 
insufficient to influence capital inflows as these 
deviations did not exceed tne relevant transaction costs. 
FIGURE 5.10 DEVIATIONS FROM INTEREST PARITY 
(0.25% transaction cost boundaries). 
tt 010------------------.., 
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Transaction costs in the foreign exchange market may be 
measured in terms of exchange rate points. This is 
reflected in the bid-ask spread facing traders. Rand/U.S. 
dollar bid-ask spreads at the retail level (for smaller 
amounts) are presented in Table 5.5 for specified dates. 
TABLE 5.5 BID-ASK SPREADS IN SPOT AND FORWARD RATES 
Rand Bid rates/Rand Ask rates stated in U.S.Dollar terms. 
Spot Forward 
Date Bid Ask Spread Bid Ask Spread 
30/05/84 0.7690 . 0.7790 lOOpts 0.7518 0.7672 154pts 
30/08/84 . 0.6365 0.6465 lOOpts 0.6193 0.6305 112pts 
30/11/84 0.5315 0.5415 lOOpts 0.5149 0.5272 123pts 
28/02/85 0.4985 0.5085 lOOpts 0.4806 0.4926 120pts 
30/05/85 0.4970 0.5070 lOOpts 0.4827 0.4947 120pts 
27/08/85 0.3700 0.3800 lOOpts 0~3670 0.3790 120pts 
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At the retail level, the spot market has reflected a 
spread of 100 points whereas the spread on the forward 
market is approximately 120 points. These spreads are 
clearly not relevant for a firm which would be transacting 
with large amounts but the magnitudes of these spreads may 
indicate inefficiencies at the retail level. 
In the interbank market the bid-ask rates reflect 
significantly reduced margins. The average spread is 
1 approximately 8~10 points in the spot market. The bid-
ask spread is slightly wider in the forward market. 
A swap transaction involves a spot and a forward 
transaction. If we assume the spread facing ~ blue chip 
corporate client is 8 points in the spot market and 10 
points in the forward market, then the average spread 
facing an arbitrageur for both legs of the swap 
transaction would be 9 points. 
1 As banks are dealing on a transaction basis for buy/sell orders it is difficult 
to obtain dat,; on the spreads facing arbitrageurs. A'ccording to private 
intervi~ws by the writer, the spread in the spot ·market is approximately 8-10 
points. Also, see Gidlow (1980[b]). 
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Demsetz, in a study of the U.S. foreign exchange market, 
found that transaction costs in buying and selling 
securities. were on average 2.5 times the costs of 
transacting in the foreign exchange market. 
If we apply this ratio to the average spread facing an 
arbitrageur of 9 exchange rate points in the foreign 
exchange market, then the level. of transaction costs 
facing arbitrageurs would be 22.5 exchange rate points. 
In Figure 5.11, point deviations from interest parity are 
plotted with transaction cost boundaries of 22.5 exchange 
rate points. This results in a wider band than the 
transaction cost boundaries employed by Levich ( 1979 [b] ) 
and Clendenning (1970). 
Apart from September 1985, there were only three times 
when deviations from covered interest parity exceeded 22.5 
points, and then only marginally so. 
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FIGURE 5.11 DEVIATIONS FROM INTEREST PARITY 





....... _,,_, ___ .........._.... ................ --- _....,.._.__. ______________ ~ 






-0 I 0 0 6 ~""""""""""""""'lftllllllll!lll"""""""'~"""""""'"""""""""""'"R""'fl--""l"""""B'I"""""""""""""""'""""""""""' 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
The interest data reflect Bankers' Acceptance rates quoted 
in the secondary market and excludes acceptance commission 
and stamp duty. The acceptance commission and stamp duty 
represents the transaction costs involved in undertaking 
Banker acceptance finance. 
The acceptance ·commission is approximately 1.5 percent per. 
annum of the nominal value, and stamp duty amounts to 5 
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cents for ever';/ RlOO ( 0. 0?%). For "biue chip" corporate 
·clients, the acceptance commission amounts to 0.25 percent 
per annum. 
The cost of the acceptance commission facing a blue chip 
corporate client for a three month transaction would be: 
0.25/100 x 3/12 = 0.06 percent 
The stamp duty is 0.05/100, that is, 0.05 percent. The 
total transaction cost on Bankers' Acceptances would 
. 2 therefore amount to .0.11 percent for "blue chip" traders. 
Theref9re, "blue c~ip" corporate clients would face 
transaction costs of 0. 11 percent on the money market 
transaction and at least 8 exchange rate points in the 
foreign exchange market. At an average exchange rate of 
Rl = $0.50, this would amount to a bid-ask spread of 0.16 
per<;:ent. 
Therefore the transaction costs facing a "blue chip" 
corporate client, before taking into account the costs 
involved ·in dealing in U.S. bankers acceptances, would 
amount to 0. 27 percent. This estimate offers support 
2 Source: Private Interview with Ina Terblanche of Investec Bank. Cape Town. 
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(assuming minimal costs in the U.S.) for the 0.25 percent 
transaction cost boundaries used in Figure 5.10. 
Although banks would face a reduced level of transaction 
costs in dealing with Bankers' Acceptances in the 
secondary market, with the reported turn being an 
estimated 0.1 percent per annum (i.e. 0.025 percent. per 3 
months), arbitrage transactions by the banks are 
restricted by the requirements of the Bank's Act. 
This substahtiates the view taken by C. Viettri of First 
National
3 
who required deviations from interest parity to 
be· in the order of 1-2 percent before the bank would 
undertake any- arbitrage transactions. Apparently, ·the 
level· of arbitrage transactions being undertaken by the 
banks was insignificant. The requirements of the Bank's 
Act constrains arbitrage abtivities due to the Act's 
liquid asset and profitability .requirements. 
If firms are able to transact at the reported margins of 
O. 1 percent per annum then the transaction costs would 
amount to at least 0.21 percent (i.e. 0.16% + 0.025% x 2). 
Therefore the transaction cost boundaries employed in this 
3 Private interview with the writer 
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study appear to be reasonable estimates of'. the actual 
transaction costs facing traders. 
The deviations from covered interest parity using monthly 
prime overdraft rates and monthly forward rates are 
depicted in Figure 5.12, with transaction cost boundaries 
w_hich are assumed to amount to at least 0. 20 percentage 
points. 
In the foreign exchange spot market the bid-a,sk spread 
facing traders would tend to be independent of the 
investment period. A bid-ask spread of 0.16 percent, and 
a further cost margin of 0. 04 percent is pl-otted on the 
graph to depict a 0.20 percent boundary, where transaction 
costs would offset any arbitrage opportunity. 
This is depicted in Figure 5.12. Significant deviations 
from interest parity were recorded for the months of 
August, September and October 1985. This may reflect the 
turbulence in the market in the aftermath of the · market 
I. 
251 
pressures leading to the imposition of the debt standstill 
and the reintroduction of the Financial rand mechanism. 
Deviations from covered interest parity for the remaining 
period did not fall outside the transaction cost 
boundaries. 
FIGURE 5.12 DEVIATIONS FROM COVERED INTEREST PARITY 
n - -c: 
t;j I l::l~..J 
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(using prime overdraft rates) 
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5.12 INTERPRETATION AND COMPARISON 
McCormick (1979) found that when using Reuters data, 
-transaction costs explained only 38 percent of the 
deviations from interest parity using U.S. and U.K. 
Treasury Bills. These represent securities issued in 
different political jurisdictions. 
In contrast, McCormick found that 100 percent of the 
deviations from interest parity for securities issued in 
the same political jurisdiction (Euro-sterling and Euro-
dollar deposits) could ·be explained by transaction costs. 
McCormick (1979, p.416) goes on to state that: 
"These ' results do not seem unreasonable. The 
United Kingdom has long had very stringent 
capital controls. These controls have 
frequently caused large discrepancies between 
domestic sterling and Euro-sterling interest 
rates, and one ·would expect them to also have 
caused large discrepancies from covered interest 
arbitrage parity between U.S. and U.K. treasury 
bills. ~n the other hand, the absence of such 
controls in the Euro-currency markets makes it 
/ 
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much more likely that discrepancies from covered 
interest arbitrage parity between Euro-dollars 
and Euro-sterling are due only to · transaction 
costs." 
Aliber (1973) found that the mean deviation from interest 
parity is seven times greater when U.K. and U.S. treasury 
bills are used to predict the forward rate than when 
external dollar and sterling deposits are used. 
(1973, p.1455) goes on to state that: 
Aliber 
"a major source of the difference between 
predicted and observed forward rates is that the 
securities used to predict the forward rate are 
not identical in terms of political risk." 
Aliber recognises that exchange controls may restrict the 
ability of investors to take advantage of deviations from 
interest parity, and thereby re-establish interest parity 
through equilibrating capital flows. Further, investors 
may face different tax rates and therefore the quoted 
interest yields do not reflect effective yields. 
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Dooley and Isard ( 1980) emphasised the role of capital 
controls and differences in political risk in explaining 
. deviations from interest parity. Isard ( 1987) concludes 
that deviations from covered interest parity are 
immaterial when Euro-currency rates are employed, while 
deviations from covered interest parity for securities 
issued in different political jurisdictions are due to 
capital controls or varying political risks. 
In conclusion, studies have generally reported deviations 
from covered int.erest parity for securities issued in 
regulated markets, while covered interest parity is valid 
for securities issued in unregulated markets. The 
conclusions reached in these studies· draw an interesting 
contrast to the results reported in this thesis 
This chapter concluded based-on empirical tests over the 
period August 1983 to February 1988, that covered interest 
parity was valid in the South African foreign exchange 
market, except for limited periods, when using 3 ·monthly 
Bankers' Acceptance. rates and prime overdraft rates to 
predict the forward rate. 
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relatively high, as South Africa has imposed a wide 
ranging system of exchange controls. The imposition of 
the debt standstill, the readoption of the Financial rand 
system represents evidence that the level of uncertainty 
relating to future capital controls is high. Further, 
political risk as more widely defined, and relating to 
political and socioeconomic stability and the local 
consequences of investment in South Africa for U.S. 
entities, would be factors limiting U.S. investment in 
South African securities. 
The material Financial rand discount indicates the premium 
required by foreign investors to compensate for the level 
of political risk involved in investing in·south African 
securities. 
However, · it is not correct to compare returns earned by 
non-residents using the Financial rand mechanism to 
returns using the ·commercial rand, due to the fact that 
the Financial rand is more volatile, there is limi t13d 
forward cover available, and it is an extremely thin 
market. A transaction of RS million can have a 
significant effect on the Financial rand rate. 4 
4 Source: Private interview with Mr. Pike of Exchange Control, S.A. Reserve Bank. 
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South Africa has a system of extensive exchange and 
capital controls, which limit the ability of arbitrageurs 
from taking advantage of deviations from interest parity. 
These controls have been cited in detail in Chapters 2 and 
3. Residents are (legally), severely restricted in their 
ability to move funds into foreign securities. Non-
residents are also subject to exchange controls. 
A spe,c'.ific restriction which applies to non-residents and 
particularly non-resident banks, is that these banks are 
not permitted to trade in bearer documents such as 
bankers' acceptances [see Gidlow (1984[d])]. South 
Africa's system of exchange controls would be expected to 
restrict the ability of arbitrageurs from undertaking 
equilibrating capital flows to re-establish covered 
interest parity. 
Therefore, deviations from interest 
for sustained periods of time. 
parity could remain 
The ,liquid asset 
requirements and the required capital reserve ratios would 
tend to discourage equilibrating capital flows [see Gidlow 
'(1984[d])]. 
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There is an alternative argument; 
ineffective and therefore would 
exchange controls are 
not be relevant in 
explaining deviations from covered interest parity in the 
South African foreign exchange market. The large short-
term capital outflows reported in Chapter 3, despite an 
extensive system of exchange controls lends credence to 
this view. 
Differences in the ta~ation of security income would also 
result in deviations from covered interest parity when 
nominal interest rates are compared. In this case the 
nominal rate would not represent the effective rate. This 
however, would require a period-by-period comparison due. 
to ongoing changes in tax legisiation. 
Normally, non-residents who are investing funds in South 
African ·securities, would not be taxable as South African 
tax entities. Non-resident Tax on Interest (NRTI) 
[Section 64a] was repealed by Act 90 of 1988. This had 
represented a 10 percent withholding tax on interest paid 
to non-residents. 
In the U.S.A., corporations are taxed on· worldwide income. 
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The marginal ·rate is currently 34 percent. The u. S. 
entity is allowed to deduct foreign taxes paid as a credit 
·to its U.S. tax liability. In New York, entities are 
further subject to State taxes of 10 percent. 
In 1987, the Rangle Amendment passed by Congress withdrew 
the tax credit for South African tax paid by U.S. entities 
oper~ting in South Africa. The difference in the tax rate 
(including state taxes) faced by Sm!th African' compan{es 
and U.S. companies is presently only 6 percent, if these 
companies are not registered as tax entities in both 
countries, but only act as arbitrageurs to take advantage 
of deviations from interest parity. 
However, the inclusion of tax would require a perio~-by­
period comparison of the tax legislation in both 
countries. Al though outside the ambit of this thesis, 
this would represent a useful avenue for future research 
on covered interest parity 
5.13 CONCLUSION 
This study 








Hypothesis 1 as 
African foreign 
exchange market is. efficient to the extent that covered 
interest arbitrage opportunities are quickl.y elimina.ted. 
This is based on the assumption that the covered interest 
arbitrage opportunities were risk-free. The results of 
the study are generally in contrast to other studies which 
reported deviations from covered interest parity in 
regulated markets. 
The results, except for a·1imited period, are consistent 
with what would be expected to occur in a free and 
competitive market and is consistent with the results of 
studies on unregulated markets. 
The Reserve Bank has set the price of forward exchange on 
the basis of what would be expected to occur in a 
competitive market. 
The forward exchange losses incurred by the Reserve Bank 
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on parastatal borrowings would support the view that 
deviations from interest parity are not a feasible policy 
alternative. 
The fact that deviations from covered interest parity were 
insignificant over the sample period has implications for 
.the decision by South African companies to· obtain offshore 
finance. In the period 1982-1985 South African companies 
undertook significant levels of foreign debt. 
South African companies were attracted to foreign sources 
of finance due to lower foreign interest rates. This 
chapter presents evidence that the adv~ntage of lower 
foreign interest rates was off set by the cost of forward 
cover (the forward dollar premium), and therefore there 
was no benefit, after adjusting for risk, for South 
African management to borrow from off shore sources of 
finance. 
The results of this study, in addition, 
Reserve · Bank has remained neutral 
indicate that the 
in relation to 
influencing 
specifically 
capital flows. The Reserve Bank has 
not set the forward dollar premium 
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significantly below its interest parity value to encourage 
short-term -capital inflows. 
The study .found that deviations from covered interest 
parity increased in the post-debt standstili period. 
However, ~xcept for limited specified periods, such 
deviations remained insignificant. These conclusions are 
however based on the interest data employed in the study. 
In conclusion, the study was unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the foreign exchange market is efficient 
to the extent that covered interest arbftrage 
opportunities, except for a limited period, did not exceed 
related transaction costs. However, differences· in 
political risk, 
which would be 
capital controls and taxation are factors 
expected to result in deviations from 
covered interest parity in the South African situation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MARKET EFFICIENCY: TESTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPOT 
OBJECTIVE 
* AND FORWARD EXCHANGE RATES 
This chapter tests for market efficiency by ex~minin9 the 
relationship between spot rates and forward rates. In an 
efficient market' the forward rate . should reflect market 
expectations of. the future spot rate. Although the forward 
rate may not be a good predictor of the fut~re spot rate, 
due t6 the effect of . "news", it should be an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot rate (assuming · a zero risk 
premium). Tests for market efficiency include plotting _and 
regressing the spot rate against both the contemporaneous 
and corresponding forward rate. If spot and forward rates 
embody all current information and new information alters 
expectations regarding the future spot rate, then · there 
should be a strong correlation between movements in the 
spot rate and movements . in the contemporaneous forward 
rate. The addition of lagged forward rates to.the equation 
should not result in coefficients which are significantly 
different from zero. The forward premium which reflects 
the expected change in the spot rate is plotted against 
actual changes in the spot rate. The validity of a zero 
risk premium in the pricing 0£ forward e~cihange is tested 
by analysing the mean forward forecast error and related 
autocorrelations. 
* The initial findings of part of this chapter were used in a paper presented at the 
Management and Economic Sciences Conference in 1987. Correia C. de J. "Foreign 
Exchange . Management: Risk. Reserve Bank Policy. and the role of the Market in a 
changing Environment" Conference in Management and Economic Sciences, University of 
Natal. Pietermaritzburg. 20-22 October. 1987. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The recent history of the South African foreign exchange. 
market, reflecting a period of turbulence and the dramatic 
decline in the Rand exchange rate vis-a-vis the world's 
major currencies, has · added impetus to the ·question ·of 
whether the foreign exchange market is efficient. 
In Chapter 5, market. efficiency was ·tested to the extent 
that covered interest arbitrage profit opportunities should 
be quickly eliminated. . This involved testing for 
deviatioris from covered interest parity# which essentially 
represent risk--f-ree profit oppor1;:uriities . 
. Tests of market efficiency in relation to unexploited risk-
adjusted profit opportunities ·are.more problematic due to 
model specification problems and . competing hypotheses. 
Market efficiency is a wide economic statement which 
requires the specification of testable hypotheses.· 
Chapters 6 and 7 will apply methodologies adopted from the 
market efficiency literature and apply hew methods to test 
specific hypotheses. As there ·is no overall test of market 
.·~ffi6iency, "tests of efficiency" should be measured 
against specific alternativ~ hypotheses. In Chapter 5, we 
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tested the specific hypothesis that in an efficient market, 
d~viations from covered interest parity should be· quickly 
eliminated. 
The market efficiency concept is expanded in chapters 6 and 
7 by undertaking the following tests; 
1. An analysis of the relationship between spot and 
forward exchange rates based on the assumption that 
the forward rate represents the market's expected 
future spot exchange rate. 
2. Tests on the ability of traders/speculators to predict 
future exchange rate movements based on past rate 
movements (the so-called "weak-form" tests of market 
efficiency). 
3. An analysis of the relationship between changes in the 
. exchange rate and changes in "fundamental" variables 
which form part of the public information set (the so-
called "semi-strong" tests of market efficiency). 
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6.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND-
Fama ( 1970) defined an efficient market as one in which 
prices fully reflect available information. In an 
efficient market, prices adjust immediately to reflect new 
information. Therefore, currently available information 
cannot be employed to systematically predict future prices 
as such information has already been, discounted in the 
asset price. 
in contrast, an inefficient market implies that prices 
respond slowly to new information. This implies that 
traders/speculators can util~se.new information to improve 
their accuracy in forecasting future exchange rate 
movements. 
Expectations play a central role in the determination of 
the current exchange rate. New information which alters 
expectations is immediately reflected in changes to the 
current exchange rate. 
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Frenkel (1981, p.5) states; 
to exchange rate "the modern approach 
determination implies that 
strongly influenced by _ 
exchange rates are 
"news", which by 
definition is unpredictable ... in periods which 
are dominated by "news" that alters expectations, 
exchange rates are likely to be more volatile." 
The definition of an 
nature and requires 
testable hypotheses. 
efficient market is of 
the specification of 
a general 
empirically 
Market efficiency is relevant in relation to specified 
information sets. Fama employed the terms weak form, semi-
strong and strong form to describe the tests of market 
efficiency based on the information sets of past price 
movements, public information and all available 
information. 
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Formally, market efficiency requires that, 
E ( S - S \I ) = 0 
t e,t t-1 (6.1) 
Where S is the one-period ahead forecast of the spot e,t 
exchange rate based on the information set available at 
time t-1, I E is the expectations operator. This 
t-1 
implies that traders do not systematically make errors in 
setting forecasts of the fut~re spot rate. If the error 
term consists of "white noise", then it contains no 
information which may be used to improve forecasts of 
future rates, and the market for foreign exchange market is 
said to be efficient. 
6.3 FORWARD EXCHANGE RATES AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
:tn this section the forward exchange rate is used as a 
proxy to measure market expectations of the future spot . 
rate. This is however subject to the assumption that there 
is a zero risk premium in the pricing of forward exchange. 
This limiting assumption is analysed further on in the 
study. 
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Forward exchang~ rates should reflect .market expectations 
regarding future spot rates. This implies that the forward 
exchange Fate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
exchange rate, otherwise traders may use any bias to devise 
profitable trading strategies and earn excess returns 
(assuming a zero risk premium). For instance, if the 
forward rate systematically under-predicted the future 
value of the rand spot exchange rate, traders could use 
this information to buy rands forward at time t-1 and sell 
Rands spot at the time of the exercise of the forward 
contract (time t). 
Empirical studies (for example, see Frenkel 1981, Levich 
1979[c]) which use forward rates to measure market 
efficiency, normally employ the following equation; 
S = a + bF + u t t-1 t (6.2) 
Where s is the spot exchange rate at time t, F is the 
t t-1 
forward exchange rate ruling at time · t-1 for delivery at 
time t and u is an error term. 
t 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient then the error 
term, ut, should represent "white noise" and therefore 
should not be serially correlated. Market efficiency 
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requires that the forward exchange rate is an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot exchange rate. This means 
that in the above equation, the constant term, should not 
be significantly different from zero (E(a)=O) and the slope 
coefficient should not be significantly different from 
unity (E(b)=l). 
Equation 6. 2 is empirically tested for the South African 
rand/U.S. dollar exchange rate and the results are 
·presented in Table 6.1. 
6.4 DATA 
As overlapping data induces serial correlation in the 
residuals, non-overlapping dc;tta was employed to test the 
equation using the rand/U.S. dollar spot and forward 
exchange rates for the one month and three month 
maturities. 
Data was obtained directly from the International Division 
of Standard Bank in Johannesburg, and other data was 
downloaded from the Standard Bank's CATS system. The use 
of non-overlapping data reduces the sample size and means 
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that only the monthly spot and forward rates and three 
monthly spot and forward rates were used in order to obtain 
an acceptable sample size. 
The data firstly consists of monthly end-of-the-month spot 
exchange rates and the one-month forward exchange rates for 
the period January 1981 to December 1985. This represents 
59 observations. This period covered the introduction of 
the managed floating exchange rate system and abolition of 
the Financial rand system in 1983, the imposition of the 
debt standstill and the reintroduction of the financial 
rand system in August 1985. 
In addition quarterly data was obtained for the period 
March 1981 to June 1989. This represents 33 observations. 
The data consists of end-of-quarter spot exchange rates and 
three month forward exchange rates. 




TABLE 6.1 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATIO~ :· S = a + bF + u 
t t-1 t 

















The results for the monthly data are consistent with the 
market efficiency hypothesis. The constant is not 
significantly different from zero ( a=O. 009) and the slope 
coefficient is not significantly different from unity 
( b=O. 97). 
The R
2 
is 98 percent indicating that the level of the 
forward exchange rate explains a high proportion of the 
changes in the level of the future spot exchange rate. The 
Durbin...;Watson statistic of 1. 96 is consistent with the 
absence of first order serial correlation in the error 
term. 
The results for the quarterly data do not support the 
market efficiency hypothesis. The standard error of 0.024 
* The Durbin-Watson statistic may not be appropriate for testing for serial correlation 
when there is a regression of a variable on its OWn lagged value. As F is highly 
t-1 . 
correlated with S • Durbin• s h statistic was calculated but this revealed an 
t-1 . 






for the constant term indicates that the constant term is 
not significantly different from zero, at the 9_5 percent 
confidence level. However, the slope coefficient of 0.91 
is significantly different from unity. The. Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 1.76 is consistent with the absence of serial 
correlation in the error ·term. 
6.5 LAGGED FORWARD EXCHANGE RATES 
If the market is efficient, then the forward rate at time 
t-1 should include all available information including 
information implicit in the forward exchange rate at time 
t-2. This means that the addition of lagged forward 
exchange rates should not result in an improvement in the 
value of .the R2 ratio and should not result in coefficients 
that are significantly different from zero. 
To empirically test this hypothesis, the forward exchange 
rate at time t-2, F , was added to equation 6.2 for both 
t-2 . 
the monthly and the quarterly data. 
presented in Table 6.2. 
The results are 
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TABLE 6.2 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION·: 
s = a + b F + b F + u t 1 t-1 2 t-2 t 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Coefficients 
Data Period a b -1 b 
R2 
-2 s.e. D.W.* 
Monthly 1981.01- 0.015 0.97 0.002 0.98 0.033 
1985.12 (0.016) (0.136) (0.136) 
Qtrly 1981.1- 0.043 1.01 -0.10 0.96 0.054 
1989.2 (0.026) (0.183) (0.169) 
In both cases, the addition of the lagged forward exchange 
rate, F , does not improve the goodness of fit as measured t-2 
by the value of R2• Further, in both cases the coefficient 
of F is not significantly different from zero. t-2 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis of market 
efficiency, in that the forward exchange rate, F t-i' 
includes all information including information implicit in 
the forward exchange rate quoted at time t-2. 





6.6 THE FORWARD PREMIUM AND REALISED CHANGES IN THE SPOT 
EXCHANGE RATE 
In an efficient market, exchange rates will respond 
immediately to new information which alters expectations 
about the future spot exchange rate. Therefore, as new 
information cannot be predicted, we would expect the 
forward exchange rate to be a poor predictor of the future 
spot exchange rate, although i~ may represent an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot exchange rate. 
In Figures 6.1 and 6.2 the forward dollar premium/discount, 
-
which represents the expected change in the spot exchange 
rate, is plotted against the actual percentage change in 
the spot exchange rate, for the one-month and three-monthly 
data. 
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FIGURE 6.1 . MONTHLY PERCENT.AGE CHANGES IN THE SPOT RATE 
AND THE ONE-MONTH FORWARD DOLLAR PREMIUM 
JAN 1981 - DEC 1985 
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FIGURE 6.2 THREE MONTHLY PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN THE SPOT 
RATE AND THE THREE-MONTH FORWARD DOLLAR 
PREMIUM 
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It will be noted from Figures 6.1 and 6.2 that generally, 
the forward premium has not been a useful predictor of the 
e~pected change in the spot exchange rate. Variation in 
the forward premium is insignificant in relation to the 
large movements experienced in the spot exchange rate over 
the sample period. 
Frenkel (1981), who records similar empirical results, uses 
these results to ·conclude that most of the exchange rate 
changes are due to new information which by def ini ti on 
would not be reflected in the forward premium. 
However, the large movements in the spot exchange rate and 
the relatively low , forward premium may be indicative that 
the spot exchange rate is close to the market's best 
forecast of the future spot exchange rate, and the 
incremental benefit of the forward premium is low. 
However, the forward premium may be useful in predicting 
the direction of future exchange rate movements, as the 
u. s. dollar has been consistently at a forward premium 
(rand forward discount) since 1982 and the rand exchange 
rate has generally depreciated over ·this period. 
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6.7 THE SPOT EXCHANGE RATE AND THE CONTEMPORANEOUS FORWARD 
EXCHANGE RATE 
The current spot exchange rate at time t, s I 
t 
and the 
current forward rate, F , embody all information available 
t 
at time t. New information which alters expectations about 
the future exchange rate should be immediately reflected in 
the spot exchange rate and the forward exchange rate. If 
this is so, then we would expect to find a high correlation 
between movements in the spot· rate and movements in the 
contemporaneous forward exchange rate. 
In Figure 6. 3, the spot exchange rate at the end of each 
month is plotted against the contemporaneous monthly 
forward exchange rate for the period January 1981 to 
December 1985. 
In Figure 6. 4 the ·spot exchange rate at the end of each 
quarter is plotted against the contemporaneous three-month 
forward exchange rate for the period June 1981 to June 
1989. 
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FIGURE 6.3 THE SPOT RATE AND_ THE CONTEMPORANEOUS FORWARD 
RATE 
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FIGURE 6.4 THE SPOT RATE AND THE CONTEMPORANEOUS FORWARD 
RATE 
QUARTERLY DATA : ,JUNE 1981 - JUNE 1989 
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In both cases, the spot and forward exchange rates have 
moved extremely close together. If new information is 
driving exchange rates, then the spot rate and the 
contemporaneous forward rate appear to respond immediately 
and by the same amount to this new information (which by 
definition could not have been predicted). 
The correlation between the percentage change in the spot 
rate and the percentage change in the forward rate for the 
monthly data, for the period January 1981 to December 1985 
exceeds 99 percent, while the correlation between the 
percentage change in the spot rate and the percentage 
change in the forward rate for.the quarterly data for the 
period June 1981 to June 1989, also exceeds 99 percent. 
The high correlation between movements in the spot and the 
contemporaneous forward exchange rate is consistent with 
market efficiency. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that the 
spot and the contemporaneous forward exchange rate are very 
close to each other, and this may indicate that the 
market's best forecast of the future spot exchange rate is 
the current spot exchange rate. 
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This raises the question of whether any incremental benefit 
may be gained from using the forward rate rather than the 
current spot eichange rate to forecast the future spot 
exchange rate. 
As previously mentioned, the forward dollar has generally 
been quoted at a forward premium (rand at a forward 
discount) and the rand has generally tended to depreciate 
over the period 1982-1989. Therefore, the forward rate may 
be useful to indicate the general future direction of the 
spot exchange rate. This finding is consistent with other 
studies (see, for example, Mussa, 1979). 
If the forward exchange rate represents the market's 
optimal forecast qf the future spot exchange rate, then the 
standard deviation of the errors of using the forward 
exchange rate should not exceed the standard deviation of 
the forecast errors in using any alternative model. 
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Table 6.3 presents summary statistics for the forecast 
errors of using the forward exchange rate and using the 
current spot exchange rate to predict the future spot 
exchange rate. 
TABLE 6.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FORECAST ERRORS 
RAND/U.S. DOLLAR RATE. 
A. THE FORWARD RATE MINUS THE SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED SPOT RATE: 
F - s 
t-1 t 
Data Period Mean S.D. t-statistic 
Monthly 1981. 01- 0.0138 0.0332 0.416 
1985.12 
Quarterly 1981.1- 0.0226 0.0586 0.386 
1989.2 
B. THE SPOT RATE MINUS THE SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED SPOT RATE: 










Mean S.D. t-statistic 
0.0161 0.0322 0.50 
0.0282 0.0572 0.493 
288 
In both cases the mean dev,iation is not significantly 
different from zero. Al though the· results are extremely 
close, the standard deviation of the forecast errors of 
using the forward rate slightly exceed the standard 
deviation of the forecast errors of using the current spot 
rate. 
The mean deviation of the forecast errors in using the 
current spot rate slightly exceeds the mean deviation of 
the forecast errors in using the forward exchange rate. The 
spot exchange rate, based - on the standard deviations, 
reflect very similar results to the forward exchange rate. 
Prior evidence suggests _that the forward rate is not a very 
good predictor of the future spot exchange rate, but may 
be an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. 
This is to be expected in an efficient market where the 
major determinant of exchange rate movements is new 
information which alters expectafions regarding the future 
spot exchange rates. 
289 
However, market efficiency requires that the forward rate 
should generally be. a better predictor of the future spot 
exchange rate than the current spot exchange rate. 
However, there are counterarguments to this hypothesis. 
Longworth (1981, p.45) states; 
"As the forward premium seems to have little to 
do with the change in the spot rates, perhaps the 
current spot rate itself is a better predictor of 
the future .spot rate than is the forward rate. 
One cannot reject the hypothesis that the forward 
rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
rate, but the more reasonable hypothesis might be 
that the current spot rate is an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot rate, and that the 
forward rate adds nothing."· 
In Figure 6.5 the current spot exchange rate, s , 
t 
is 






THE SPOT RATE AND THE CORRESPONDING FORWARD 
RATE 
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It is clear from Figure 6.5, that the forward rate was not 
able to predict the changes in the spot exchange rate over 
the sample period. 
In Figure 6.6, the current spot rate, St, is plotted 
against the preceding spot exchange rate at time t-1, St-l 
$ 
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The lagged spot exchange rate was not able to predict · 
movements in the spot exchange rate. 
FIGURE 6.6 THE CURRENT SPOT RATE AND THE.LAGGED SPOT RATE 
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A .comparison of Figures 6. 5 and 6. 6 indicates, that the 
lagged spot exchange rate was as good a predictor of the 
future spot rate as the forward exchange_ rate. 
Crystal and Thornton (1988, p.324) state; 
"Since the current spot rate embodies the same 
information as the current forward rate, it could 
dominate the forward rate as a predictor of the 
future spot rate. Indeed it is quite likely that 
the spot rate contains more information about 
future spot rates than the forward rate does, 
because the forward market is typically thinner 
and involves higher transaction costs". 
However, the forward exchange rate may have a slight 
advantage to the lagged spot rate as a predictor of the 
f:uture spot rate as the U.S. dollar has generally been 
quoted at a forward premium (the rand at a- forward 
discount) in recent years, and the -~and exchange rate has 
tended to depreciate over the same period. 
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However Crystal and Thornton (1988, p.328) state; 
"We know that covered interest parity holds in 
Euro-deposit markets. If monetary authorities 
are able to peg interest rates, they will ·also 
influence the forward pre~ium on currenci~s. 
Hence, the forward rate may be more affected by 
interest rate policy than by spot rate 
expectations". 
In terms of the International Fisher effect, the relative 
interest differential should reflect expectations of the 
future movement in the spot exchange rat~. 
However, if the forward rate is a passive variable, as 
suggested by Crystal and Thornton, and merely reflects the 
interest differential between currencies and not the 
market's expectations of the future spot rate, then 
significant deviations between the quoted forward rate, 
which reflects covered interest parity, and the market's 
expected future spot rate would induce arbitrage (in a 
competitiv~ market) so that the expected future spot rate 
and the quoted forward rate converge - even if this occurs 
through resultant pressures upon relative interest rates. 
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Mark~t efficiency requires that the forward exchange rate 
should be an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
exchange rate. · This assumes a zero risk premium in the 
pricing of forward exchange; This assumption is studied in 
the next section. · 
6.8 THE EXISTENCE OF A RISK PREMIUM IN FORWARD EXCHANGE 
If the pricing of forward exchange 'includes a risk or 
liquidity premium, then the existence of bias in the 
forward exchange rate, ·is consisten~ with market 
efficiericy. Cornell (1977, p.57) states: 
"the average liquidity premium can be ·identified 
with the mean forecast error that occurs when the 
forward rate is used as a predictor of the future 
spot rate" 
The ·results ·of tests undertaken by Cornell indic.ate that 
the average. liquidity pr,emium on forward excha.nge has. been 
zero for the currencies examined in the study. 
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Levich (1979[c]) indicated that the mean forecast error for 
most currencies tested was not significantly different from 
zero. Frankel ( 1982) found that the mean forecast error 
for each of the six currencies tested was not significantly 
different from zero. The results of these studies suggest 
that there is a zero ri~k premium in the pricing of forward 
exchange. 
The results of this thesis support the hypothesis of a zero 
risk premium. Tests of the regression equation, S = a + 
t 
bF + u indicate that the forward exchange rate is an 
t-1 t 
unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. 
Further, the mean forward forecast error reported in Table 
6.3 was not significantly different from zero for both the 
monthly and quarterly data. If the risk premium is zero, 
then the forward exchange rate may be used to measure the 
market's expectation of the future spot exchange rate. 
However, the results of these tests are also consistent 
with a risk premium that often changes sign but has a mean 
of zero. Frankel (1982) indicated that the forward 
forecast errors for certain currencies reflected serial 
correlation. Longworth (1981) and Cumby and Obstfeld 
(1981) reflect evidence which is consistent with the 
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existence of a risk premium, in that changes in the risk. 
premium could result in serial correlation .. but a mean 
forward forecast error that is not significantly different 
from zero. To test for a time varying risk premium in 
forward exchange, the mean forward forecast error and the 
autocorrelations of the forward forecast errors are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
TABLE 6.4 AUTO~ORRELATIONS OF THE FORWARD FORECAST 
ERRORS 
Data Monthly Quarterly 
Period 1981.02- 1981.1-
1985.12 1989.2 
No. of obs. 59 33 
Mean 0.0138 0.018 
pl 0.03 0.22 
p2 0.12 -0.22 




Ps -0.11 -0.tl 
p6 -0.05 -0.33 
P1 -0.06 -0.06 
Pa -0.05 0.08 
S.E. 0.13 0.17 
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In terms of the monthly spot and one-month forward rates, 
the mean forecast error is not significantly different from 
zero. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
average risk premium is zero. Further, the 
autocorrelations are not significant and this reflects 
evidence against the existence of a time varying risk 
premium which is on average equal to zero. 
The mean of the quarterly forward forecast errors is plso 
not significantly different from zero. Although the 
autocorrelation coefficients are much larger than for the 
monthly data, they are still not statistically significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level. 
In general, the study was not able to establish the 
existence of a risk premium ih the pricing of forward 
exchange. This indicates that the forward rate should 
reflect the market's expe_ctations of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
In an efficient market the forward rate should be an 
unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate. The 




The results of the tests performed on forward rates are 
generally consistent with the concept of market efficiency. 
Firstly, the forward rate was found to be an unbiased 
' predictor of the future spot exchange rate. If there is no 
risk premium in the pricing of forward exchange, then 
market efficiency requires that the forward rate should be 
an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. 
Secondly, the addition .of further lagged forward exchange 
rates to the regression equation did not result in an 
improvement in t~e goodness of fit nor in coefficients 
which were significantly different from zero. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that forward rate . should 
reflect all information including the information implicit 
in lagged forward exchange rates. 
Thirdly, if in an efficient market the driving force behind 
exchange rate movements is new information, then the 
forward premium should not be a good predictor of future 
movements in the spot exchange rate. The empirical 
evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. 
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Fourthly, the current spot exchange rate and the 
contemporaneous forward exchange rate appear to be based on 
the same information set available at time t. If the major 
determinant of exchange . rate movements is new· information 
which alters expectations, then in an efficient market 
there should be a high correlation between movements in the 
spot exchange rate and movements in the contemporaneous -
forward exchange rate. Again, the empiiical evidence is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Although this represents convincing evidence in support of 
the efficiency of the forward exchange market, there remain 
unfortunately a few persistent doubts. Firstly, evidence 
indicates that the current spot rate inay be as good a 
predictor of the future ·spot rate as the corresponding 
.forward rate. 
Secondly, although the forward rate reflects covered 
interest parity, it may be a passive ~ariable. The market 
for interest securities may reflect inefficiencies, and yet 
the forward rate may still be correctly priced to reflect 
covered interest parity, bu.t not the market's expectation 
of the future spot exchange rate. 
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In an open economy, arbitrage transactions should result in 
a convergence of a forward rate that reflects the future 
expected spot rate. and a forward rate that reflects covered 
interest parity. 
If the expected future rand spot exchange rate is 
~ystematically below the quoted forward rate, which 
reflects covered interest parity, then traders will 
purchase foreign currency forward and sell foreign currency 
spot when the forward contracts mature. 
If traders proceeded with these trans.actions, this would 
result in banks covering positions by undertaking current 
borrowings from local sources , purchasing foreign currency 
on the spot market and investing in foreign interest 
securities until the maturity date of the forward 
contracts. 
This would result in a decline in foreign interest rates 
and an increase in local interest rates~ There would be 
an increase in the forward rand discount in order that the 




These transactions result in relative interest rates 
, reflecting the market's expectation of the future spot 
exchange rate. By definition, i·n such a situation if the 
: 
forward rate reflects covered interest parity, it al.so 
reflects the market's expectation of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
However, if the market for interest securities is subject 
to stringent · controis which preclude these arbitrage 
transactions, and exchange control preclude arbitrage 
transactions between the spot and forward markets, then the 
authciriti~s may simul~te an efficient market wi~h respect 
to the pricing of forward exchange, in that ·it. reflects 
covered interest parity, but "does not reflect the expected 
future spot rate. 
This implies tha't. al though the pricing of forward exchange'. 
may be efficient (in the sense that it reflects covered 
-
inter'est parity) , the market for interest securities and 
the spot market may be inefficient. 
The large losses incurred by the Reserve Bank on ·its 
forwar¢l exchange account may ind1cate that al though the 
forward rate reflects covered interest parity, it does not 
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re~lect the expected future spot·exchange rate, and traders 
are experiencing a "one way bet" with the . Reserve· 
· Bank/Treasury. 
In S°'uth Africa, the· Reserve Bank sets the price of forward 
exchange •. " The inability of the Reserve Bank to withdraw 
from this market as planned, was due to the restrictions of 
. ' . . . 
the exchange.control regulations on banks to cover forward 
purchases of foreign currency by· clients. Without exchange 
control this would normally occur through the purchase of 
foreign currency spot and the investment in foreign 
interest securities ·to maturity date. 
The pricing of forward exchange may preclude the earriirig of 
risk-free profits from covered interest arbitrage. 
Speculation may result. in excess profits· - however, the 
absence of bias in the pricing of forward exchange may. 
refute this argument. 
In conclusion, subject to the above caveats, .the tests on 
the relationship between. spot and forward rates generally 
lend support.to the efficient market hypothesis. The time 
series behaviour of the spot rate and forward rate is 
generally consistent with market· efficiency and the results 
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of the tests are consistent with the efficient pricing of 
fbrward_exchange. In the.next cha~ter tests are performed 
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CHAPTER 7 
SPOT EXCHANGE RATES AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
.-
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the efficiency 
of the spot foreign' exchange market. The. methodologies 
adopted to test for "weak _form" ef_ficiency involve _tests. 
· for serial correlation _and analysing the prof i tabili ey-- of-
f il ter trading rules relative to a buy-and-hold policy .. 
Tests· of "semi-strongi• efficiency ·involve tests of the 
.forecasting ability of an adv~spry servi~E~!ative to·the 
forward .rate, and an empiri~--a:rysn;-or the relationship 
between the . spot· exchange rate and publicly available 
information on selected macro-economic variables. If. the 
foreign exchange market is efficient then traders should 
not be able to use past movements in the spot exchange 
rate, and publicly available information on macro-economic 
variables to systematically improve their forecasts of the 
future spot ~xchange rate . 
. .... .. ~. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, tests were applied to measure the 
efficiency of the forward exchange market. Generally, the 
tests were unable to reject the hypothesis that the· forward 
exchange market is efficient, and there were several 
indications that the current spot rate was as good as the 
forward exchange rate in predicting the future spot 
exchange rate. 
In this chapter, tests are applied to measure the 
e£ficiency of the spot exchange market. Market efficiency 
requires that the current. spot exchange rate reflects all 
available information at the current date. A sub-set of 
all available information represents the past history of 
spot exchange rates. 
If the market is efficient, then traders/speculators should 
not be able to systematically earn excess returns by 
forecasting the future spot exchange rate on the basis of 
past movements in the spot exchang~ rate. If the 
equilibrium return remains constant then the market is 
efficient if the spot exchange rate follows a random walk. 
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/ 
One of the tests undertaken in Chapter 6 on forward market 
exchange rates, involved regressing the spot rate at time t 
on the forward rate at t-1 for delivery of foreign currency 
at time t. The results of this test indicated that the 
forward rate was an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
exchange rate, which is what would be expected to occur in 
an efficient market (assuming a zero risk premium). 
In this chapter, the following equation is used to test the 
relationship between the spot rate and the lagged spot 
exchange rate: 
S = a + bS + u t t-1 t (7.1) 
Where S is the current exchange rate, S is the lagged t t-1 
spot rate at time t-1 and ut is the error term. The above 
formula represents the familiar "random walk" model. 
This equation has been used to test market efficiency (see, 
for example, Chrystal and Thornton, 1988), in that if the 
spot exchange rate reflects all information, then the 
current spot rate should include all information, implicit 
in the past history of exchange rates. Therefore, past 
movements in the spot exchange rate will have no value for 
forecasting future movements in the spot exchange rate. 
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The current spot exchange rate reflects all information 
implicit in past exchange rates. 
If. the market is weak form efficient then the expected 
value of the constant, [a], should be zero and the slope 
coefficient, [b], should not be significantly different 
from unity. Most importantly, the error term should 
reflect the absence of first order autocorrelation. 
Equation 7 .1 was tested firstly for the period January 
1981 to December 1985 on a monthly data basis, and for the 
p~riod June 1981 to June 1989 on a quarterly data basis. 
The_ sample periods correspond to the periods examined in 
regressing the current spot rate on the corresponding 
forward rate as reflected in equation 6. 2 in Chapter 6. 
The results are presented in Table 7.1. 
In addition, the data source was expanded and the 
regression equation was applied to monthly data over the 10 
year period, June 1979 to May 1989. These results are also 
presented in Table 7.1. 
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TABLE 7.1 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION: s = a + bS + u 
t t-1 t 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Coefficients 
Data Period b R2 * a s.e. D.W. h 
Monthly 1981.01- -0.007 0.99 0.032 0.98 2.05 -0.195 
1985.12 (0.015) (0.017) 
Quarterly 1981.1- 0.03 0.918 0.053 0.96 1.76 0.713 
1989.2 (0.025) (0.033) 
Monthly 1979.06- -0.003 0.996 0.029 0.99 1.76 1.320 
1989.05 (0.007) (0.008) 
Monthly 1986.01 0.064 0.856 0.024 0.69 1.58 1.664 
1989.05 (0.042) (0.092) 
The results of the regression equation tested in Table 7-1 
are consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. The 
-
constant, [a], is not significantly different from zero for 
all three data sets (at the 5% level). The estimate of the 
slope coefficient [b] is not significantly different from 
unity. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the absence of 
first order serial correlation. 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient, then spot 
exchange, rates should adjust immediately to reflect any new 
information which alters expectations. If the spot exchange 
rate adjusts immediately, then this implies that 
* The calculation of Durbin' s h statistic does not reveal the existence of positive serial 
correlation at the 5 percent level of significance. 
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future exchange rates can ·not be predicted on the basis of 
past exchange rates. 
The random behaviour of the spot exchange rate is. 
consistent with market. efficiency in 
traders/speculators were not able to use past movements in 
the ~pot exchange rate to syst~matically predict the future 
spot exchange rate. 
In . Table 6. 3 in Chapter 6 the mean of the spot rate minus· 
the subsequently observed spot rate, S - St' was found to 
. t-1 
be not significantlt -different .from zero. The mean 
deviation for the new monthly data for the period June 1979 
to.May 1989 is -0.007, with~ standard deviation of 0.029. 
This mean deviation for, the new mont_hly data. is also not 
significantly different _from zero. These results are 
consistent with an· efficient market as exchange rate 
movements appear to be.·random. 
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7.2 AUTOCORRELATION TESTS ON SPOT EXCHANGE RATES 
The tests for serial correlation are expanded by analysing 
the autocorrelation function for a number of cu~rencies and 
time periods. 
Firstly, the autocorrelation function was estimated for 
monthly returns on spot exchange contracts for the period 
-
June 1979 to May 1989 for the Rand/U.S. dollar spot 
exchange rate. The autocorrelation coefficients for up to 
eight lags are presented in Tabl~ 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
MONTHLY RAND/U.S. DOLLAR SPOT RATES 
Period 1979.06-1989.05 










* Statistically significant at 5% level 
In respect to 
autocorrelation 
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the eight lags, it 
coefficients for 
was found that the 
three lags were 
statistically significant, although for lags 5 and 7 only 
marginally so. 
Higher order autocorrelation is inconsistent with market 
efficiency as it indicates that lagged returns in the spot 
market may be used to predict future returns. 
The autocorrelat~on function was also estimated for one-day 
rates of return for the U.S. dollar, sterling and 
deutschemark currencies for the period November · 1988 to 
June 1989. The autocorrelation coefficients are presented 
in Table 7.3. 
Only five estimates are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level. However, all three currencies 
indicate significant first order autocorrelation. This 
implies that traders/speculators are able to use the 
immediately preceding one day return to predict, the next 
day's spot exchange rate return. 
to predict future returns is 
efficient market hypothesis. 
The use of past returns 
inconsistent with the 
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TABLE 7.3 AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
DAILY SPOT RAND EXCHANGE RATES: 
NOVEMBER 1988 - JUNE 1989 
Currency US Dollar UK Sterling 
Period 21.11.88- 15.11.88-
30.06.89 26.06.89 
No. of obs 159 159 
pl -0.228* -0.180* 
p2 0.201* -0.031 
P3 -0.128 -0.048 
P4 0.134 0.149 
ps -0.042 -0.090 
p6 0.007 -0.109 
P7 0.029 0.066 
Pa -0.256* -0.082 
S.E. 0.079 0.079 














The autocorrelation function was further estimated for 
weekly returns for the rand/U.S. dollar, rand/sterling and 
rand/lira spot exchange rates for the period July 1986 to 
June 1989. The autocorrelation coefficients are presented 
in Table 7.4. 
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TABLE 7.4 AUTOCORRELATION ,COEFFICIENTS 
WEEKLY SPOT RAND EXCHANGE RATES. 
Currency UK Sterling Lira us Dollar 
Period July 1986 - July 1986 - Aug. 1983 -
June 1989 June 1989 Feb. 1988 
No.of obs 159 159 232 
pl 0.036 0.004 0.073 
p2 0.065 -0.018 0.101 
P3 0.033 .;.,0.023 -0.155* 
p 
4 
-0.048 -0.114 -0.073 
Ps 0.060 -0.038 0.050 
p 
6 
-0.018 -0.096 0.095 
P7 -0.048 -0.095 0.060 
Pa 0.034 -0.057 0.003 
S.E. 0.079 0.079 0.066 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The autocorrelation coefficients for the weekly returns on 
spot exchange rates are not (except for one) statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The 
autocorrelations indicate that there are no linear trends 
in weekly spot exchange rates. In general, the 
autocorrelation coefficients indicate that spot exchange 
rate movements are random and there are no linear trends in 
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the spot exchange rates for various currencies over various 
time periods. 
However, the significant first order autocorrelations 
recorded . for the daily spot exchange rates for sterling, 
the U.S. dollar and the deutschemark indicate that the 
daily returns on spot exchange contracts may be useful to 
improve forecasts of the next day's returns. This is not 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Of course, serial correlation tests, although often used in 
market efficiency tests, may suffer from certain 
weaknesses. Cornell and Dietrich (1978, p.115) state; 
"If the stochastic process generating ·daily 
exchange rates is non-stationary, the 
autocorrelation function may fail to detect the 
underlying pattern" 
One way to increase the confidence in the results of the 
serial correlation tests is to test the profitability of 
technical trading rules. 
to using filter rules 
effects". 
A commonly used technique relates 
to test for possible "bandwagon 
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7.3 FILTER TRADING RULES 
Filter trading rules were traditionally used to te-st for 
weak-form efficiency in the stock market. Logue and 
Sweeney (1977, p.764) quote one rule tested as; "Buy when 
the price is X% above its previous low and sell when the 
price is Y% below its previous high". 
In relation to the foreign exchange market, the rule 
states; -when a foreign currency · appreciates X% from a 
previous low, purchase foreign currency and sell local 
currency; when the foreign currency depreciates Y% from a 
previou~ high, sell foreign currency and repurchase local 
currency. Filter trading rules are designed to enable 
traders to take advantage of discernible "market trends". 
The profits earned from using a filter trading rule are 
compared to a buy-and-hold policy. The study takes the 
view of a South African trader who determines returns in 
rands. The adoption of a simple buy-and-hold policy implies 
that a trader will buy foreign currency with rands on the 
first day and sell foreign currency for rands on the last 
day. In contrast, by following the filter trading rule the 
trader will buy into a "rising market" and sell out of a 
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"falling market" during the sample period. It is assumed 
the investor will hold either rands or foreign currency. 
Logue and Sweeney (1977) and Cornell and Dietrich (1978), 
in testing for autocorrelation, found that exchange rate 
changes represented "white noise" and concluded that this 
was consistent with market efficiency. However,- the use of 
filter trading rules resulted in significantly greater 
returns than employing simple buy-and-hold policies. 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient, then a filter 
trading rule should not result in significantly higher 
returns than a simple buy-and-hold policy. This would 
contradict the "chartist" view that there are discernible 
market trends which can be used to forecast future exchange 
rates. 
There are numerous possible permutations in selecting the X 
and Y filters. The filters used in this study range from 
0.2 percent to 5 percent. The X and Y filters were set at 
equal values in each case. A number of filter trading 
rules were applied to the monthly spot rand/U.S. dollar 
exchange rates for the period June 1979 to May 1989. 
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The trader is assumed to start with RlOO which is used to 
purchase foreign currency on the first day. 
If the trader applies a filter rule, then the foreign 
currency will be sold for rands as soon as its value falls 
by at least a given percentage against rands. If the 
foreign currency rises by at least the filter percentage, 
then funds are switched from Rands into foreign currency. 
If there are dependencies in price changes, as chartists 
often claim, which are useful to predict future movements 
in exc~ange rates, then applying a filter trading strategy 
would result in a higher return than a simple.buy-and-hold 
policy. 
In a buy-and-hold policy, the trader purchases the foreign 
currency on the first day and sells the foreign currency on 
the last day of the period studied. The results of 
. . 
applying various the filter tests are presented in Table 
7.5 .. 
In relation to interest returns earned on securities quoted 
in each currency Corneil and Dietrich (1978 p.115) 
adopted the methodology of adjusting for interest earned at 
the end "by mu! tiplying the average' interest rate in each 
\ 
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currency by the fraction of time the investor was in that 
currency" 
Due to an overdue reliance.on average interest rates over a 
lengthy sample period, this methodology may result in 
inaccurate results. In this thesis the interest adjustment 
is based on the average interest rate for each specific 
period that traders remained in each currency. 





smaller filters, it would be more 
theory that relative interest rates 
compensate ori average for currency movements. 
For example, this method would take into account a 
situation where a trader was in a currency which was 
depreciating, yet was at the same time gaining (on average) 
from the higher interest rates being paid on securities 
denominated in the depreciating currency. 
The interest rates employed reflect the monthly prime 
· overdraft interest rates quoted in South Africa and the 
United States over the sample period. In general, South 
Africa registered higher nominal interest rates over the 
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sample period. The thesis assumes that traders are able to 
achieve a,return equal to the prime overdraft rates quoted 
in each currency. 
If we compare a buy-and-hold policy to various filter 
trading rules, Table 7.5 indicates that the filter trading 
rules were not able to outperform a simple buy-and-hold 
policy. This is consistent with market efficiency. 
However, once an adjustment is made for interest returns 
earned on securities quoted in each currency, then the one 
and two percent , filter. trading rules outperform a simple 
buy-and-hold policy. The five percent filter t~ading rule 
still results in a weak trading strategy. 
Although, the interest adjusted results for the one and two 
percent filter trading rules appear to outperform a simple 
buy-and-hold policy, a further adjustment is made for 
transaction costs~ 
In Table 7.5 the results are further adjusted for an 
estimated minimum transaction cost of 0.1 percent. At an 
exchange rate of U.S. $0.50 this represents a transaction 
cost of 5 exchange rate points per transaction. This 
323 
estimate covers half the spread on the foreign exchange 
market assuming traders are achieving interbank bid-ask 
spreads. 
The actual transaction costs of maintaining a filter 
trading rule in terms of management time, administration 
costs and control is significantly higher than the estimate 
used. Further, transaction costs would be incurred in 
relation to administration and fee costs of maintaining 
bank accounts in the quoted currencies. 
Once the results for the one and two percent filters are 
adjusted for the minimum level of transaction costs 
incurred, then the terminal values of using the one and two 
percent trading rules become very close to the results of 
using a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
This is consistent with market efficiency, which states 















FILTER TRADING RULE RESULTS 
MONTHLY RAND/U.S. DOLLAR SPOT EXCHANGE RATES: 
JUNE 1979 - MAY 1989. 
< 
Terminal Value Terminal Value Terminal Value 












1 = (No interest adjustment) 
2 = (Interest adjusted) 
3 = (Adjusted for interest and transaction costs) 
The results in Table 7.5 indicate that filter trading rules 
were not able to outperform a simple.buy-and-hold strategy. 
This indicates that the exchange rate fluctuated randomly 
around a trend ~ which over the sample period, reflected a 
long term decline in the · Rand/U. S. dollar spot exchange 
rate. 
The inability of filter rules to outperform a simple buy-
and-hold policy is consistent ·with the efficient market 
hypothesis, in that, traders were unable to use past 
movements in the spot exchange rate to predict future 
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movements in the ~pot exchange rat~ ~nd were thereby unable 
to systematically earn a higher return ·thah that.achieved 
und~r a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
·Further filter trading rules . were applied . to other data 
sets for three currencies. Filter trading rules were 
applied to the daily spot exchange rate for sterling, the 
U.S. dollar and the deutschemark. 
In this case due to the use of daily data over 7 months the 
·interest adjust_ment. was determined by using the average 
interest rate per currency and the proportion that a trader. ' 
remained in each currency during the sample period. 
The filters used in this case were 0.1 percent, 0.2 percent 
and 0.5 percent. The results of using filter trading rules 





TABLE 7.6 FILTER TRADING RULE RESULTS 
DAILY EXCHANGE RATES 
NOVEMBER 1988 - JUNE 1989. 
A. Currenc;y:: U.K. Sterling 15.11.88 - 26.06.89 
Filter Size No. of Trades Terminal Value Terminal Value 
(no interest (interest 
adjustment) adjusted) 
R R 
0.2% 68 93.71 102.45 
0.5% 20 94.98 103.47 
1.0% 10 92.40 100.24 
Buy-and-Hold 2 R99.07 Rl06.69 
B. Currency: Deutschemark 21.11.88 - 30-.06.89 
Filter Size No. of Trades Terminal Value Terminal Value 
(no interest (interest 
adjustment) adjusted) 
R R 
0.2% 42 103.18 110.17 
0.5% 18 101. 58 107.82 
1.0% 8 99.35 105.45 
Buy-and-Hold 2 R103.55 Rl07.67 
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C. Currency: U.S. Dollar 
Filter Size .No. of Trades 
0.2% 50 
o .. 5% 28 
1.0% 12 
Buy-and-Hold 2 

















Tests on the profitability of using filter trading rules on 
daily rates for the three currencies tested, - result in 
similar conclu$iOns as those· reached· in the study of the 
monthly rates. No filter trading rule for U.K. sterling, 
the deutschemark and the · u. S. dollar ·c ignoring interest 
returns) outperformed a simple buy-and~hold policy. 
The adjustment for interest returns on invested securities, 
employing :the prime overdraft interest rates in each 
cur~ency to measure returns, does not alter the results for 
sterling and the U.S. dollar, that is, no filter trading 
rule outperforms a buy-and-hold policy. . In respect to the 
.. 
deutschemark, the 0.2 and 0.5 percent filters result in 
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sma~l profits in relation to a simple buy-and-hold policy, 
however, the size of these profits are not sufficient to 
offset related transaction costs. 
In conclusion, the results of the filter trading rule tests 
are consistent with market efficiency. Filter trading 
rules have not outperformed a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
This conclusion is subject to the usual caveat that the 
results are valid for the sample period and the filter 
sizes and currencies selected. However, the results 
support the autocorrelation tests performed in the prior 
section. 
· This is in contrast to studies by Cornell and Dietrich 
. (1978) and Logue and Sweeney (1977) who reported an absence 
of serial correlation in terms of the normal 
autocorrelation tests but found that filter trading rules 
resulted· in excess returns. 
The results in this study lend support to the efficient 
market hypothesis in that the use of past movements in the 
exchange rate are not useful in predicting movements in the 
future spot rate. This implies that the "chartist" 
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approach to forecasting future movements in the spot 
exchange rate lacks empirical support. 
Table 7.6 indicates that for daily returns on spot exchange 
contracts, filter trading rules were not able to outperform 
a simple buy-and-hold policy. The filter trading results 
are consistent with the concept of market efficiency. If 
the market is efficient, then filter trading rules should 
not outperform a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
Al though a few autocorrelations were significant in the 
serial correlation tests, the filter tests indicate that in 
general, the market is efficient to the extent that over 
the sample periods there were few dependencies to be found 
in spot exchange rate movements. 
These results are perhaps surprising, considering the 
extensive system of exchange controls in South Africa and 
the possible influence of the Reserve Bank over rand 
exchange rate movements, however, the time series 
properties of the rand spot exchange rate over the sample 
period are consistent with weak-form market efficiency. 
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7.4 FURTHER TESTS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
7.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this thesis was to t_est the efficiency of the 
foreign exchange market by firstly, testing for the 
existence of covered interest arbitrage opportunities, 
secondly, by undertaking an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between spot and forward exchange rates and 
thirdly, by undertaking an empirical study of the time 
series properties of movements in the rand spot exchange 
rate. 
In this section, tests on market efficiency are expanded to 
include an analysis of the relationship between the 
Commercial rand exchange rate and certain 11 fundamental 11 
variables and an analysis and empirical testing of the 
accuracy of a forecasting organisation. 
In the previous section, tests of market efficiency were 
based on the information set of historical exchange rates. 
The various tests were unable to reject market efficiency, 
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to the extent that traders are nqt able to use past 
movements in spot exchange rates to earn excess returns. 
The tests in this section may indicate whether the foreign 
exchange market achieves semi-strong efficiency in relation 
to the variables tested. The tests in Chapter 6, also 
reflected tests of semi-strong efficiency. If the market 
is semi-strong efficient, then the spot exchange rate 
should ref le ct the public information set. The forward 
rate is part of the public information set. 
The first test in this section is to measure the 
forecasting accuracy of a foreign exchange advisory 
service. The study then analyses the relationship between 
the spot exchange rate and five variables; the gold price, 
foreign exchange reserves, money supply growth, the current 
account balance and the Financial rand rate. The validity 
of the purchasing power.parity theory in South Africa has 
been studied elsewhere. 1 
h b · t · f th th · 1' s not to test models of T e o Jec 1ve o e esis 
exchange rate determination. Rather, the objective is to 
test whether publicly available information on certain 
1 See Holden M. (1986) A Note on Purchasing Power Parity in South Africa. South 
African Journal of Economics. Vol 54 No. 3 p.332-338 
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-~ariables could be used to devise trading iuies that earn 
significant returns. 
The variables selected are important for a number of 
reasons. The gold price is a critical variable fo~ South 
Africa's economy and its balance 6f payments and as a 
source of government revenue. The authorities may be 
inclined to protect the rand . price of gold to protect the 
mining industry and its substantial mining tax revenues. 
The monetary model of exchange rate determination 
emphasises the role of nat.ional money supplies. 
Chapters 2 and 3, recorded numerous occasions when the 
authorities (prior to the managed float era) referred to 
the state of the Reserve. Bank's foreign exchange reserves 
to justify ~ change in the exchange ra~e. 
) ' ' 
The Financial rand exchange rate may reflect the market's 
expectations of the future direction of the Commercial rand 
spot exchange rate. 
The objective in ~esting the relationship between the spot 
exchange rate (i.e. the Commercial rand) and· these 
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variables is to establish firstly, whether a statistically 
significant relationship exi$ts, but more importantly to. 
determine whether the utilisation of public information on 
these selected variables may lead to improved forecasts of 
future spot exchange rates. 
'fhe study first analyses the forecasting accuracy of a 
foreign exchange advisory service. 
7.4.2 TESTS ON THE FORECASTING ACCURACY OF AN ADVISORY 
SERVICE 
In this section, a test of market efficiency is devised by 
analysing the forecasting accuracy of the Standard Bank's 
foreign exchange advisory service. The Standard Bank 
provides quarterly forecasts of the future spot rand/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate. 
If the market is efficient and the spot exchange rate 
reflects all public information, _ then the mean squared 
forecast error of using the Standard Bank estimates should 
not be significantly less than the mean squared forecast 
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error of using the forward rate and/or the current spot 
rate to estimate the future spot rate. 
It may be argued that this represents a test of strong form 
efficiency, in that Standard Bank with First National Bank 
are the major participants and dealers in the South African 
foreign exchange market. Therefore, Standard Bank should 
be in a position to obtain privileged or "inside" 
information about future exchange rate movements. 
Quarterly data for the period June 1981 - June 1989, was 
obtained from the Standard Bank CATS system. The quarterly 
forecasts are revised at the end of each month, therefore 
the final quoted forecasts represent the last month of the 
preceding quarter's forecast. 2 
Forecast errors are calculated as follows; 
(7.2) 
Where s is the future spot rate, S represents the one-
t f,t-1 
period ahead forecast of the spot rate and E represents 
. t-1 . 
the squared forecast error. In Figure 7. 1, the squared. 
2 Source: Telephonic interview with Mr Pennington at Standard Bank, Johannesburg. 
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forecast error of using the Standard Bank's . estimate is 
plotted against the squared forecast error of using the 







E - = [( S - F ) /S ] 2 
F. t-1 t t-1 · t 
SQUARED FORECAST ERRORS 
QUARTERLY DATA: 
MARCH 1981 - DECEMBER 1988. 
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(7.3) 
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In general, over the period 1981 to 1987 the squared 
forecast errors in using the Standard Bank's estimates were 
less than the squared forecast errors of using forward 
exchange rates. This position reversed in 1988, when the 
mean squared forecast error, using the Standard Bank 1 s 
estimates, were significantly higher than the mean squared 
forecast error, using the forward exchange rate. Table 7.7 
presents the mean squared forecast errors (M.S.E.) of using 
the Standard Bank's estimate, the forward . exchange rate, 
and the current spot exchange rate to forecast the future 
spot exchange rate. 
TABLE 7.7 MEAN SQUARED FORECAST ERROR: 
QUARTERLY DATA 
MARCH 1981 - DECEMBER 1988 











A trader using the standard bank forecast to predict the 
end-of-quarter spot exchange rate would have reported a 
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smaller mean forecast error ·than if the forward rate or 
spot exchange rate had been employed. 
The use of the mean squared forecast error to . analyse the 
forecasting accuracy of the Standard Bank's ·foreign 
exchange advisory service may lead to inaccurate 
conclusions, as the direction of the forecast may be more 
important thari the squared error of the forecast. 
The forward rate . may resui t in a forecast which indicates 
that traders ·should sell rands while the· Standard Bank 
forecast may reflect the correct realised direction . that 
traders should purchase rands. However, the squared .error 
of the Standard Bank forecast may exceed the squared error 
of using the forward rate. In this case it is useful to 
measure the times that the Standard Bank's forecasts are 
correct in. forecasting direction relative to the forward 
) 
rate. 
The direction of change implicit· in the Standard Bank 
forecast (sf .. t-l) and implicit in the forward rate ( F t-l) is . 
compared and' evaluated. in terms of· the realised direction 
measured by the actual spot rate movement. 
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The methodology employed to measure direction was 
implemented as follows; 
s < s = 1 (S > s = 0) t t-1 t t-1 
s < s = 1 < sf.t-1 > s = 0) f.t-1 t-1 t-1 
F < s = 1 ( Ft-1 > s = 0) t-1 t-1- t-1 
The allotment of 1 to the above captures the general trend 
in the rand exchange rate over the sample· period. The 
number of times that the forward rate and the Standard Bank 
forecast correctly predicted the direction of change. is 
compared to the actual ~irection of change as measured by 
S relative to S 
t t-1 
This involved comparing the actual direction of change in 
each period to the predicted change indicated by the. 
forward rate and the Standard Bank forecast. The number of 
times that the forward rate and the Standard Bank forecast 
correctly predicted the future one quarter direction in the 
spot rate is presented in Table 7.8. 
Over the sample period the actual quarterly direction in 
the Rand exchange rate was downwards in 22 of the quarters. 
Of the total directional movements in 31 quarters, the 
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forward rate correctly predicted the direction of change in 
19 quarters . This lends some ·support to the conclusions 
reached in Chapter 6 that al though the forward rate was a 
poor predictor of the future spot rate, it may be a better 
than average indicator of the future directional change in 
the spot exchange rate. This compares however to the 
Standard Bank estimates which predicted the correct 
direction of change in 26 quarters. 
TABLE 7.8 TESTS ON DIRECTION OF CHANGE 
QUARTERLY DATA: JUNE 1981 - DECEMBER 1988 
No. of Obs 31 
DIRECTIONAL MOVEMENTS 
s < s ·s < s F < s t t-1 f.t-1 t-1 ·t-1 t-1 
22 23 28 
s >'S s > s F > s t t-1 f.t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 
9 8 3 











The test on the relative ability of the forward rate and 
the Standard Bank forecast to predict the direction of 
change, indicates that the · Standard Bank estimates 
outperformed the forward rate in predicting the direction 
of change over the sample period. This supports the prior 
·results of using the mean squared forecast errors to 
compare the two rates. 
It is submitted that the test on directional changes is the 
more valid test of relative performance. Traders will take 
positions on the basis of predicted directional changes. 
Therefore, if the rand is expected to depreciate against 
the U.S. dollar, traders will be long in U.S. dollars and 
short in rands. If the actual directional movement in the 
rand exchange rate is in accordance with this expectation, 
then the trader will earn a return from taking that 
position. 
A simple example will further illustrate this 'point. 
Assume the current spot exchange rate is $0.50, the three 
month forward rate is $0.45 and the Standard Bank forecast 
is $0.51. Based on the forward rate, a trader would sell 
rands and buy U.S. dollars. However, based on the Standard 
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Bank forecast, the trader would buy rands and sell u. s. 
dollars. 
If the actual spot exchange rate turns out to be $0.49, 
then the trader would have minimised ex post his forecast 
error by utilising the Standard Bank estimate but would 
have at the same time recorded a loss from taking a 
position based on such an estimate. 
The directional change predicted by the forward exchange 
rate would result in the trader taking a profitable 
position of being long in U.S~ dollars and short in rands 
even though in this case it would result, ex post, in a 
greater forecast error. The predicted directional change 
indicates the positions to be taken by traders and thereby 
determines their profitability. 
This indicates that measures of relative performance should 
t>e based upon the ability of the forward rate and .the 
Standard Bank estimates to predict directional changes in 
the future spot exchange rate. 
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The Standard Bank estimates resulted in smaller mean 
squared forecast errors and a greater level of accuracy in 
predicting directional movements.in the spot rate relative 
to the forward.rate. 
In an efficient market forecasts issued by advisory 
services shotlld not outperform the forward exchange rate in 
predicting future directional movements in the spot . 
exchange rate. 
The results indicate that Standard Bank may have access to 
privileged information 







The results are 
efficient market· 
In Table 7. 9, the actual percentage change in the spot 
exchange rate (SC) is ·regressed against the percentage 
change predicted by the Standard Bank advisory service (AC) 
and the percentage change predicted by the forward premium 
( FC). 
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TABLE 7.9 REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
QUARTERLY DATA: JUNE 1981 - DECEMBER 1988 
A. Regression Equation: SC = a + bAC + u 
t t t 
a b s.e. 
-0.022 1.012 0.062 
(0.011) (0.164) 
B. Regression Equation:~ 
a 
0.027 
SC = a + bFC + u 











The results lend further support to the previous analysis 
of the performance of the advisory service relative to the 
quoted forward rate in predicting the future spot exchange 
rate. The slope coefficient for Equation (A) is not 
significantly different from unity and the equation 
reflects a R2 of 0.57. 
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The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the absence of first 
order serial correlation· given the damp1e si~e. 
~n contrast, the forward premium was not able ·to predict 
the change in the spot exchange rate. The slope 
coefficient for Equation (B) i~ not significantly different 
from zero, however it is also not significantly different 
from unity. 
. . 2 . ' . . . . . . 
The R ratio is very close to zero· at 0. 002. 
The Durban-Watson statistic indicates an absence -0£ first 
order serial correlation. 
In Figure 7. 2 the percentage f orecasted change in the_ spot 
exchange rate_ as reflected in th& Standard Bank f6reca~t is· 
' plot.~ed against the actual percentage change experienced 
over the sample period. 
The -relationship between the ·actual change and the 
predicted change depic_ted in Figure - 7. 2· is in contrast to 
the relationship between the expected change in the spot. 
rate as. indicated by the forward premium and the actual 
. - ' . . . . 
· . ..;. 
percentage change that occurred in the spot exchange rate 
over the sample period. The latter relationship is 
depicted in Figure 7.3. 
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FIGURE 7.3 ACTUAL· AND . PREDICTED CHANGES IN THE · SPOT 
, . 
EXCHANGE RATE: THE FORWARD PREMIUM 
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In an efficient market, forecasts issued by advisory 
services should not outperform the forward exchange rate in 
predicting the future spot exchange rate. 
The results of the mean squared error tests and directional 
tests~ indicate that the fore6asts issued by the Standard 
Bahk were able to significantly outperform the forward rate 
in predicting movements in the spot exchange rate . 
. Regression estimates . and analysis of plots lend further 
support ·to these findings. 
The results are not consistent with the effici'ent market 
hypothesis in this ~ohtext and indicate that traders using 
the Standard Bank estimates would be able to earn s~perior 
returns. 
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7.4.3. THE FINANCIAL RAND MECHANISM 
This section examines the relationship between the 
movements in the Commercial rand (up to now termed the 
"spot" rate) and'movements in the Financial rand rate. The 
objective-of this section ~s to test whether· a trader.would 
be able to use past movements in the Financial rand rat~ to 
, : predict movements in the spot. (Commercial· rand) rate. 
Barr and Kantor (1983, p.13) state; 
"The main purpose of any dual exchange rate 
system is to isolate the commercial exchange rate 
from what are regarded as de-stabilising capital 
flows". 
In a dual exchange rate system current account transactions 
are undertaken through the Commercial rand while designated 
capital account ·transactions are undertaken through the 
Financial rand. In effect Financial rands are South 
African bank balances owned by non-residents. Non-
residents are able to sell such Financial rand balances to 
other non-residents, for U.S. dollars at a rate negotiated 




Financial rand exchange rate and is determined by demand 
and supply factors. 
The official foreign exchange reserves are· not affected by 
the supply and demand for. Financial rands, and th~reby are 
protected from sp~cuiati ve capital ·flows. . However, in a 
free floating exchange rate system for the Commercial rand, 
the foreign exchange reserves should not really be affected 
anyway by changes in demand and· supply of rands in the 
foreign exchange market. The adjustment should occur 
through the exchange rate. 
The Financial rand is descended from the blocked rand which 
-
arose subsequent to the imposition of restrictions on 
capital repatriation by non-residents, and flowing from the 
aftermath of ·. the Sharpvil_le disturbances in 1960. In 
February 1983 the South African authoriti~s adopted a 
unitary exchange rate systein but reintroduced the Financial. 
rand me.chanism, with the imposition of the foreign debt 
standstill, in September 1985. 
In Figure 7.4, the weekly spot (Commercial) rand/U.S. 
doliar exchange rate is plotted ag~ins~ the weekly 
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Financial rand/U ~ S. dollar exchange rate for the period 
September 1985 t6 February 1988. 
·FIGURE 7 .4 WEEKLY SPOT AND FINANCIAL RAND EXCHANGE RATES 
SEPTEMBER 1985 - FEBRUARY 1988 
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The difference between the·. two exchange. rates (divided by 
the Commercial rand rate) is known as the Financial rand 
·. ::,aiscount 'and serves as a barometer of foreign investor 
confidence in relation to investment in South African 
securities. 
Political. risk . is obviously· an important variable driving 
the. Financial rand exchange rate. For most of 1987 the 
·Financial ·rand stood at a di.scount of over 50 percent. 
The most important objective of a dual. exchange rate system 
is to remove the destabilising effects of speculative 
capital flows from the foreign exchange market. Therefore, 
we would expect movements. in the Financial rand exchange 
rate to be more volatile than movements in the spot 
.exchange rate. 
The weekly spot exchange and Financial .rand exchange 
r~ttirns are plotted in Figure 7.5 for the ~erio~ September 
1985 to February 1988. Returns are defined and determined 
as follows (P =price): 
( p p )·/P 
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It is clear that the Financial rand exchange rate has been 
significantly more volatile than the spot exchange rate 





. RAND/U.S. DOLLAR WEEKLY RETURNS 
SEPTEMBER 1985 - FEBRUARY 1988. 
Mean S.D. 
Spot exchange rate return 
Financial rate return 
0.0022 
0.0014 
0 .. 0288 
0.0522 
The mean spot exchange rate and Financial rate returns are 
very close to zero. However, the standard deviation of the 
Financial · rate return is almost twice the standard· 
deviation of the spot exchange rate return. 
This implies that non-resident investors were subject to 
higher degrees of risk, as measured by the level of 
variability of Financial rate returns. 
The question of whether the reintroduction of the Financial 
rand reduced the volatility in the official foreign 




RAND/U.S. DOLLAR WEEKLY RETURNS 
AUGU.ST 1983 - AUGUST 1985. 
Mean 
Spot exchange rate -0.00787 
S.D~ 
.o. 03485 
In Figure 7.6, the daily rand/sterling·commercial exchange· 
rate return is plotted against the daily rand/sterling 
Financial rate return for the period 21 November 1988 to 26 
June 1989. ·Tq.e mean return for both the spot and.Financial 
sterling daily returns is extremely close to zero (less 
than 0.0006). 
However, the standard deviation of. the· spot rate returns 
was 0.006 compared to the standard deviation of 0.012 for 
the Financial sterling returns. Therefore, the volatility 
in the Financial sterlifl:g _daily returns· significantly 
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DAILY SPOT AND FINANCIAL STERLING RATE ~ETURN~ 
21 NOVEMBER 1988 - 26 JUNE 1989. 
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If exchange r.ates respond immediately to new information 
which alters expectations, then there should be a high 
correlation between changes in the spot exchange rate and 
changes in the Financial rand exchange rate. Table 7 .12 
presents the estimates of regressing the weekly spot 





contemporaneous weekly Financial rand/U.S. ~ollar exchange 
rate . return (FR) ·for the period Sept.ember 1985 to February 
1988. 
TABLE 7.12 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION : 
SR = a + bFR + u · 
t t t 
(stand~rd errors in parentheses) 
a s.e. D.W. 
0.0019 0.2171 1.5. 5% 0.0265 2.42 
(0.0023) (0.0449) 
The slope· coefficient is statistically significant at the 
95 percent confidence level. However, the slope co-
efficient is also significantly · different from unity. 
Although there is a statistically significrant relationship 
between spot exchange returns and Financial rate. returns, 
2 . . . 
the R of 15~5 percent is less than expected, in relation· 
to the ·two exchange rates reacting to· new information. 
This was hinted ·at by the tests on reiative variability. 
The above .regression equation was tested for daily spot and 
Financi~i rate rettiins for the rand/sterling exchange rate 
for the period 21 November to 26 June 1989. The slope 
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coefficient of 0.16 was significant and the 2 R was 12 
percent. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.33 indicated an 
absence of first order autocorrelation. 
These results may be due to inefficiencies in the Financial 
rand market as it represents a thin market in relation to 
the spot foreign exchange market. There is some evidence 
that the Financial rand rate returns exhibit limited serial 
correlation. 
The two markets may represent two different classes of 
traders. Non-residents may react differently compared to 
residents to the same set of new information. Therefore, 
new information may impact on the expectations of non-
residents and residents, but in different ways. This 
implies that the spot exchange rate and Financial rate 
markets may be efficient (to the extent they represent 
separate markets) even though the two classes of investors 
react differently to the same set of new information. 
It may be the view that non-residents over-react to news. 
Alternatively residents may under.-react to "news". This 
may be due to info~mation asymmetry - however traders may 
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efficiently set prices on the basis of the limited 
available information. 
This may be seen as justification for government invention 
through the creation of the Financial rand mechanism to 
"segregate" non-residents, and thereby reduce the effects 
that these "over-reactions" can have on the spot exchange 
rate. The existence of a significant Financial rand 
discount when there are obvious economic motives for 
arbitrage between the two 
general the Commercial 
constitute separate markets. 
markets, is evidence 
and Financial rate 
that in 
markets 
Information asymmetry may be due to non-residents having 
access to information sources not available to residents 
(or vice-versa). 
The question pertinent for this thesis, however, refers to 
whether traders were able to utilise publicly available 
information on the Financial rand rates to improve their 
forecasts of the future Commercial rand exchange rate? 
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Barr and Kantor (1983, p.19) state; 
"the financial rand discount anticipates 
movements in the commercial rand exchange rate". 
If the sp.ot foreign exchange market is efficient then 
traders should not be able to use lagged Financial rate 
returns to forecast future spot exchange rate returns. 
Table 7.13 presents the estimates of regressing spot 
exchange returns against the one lag Financial rate 
returns. The· slope coefficient is not statistically 
significant and the R2 of the equation is low at 2. 3 per 
cent. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.2 indicates an 
absence of first order serial correlation. 
TABLE 7.13 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION 
SR = a + bFR + u 
t t-1 t 
WEEKLY RETURNS: SEPTEMBER 1985 - FEBRUARY 1988. 












Regression equations using further lagged Financial rate 
returns were estimated but none of these equations resulted 
in significant estimates. In terms of the daily 
rand/sterling data, the use of lagged Financial sterling 
returns did not result in significant estimates. The slope 
coefficient is significantly different from unity at the 5 
percent level of significance. 
If the spot exchange rate market is efficient, then traders 
should not be able to use lagged Financial rate returns to 
improve their forecasts of the future spot excJ:lange ·rate •. 
The results of the tests are consistent with this 
hypothesis and therefore support the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
However, the less than expected co-variability of spot 
exchange returns and financial exchange rate returns, may 
reflect information asymmetry and the fact that new 
information impacts upon non-resident and resident 
expectations in different ways albeit the markets may be 
efficient. As mean returns for both markets are close to 
zero, the latter point may have some support. 
In the next section, we examine the relationship between 
the spot exchange rate and variables such as current 
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account balances, the· gold price, the level of the 
country's foreign exchange reserves and money supply 
growth. 
Barr and'Kantor (1983, p.18) state; 
"The predomi,nant · forces that determine the 
manageq commercial rand exchange rate seem to be 
... the state of the balance of payments and the 
level of · foreign exchange reserves. The most 
. . 
important and readily available information about 
' 
the prospects for . the South African baiance of 
payments is,_ of course, given by the gold price. 
As would be expe6ted, there is a strong empirical 
relationship between· the dollar gold price and 
. commercial ,rand exchange rate". 
The objective of this section is·· to· examine' . whether a. 
. . 
sta.tistically significant relationship exists. between the 
spot exchange · rate and each of these .variables, and most 
.importantly ~o test whether traders would be able to use 
publicly ·available information. on specific variables to 
improve · their. forecast of the future spot exchange rate. 
J 
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The section first studies the relationship between the spot 
exchange rate and the dollar gqld price .. 
7.4.4 SPOT EXCHANGE RATES AND THE GOLD PRICE 
Movements in the dollar gold price· have material effects on 
the country.' s balance of payments and domestic economy. A 
significant proportion of state tax. revenues arise from 
taxes levied on gdld mining pr6£its. Therefore, the 
authorities may be inclined to undertake a policy of 
maintaining a given rand gold pric!3 · in order to protect 
government revenues. · 
The monthly percentage change in the spot exchange rate 
. - . . 
(SR) is regressed against the monthly percentage change in 
the London dollar gold price (GP) for the period July 1979 
to June 1989. The regression.estimates are presented in 
Table 7.14. 
The constant and slope coefficients are significantly 
different from zero,. indicating that there is a· positive 
relationship between changes in the dollar gold price and 
changes in the spot rand/U.S. dollar .exchange rate. 
·,: 




is unexpectedly low, in relation to the 
importance of the gold price to South Afric~'s balanc~ of 
payments.and domestic economy. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
of 1.96 indicates an absence of first order 
autocorrelation. 
TABLE 7.14 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION : 
SR = a + bGP + u 
t t t 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
a b s.e. D.W. 
-0.009 0.174 7.0% 0.047 1.96 
(0.004) ( 0. 058) 
These results compare with the results reached in Barr and 
Kantor's (1983) study which indicated a stronger 
relationship between movements in the spot exchange rate 
and movements in the contemporaneous gold price~ However, 
Barr ~nd Kantor tested the period prior to the adoption of 
a managed floating exchange rate system . 
In terms of market efficiency, the objective is to test 
whether traders were able to use publicly available 
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7. 4. 5 SPOT EXCHANGE RAT.ES AND CHANGES IN F'OREIGN. EXCHANGE 
RESERVES 
The ~tate of the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves 
~ay be an important indicator of futur~· direction~l 
movements in the spot exchange , rate. The level .of·. the 
foreign e~chang~ reserves may indicate whether the Reserve 
Bank is able to intervene to support a given spot exc.hange 
· r·ate. Low . levels of foreign exchange reserves may result 
in adverse leads and lags which.place further pressures on 
the spot exchange rate. 
During the rand/U.S .. do~lar-peg era, the authoritie~ 
generally substantiated a downward adjustment to the· 
-exchange rate by quoting the reason that this would improve 
the balance of payments and tt:ie coun:try' s. foreign exchang,e 
reserves (see Chapter 2). 
In a free floating exchange rate system, the adjustment 
should occur ,through the exchange rci:te rather than through 
changes in the foreign exchange' reserves. 
The monthly percentage change in the spot exchange rate 
(SR) is re~ressed against the monthly. percentage chan~e· (R) · 
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in the gold and foreign exchange reserves (stated in U.S. 
dollars) for the 10 · year period September 1979 . to June 
1989. The results are_ presented in Table 7.15. 
TABLE 7.15 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION : 
SR = a + bR + u 
t t t 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
SEPTEMBER 1979 - JUNE 1989 
a: b s.e. D.W. 
-0.009 0.185 16% 0.045 2.08 
(. 0 . 004 ) . ( 0 • 03 9 ) 
The· results of the estimated regression equation indicate 
-that there is a significant relationship between changes in 
the Reserve Bank's . gold and foreign exchange reserves and 
changes in -the spot Rand exchange. rate. The slope 
coeffi6ient .is significantly diff~rent from unity. The R2 
is 16 percent and the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates an 
absence of first order autocorrelation. 
The above regression equation was further estimated for 
lagged changes in the Reserve Bank's. gold and foreign 
exchange reserves; however, the coefficients of the 
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equ·ations tested were not significant and the· values of R2 
were close to zero. Therefore traders were unable to use 
past changes ~n the Reserve Bank's gold and foreign 
exchange reserves to improve forecasts of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
~here exists a.significant relationship between changes in 
the spot exchange rate and. contemporaneous changes in the 
Reserve Bank '.s ··gold and foreign exchange reserves. The 
question arises of whether traders were able to use this 
relatio~ship to improve their forecasts of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
- Due to the time delay between changes in the foreign. 
exchange reserves and the ·publication of these changes in 
reserves, it is highly unlikely that traders would be able 
to obtain such information contemporaneously, and thereby 
improve their forecasts of the future spot exchange rate. 
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7.4.6 SPOT EXCHANGE RATES AND MONEY SUPPLY 
The monetary approach to exchange rate determination 
emphasises the role of national monies in determiQing the 
exchange rate. Caves and Feige (198b, p.120) sta~e; 
"While it is recognised that the exchange rate is 
not purely a monetary phenomenon (being affected 
in part by the real determinants. of the demand 
for money), the thrust 6£° the new asset approach 
' to exchange rates is that the exchange rate is 
primarily determined by c::urrent past· 
innovations in the relative supplies of national 
monies." 
Caves and Feige (1980, p.121) go on to state; 
"If· the foreign exchange market is incrementally 
efficient with respect to monetary.disturbances, 
then the spot exchange rates· already incorporate 
the systematic information contained in the past· 
history o~ money supply disturbances, thus 
vitiating some of , ·the directly testable 
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implications of th~ monetary approach to exchange 
rate determination." 
The objective of this thesis is to test for market 
ef~iciency. If the foreign exchange market is efficient, 
tlr'en traders should not. be able to utilise past money . 
supply.data to improve their forecasts of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
If the spot exchange rate reflects a11· -available 
information, then there shotild not be a systematic 
relationship between past information of national monies 
and the exchange rate . 
. In Table 7 .16, changes in the money supply are regressed 




TABLE 7.16 REGRESSION ESTIMATES : 
A. 
B. 
THE RAND/U~S. DOLLAR RATE AND MONEY SUPPL~ (M ) 
. t 
Cstandard errors.in parentheses) 
Regression Equation: S = a + bM + u t . t t 
Monthly Data 
Period: July 1979 - April 1989 
No. of observations: 118 









-Regression ·Equation: S = a + bM + u. 
t t t 
Quarterly Data 
Period: 1981.1 - 1989.1 
No. of observations: 33 
Money Supply definition: Ml 
a b R2 




s.e. - D.W. 
0.09 l.9a 
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The regression· estimates are not significant and the low 
. . 2 
values. of R for both regression equations indicate that 
money supply changes have little explanatory power over 
changes in the spot exchange rate. The slope coefficients 
for both equations are significantly different from zero. 
The Durbin-Watson statistics for both equations indicate 
the·absence of first order serial correlation. 
It is interesting to note that Gerson and Kahn (1988) ·found 
that monetary developments were not a significant 
determinant of real exchange rate movements. .• 
The regression equa.tions were further tested by using 
lagged values of money supply changes, however, in both 
cases the coefficients were found to· be insignificant and 
the value of R
2 
was in each case very close to zero. 
Further, in each case the Durbin-Watson statistic was close 
to two, indicating the absence of first order serial 
correlation. 
In Figures 7. 7 and 7. 8, changes in th.e money supply are 
plotted against changes· in the exchange rate for the 
monthly .and quarterly data. 
f· - •• 
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FIGURE 7.7 CHANGES IN THE SPOT RATE AND MONEY SUPPLY 
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FIGURE 7.8 CHANGES IN THE SPOT RATE AND MONEY SUPPLY 
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' 
There is no apparent relationship between percentage 
changes in the spot rate and percentage changes in the 
money supply. However, in both cases the volatility of 
changes in the. exchange rate exceeds the volatility of 
-changes in the money supply. 0 
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The monetary approach to exchange rate determination states 
that the exchange rate is determined by the relative money 
supplies in two countries. The dat~ tested in this section 
relate to South Africa's money supply figures recorded 
within each ~ample period. In terms of the tests of fuarket 
efficiency the money supply.figures form part of the.public. 
information set, therefor~ in an efficient market, traders 
should not be able to use past information on money supply 
data to improve their forecasts of the future spot exchange 
rate. 
The results indicate litt1e correlation betweeri changes in 
the spot exchange rate and contemporaneous changes. in the 
money supply. · Further tests using lagged values of changes · 
in the money supply re~ult in estimates ·not significantly 
. - 2 . 
different from zero, and values of R close to zero. These 
results are consistent with market efficiency ·in that 
traders were not able to use past information of changes in 
the money supply to earn excess returns. 
However, the monetary approach· to exchange rate 
determination emphasises the role of. relative supplies of 
riational monies. In an efficient market, traders would not 
be able to use past information of relative money supplies 
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to improve their forecasts of the future spot excha11ge 
·rate. 'In Figure 7.9, the monthly percentage change in the 
spot exchange rate is plotted against· the monthly 
percentage change in relative money. supplies (MS /MS ) 
. · US SA 
FIGURE 7.9 THE EXCHANGE RATE AND RELATIVE MONEY SUPPLIES 
MONTHLY DATA : AUGUST 1979 - APRIL 1989 
8.2..--------------------...... 
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3,77 
The volatility of changes in the spot rate exceeds the 
volatility .of changes in the relative money supply ratio. 
The mean percentage change in the spot exchange rate is -
0. 008 with a standard deviation of 0. 048 while the mean 
percentage change in the money ~~pply r~tio is -0.-010 with 
a standard deviation of 0. 035. Table 7 .17 presents· the 
re.sul ts of the following regression equation; 
SR = a + bMR + u 
t t t 
where SR is the monthly percentage change in the spot rate t 
and MR is the monthly percentage change in the relative . . t . 
inoney_supply ratio (MS /MS ) for the period August 1979 to 
US SA 
April 1989. 
TABLE 7-17 RESULTS OF REG~ESSION EQUATION: 
SR = a + bMR · + u 
t - t t 












The results reflect insignificant. estimates while the low 
R
2 
indicates that relative money supply changes have little 
explanatory power in relation to changes in the ·, spot 
exchange rate. The slope coefficient is significantly 
different : from unity. The Durbin-Watson · statistic 
indicates an absence of first order serial correlation. 
The regression equation was further tested by using lagged 
values. of relative money supplies, but in each case the, 
. 2 estimates were insignificant and the values of .R· wer,e. very. 
close to zero. These results are consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
Traders were not able to utilise past information of 
changes in relative money supplies to improve forecasts of 
the. f¥ture spot exchange rate. There is no systematic 
r~lationship between exchange rate changes and.changes in 
relative money supplies. 
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7.4.7. · EXCH]\NGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF-PAYMENTS 
The "flow" model of exchange .rate d~termination states that 
the exchange rate is determined by the.demand by residents 
for foreign exchange and the supply of foreign exchange by 
non-residents. 
The demand for foreign exchange is determined primarily by· 
the demand by re~idents for foreign goods while the supply 
of foreign exchange depends on non-resident demand for 
local goods. Therefore, the· exchange rate is primarily 
determined . by the imports and exports of goods and the 
exchange rate will adjust to equilibrate ·the current 
account. 
In the Bretton-Woods. era, exchange rate changes.· were only. 
. permitted once a country · experienced "fundamental 
disequilibrium" which was primarily defined as a country 
incurring persistent current ~ccount imbalances.!' 
The possibility of highiy ela.stic capital flows was then 
hardly ever considered. The experience with floating· 
. .· . . 
exchange rate systems saw.the. increasing_acceptance.of the 
·asset market approach of .exchange .rate determination. 
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In this section, .the objective is to test whether. traders 
would be able to use past information on current account 
balances to improve forecasts of· the future spot exchange· 
rate. ~f the foreign exchange market is efficient, then 
there should not be a systematic relationship between 
changes in the spot exchange rate and past changes in the 
current account balance. 
In the period 1981 . to 1988, South Africa experienced a 
significant shift from a current account deficit to a 
current account surplus. In Figure 7.10 the current 
account balance is plotted over the period March 1981 to 
March 1989 in US dollar and rand terms. 
In 1984 the. current account moved from· a deficit into 
surplus. The significant increase in the current account 
surplus in rand terms compared fo U.S. dollar terms·,. is due 
to. the material decline in the rand/U. S. dollar exchange 
rate in 1984, which with the decline in domestic economic 





THE BALANCE ON THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
QUARTERLY DATA: MARCH 1981 - MARCH 1989 
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Changes in the rand exchange rate 
1987 . 1988 . 
( S ) were regressed 
t 
against changes in the current account (BOP ) for the 
t . 
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period March 1981 to March 1989 on a quarterly data basis. 
The results are presented in Table 7.18. 
TABLE 7.18 RESULTS OF REGRESSION EQUATION : 
S = a + bBOP + U 
t t t 











The regression estimates are not significantly different 
from zero. The slope coefficient is significantly 
different from unity. The low R2 of 1.9 percent indicates 
that movements in current account balances have little 
explana~ory power over movements in the exchange· rate. The 
Durbin-Watson . statistic of 2. 06 indicates _an absence of 
first order serial correlation. 
The above regression equation was further tested by using 
lagged values of changes in the current account balance, 
but in each case the estimates . were found to be 
insignific~nt and the values of R2 were . found to be very 
close to zero. 
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In an efficient market a systematic relationship should not 
·exist bet~een changes in the spot exchange rate and past 
changes in t'he current account balance. The results of the 
tests are consistent with the efficient ~a~ket hypothesis. 
. . . . 
Traders were not able to use past information of changes in 
the current account balance to improve forecasts of the 
future spot exchange rate. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, tests were .. applied to measure the 
·efficiency of the spot exchange market. An efficient 
market has been defined as one in which prices fully 
reflect available information (Fama, 1970). This implies 
that traders cannot u:se available 
. •' 
information to 
systematically improve their forecasts of future prices. 
This is. due to the fact that in an efficient foreign 
e}{change market, exchange rates react immediately to new 
information, thereby rendering such information valueless 
for forecasting purposes. 
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Market efficiency ~s a wide economic statement and 
therefore requires the specification of testable 
hypotheses. Market efficiency is therefore measured in 
terms of specified information sets. 
The first tests were based on testing for weak-form 
efficiency. .The specified information set under weak-form 
~fficiency tests, is the past history of· the spot exchange 
rate. If the· market is efficient, then traders should not 
be able to systematically forecast the future spot exchange 
rate on the basis ·of past movements in the spot ex-change 
rate. 
The spot exchange rate was regressed against the . lagged 
spot exchange rate and was found to follow a random walk. 
If the · equilibrium return is constant then this is 
consistent . with an efficient market. Further, the mean 
deviation of the spot rate minus the.subsequently observed 
spot rate, was not significantly different from zero.· 
Tests for serial correlation were expanded by examining the . . . 
autocorrelation function for the rand/U.S. dollar exchange 
rate for monthly returns, the rand/U.S. doliar, 
rand/sterling and rand/deutscherttark exchange rates for 
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daily returns and the rand/sterling, rand/lira. and 
rand/U. S. dollar exchang~ rates for weekly returns over 
specified· time periods . 
In . general, the tests reflected autocorrelation 
coefficients which were not statistically different from 
zero. This indicates that spot exchange rate movements are 
random and there are therefor.a no linear trends in spot 
exchange rate changes. However, · there .. were -a · few 
autocorrelation coefficients which were statistically 
signif ic'ant and the tests for dependencies were expanded by 
applying filter trading .rules. 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient, then filter 
trading ru·les should not outperform a simple buy-and-hold 
policy. Filter trading rules were applied f6r a number.of 
currencies ov~r various time periods. The results of >the 
tests on the f 11 ter· trading ·rules are consi$tent with an 
efficient foreign exchange market as the filter trading 
ruies selected were not able to ou~perform a buy-and-hold 
policy. 
However, certain filter .. trading· rules di~ result in higher 
returns than a simple buy-an_d-hold p_olicy once· an 
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adjustment was made .for interest· returns earned on 
securities quoted in each currency. 
However, ·once a further adjustment was made to include a 
.minimum level of transaction costs to undertake the 
transactions required under a filter trading rule, these 
excess returns disappeared. Therefore,. filter trading 
rules failed to outperform a . simple buy-and-hold policy: 
once an adjustment is made for interest returns and 
transaction costs. These results are therefore consistent 
with market efficiency, in that traders would not be able 
to use past movements in the exchange rate to improve their 
. ' 
forecasts of the future spot excharige rate. 
A foreign exchange market is semi-strong efficient if 
exchange rate_s reflect all._publicly available information. 
This chapter included tests on the forecasting accuracy of 
the Standard Ba.nk' s foreign exchange advisory service. The 
forecasts have been inciuded as part' of the ~tiblic 
information set as the forecasts are widely disseminated. 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient then the 
foreign ex.change advisory service · forecasts should not be 
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able to systematically outperform the forward rate as a: 
predictor of the future spot exchange rate. 
The measurement of forecasting accuracy was undert~ken 
through the comparison of mean squared forecasting errors 
.. . 
and the application of directional tests. The results 
. indicate that traders who used the advisory service 
forecasts would have reported significantly smaller mean 
squared ~orec,sting errors. In addition advisory service 
" 
forecasts outperformed the forward rate in predicting the 
directional change iri the spot exchange rate. 
These results are not consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis. In an efficient market, advisory service 
forecasts should not systematically outperform the forward 
rate as a predictor of the future spot exchange rate. This 
-
may reflect access to privileged information as the 
Standard Bank is one of the major dealers in the foreign 
exchange spot market. 
Market efficiency was further tested by analysing the 
relationship between the spot exchange rate and selected 
"fundamental". variables. These variables included the 






changes in the gold and foreign exchange reserves, money 
supply growth and the balance on the current account. 
Th first test analysed the relationship between the spot 
exchange rate (the Commercial rand) and the Financial rand 
exchange rate. As the Financial rand rate is determined by 
demand and supply factors and reflects non-resident 
perceptions, there exists an ·argument that the financial 
rand may anticipate future movements in the spot exchange 
rate. 
The results indicate that the Financial rand exchange rate 
recorded a significantly greater degree of volatility than 
the spot exchange rate and the adoption of the Financial 
rand mechanism in 1985 may have reduced the volatility in 
the spot or Commercial rand exchange rate. Further, the 
regression estimates reflect a limited but statistically 
significant correlation between changes in the spot rate 
and contemporaneous changes in the Financial rand exchange 
rate. 
However, regressing the spot exchange rate against lagged 
values of the Financial rand did not result in estimates 
significantly different from zero and the values of R2 were 
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very close to zero. These results are consistent with 
market efficiency as·traders were not able to utilise past. 
information on· Financial rate returns to improve forecasts 
of the future spot exchange rate. 
Although there exists a statistically significiant 
reiations~ip between changes in the spot exchange rate and 
contemporaneous changes in the dollar gold price, traders 
would not be able to use this relationship; as it reflects 
a contemporaneous relationship, to improve their forecasts 
of the future spot exchange rate. 
The regression equation was further tested.by using lagged· 
changes .in the dollar gold price. The estimates were not 
. 2 significantly different from zero while the values of R 
were very close to zero. This is consistent with market 
efficiency as traders would· not . be able to utilise past 
information on the gold price to improve forecasts of the 
future spot exchange rate. 
A signific.ant relationship exists 'between changes in the 
spot exchange rate and contemporaneous · changes in th~ 
Reserve Bank's gold arid foreign exchange reserves. 
However, there is no significant relati6nship b~tween 
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changes in the spot rate and past changes in the gold and 
foreign exchange reserves. Again, this result is 
consistent with market efficiency. 
If the foreign exchange market is efficient, then traders 
should not be able to utilise past information on money 
supply to improve for.ecasts of the future spot exchange 
rate. The results of regression equations used to test the 
relationship between changes in money supply and ·changes in 
the spot exchange rate reflect coefficients which are not 
-significant and values of R2 which are very close to zer~. 
There does not exist a statistically significant 
relationship between· changes in .the spot exchange rate and 
contemporaneous changes in the money supply. 
-__ The monetary approach to excha!lge rate determination 
emphasises the role of relative money supplies in 
determining the exchange rate. Changes in the spot 
exchange rate was further regressed against changes in 
relative money supplies. The coefficients of the_ 
regression equation were not significant while the values 
of R
2 
were very close to zero. Further tests on lagged 
values of relative money supplies resulted in insignificant 
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coefficients and values of R2 · which were . very close to 
zero. 
The results are consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis in t~at 'traders were not be able to use past 
information of money supplies to improve their forecasts of 
the future spot exchange rate. 
Over the· period 1981 to 1988, South Africa experienced a 
fundamental change in its balance_ of payinents position. In· 
the period 1981 ·to 1984~ South Africa·· reflected a current 
account deficit while in the period subsequent to 1984, 
South Africa's balance on the ~urrent account has generally 
been positive. Over this period the rand showed a marked 
decline in value against the major currencies, and the 
capital account reflected significant outflows (see Chapter 
3). 
The current account ·balance does . not merely reflect the 
decline. in .the rand· exchange rate; there has been a 
significant turnaround even ·when the balance on current 
account is stated in U.S. dollars. 
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The regression equation testing the relationsh1p between 
changes in the spot exchange rate and changes in the 
contemporaneous and· lagged changes in ·the. ·balance on 
current account (stated in u. S. dollars) reflected 
coefficients which were insignificant and values of · R2 
which were very close to zero.· 
These results are consistent with market efficiency in that 
traders were not able to use past changes in the current 
account balance to improve their forecasts ·of the future 
spot exchange rate. 
In this chapter, market efficiency was measured in terms of 
specified information sets. The first information set 
consisted of the past history · of exchange rates. . The 
results of the · serial · correla.ti6n and filter trading rule 
tests are generally· consistent with weak-form market 
efficiency. 
The .semi-strong tests of market efficiency· consisted of 
testing the relationship between the spot exchange rate and 
such "fundamental" variables as the Financial rarid exchange 
rate, the dollar gold price, the Reserve Bank's. gold and 
foreign exchange :reserves, relative money supplies and the 
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balance on the current account. The results of the tests 
are consistent with market efficiency in that traders would 
not be able to utilise past information of these variables 
to improve forecasts of the future spot exchange rate. 
However, in an efficient foreign exchange market, forecasts 
issued by aqvisory services should not systematically 
out~erform the forward rate as a predictor of the future 
spot . exchange rate. The. r.esul ts of the tests on the 
forecasting performance of an advisory service are 
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. The 
advisory servi-ce forecasts consistently outperformed the 
forward ra·te as a predictor of the future spot exchange 
rate. 
Market efficiency has been measured in terms of specified 
informa~ion sets. The weak-form and semi-strong for~ tests 
are gene~aily consistent with market efficiency. l:{owever, 
the superior forecasting perfor~ance of the Standard Bank's 
foreign exchange advisory service f o~~casts over the sample 
period relative to the forward rate is not consistent with 
market efficiency. 
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As the advisory service tested is one of the major 
participants in the South African foreign exchange market, 
the tests may represent a test of strong-form efficiency 
and the results may indicate an absence of market 
efficiency in the strong-form sense. 
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This thesis has examined and documented tests on the 
efficiency of the · South African foreign exchange _ market. 
The · thesis was. divided into two parts. P·art 1 examined 
recent developments in .the South African foreign exchange 
market and Part 2 consisted of an examination·and review of 
empirical ~tudies on market effi6iency, and tests of the 
weak form and semi-strong form levels of efficiency_in the 
South African foreign exchange market. 
Chapter 1 defined and described sufficient and necessary 
conditions for market efficiency~ 
Chapters 2 and 3 form Part 1 of the study. ·. Chapter 2 
.examined developments in th~ South African foreign exchange 
market from 1971 to the date of the Commission of Inquiry's 
.Interim report in 1979. . During this period the Reserve 
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Bank generally followed a policy of maintaining a rand/U.s. 
dollar peg and undertaking major adjustments to the peg 
based on South Africa's balance of payments position and 
the level of the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves. 
The Reserve Bank applied wide ranging controls over the 
foreign exchange market by not only setting the exchange 
rate but, for example, also setting the bid-ask spre.ad at 
the retail level., The pricing of forward exchange did not 
reflect covered interest parity. 
A system of extensive Exchange Controls av.er residents and 
non-residents was in pl'ace. South Africa applied a dual 
exchange rate system. Therefore, at that ~tage the South 
African foreign exchange.market did not reflect conditions 
consistent with an efficient and competitive market. 
The.current exchange rate did not reflect expectations, and 
there was no immediate adjustment to the exchange. rate if 
new information arose which impacted on expectations 
regarding the future spot exchange rate. However, 
pressures on the Reserve Bank's foreign exchange reserves 
may have led the authorities to alter the rand/U.S. dollar 
peg. 
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The significant deviations from covered interest parity 
implied that there existed opportunities to undertake risk-
free covered interest arbitrage transactions. However, the 
system of Exchange Controls may have restricted the ability 
of market participants to undertake arbitrage and 
speculative activities which would result in the exchange 
rate reflecting expectations. 
The Commission of Inquiry recommended the establishment of 
a flexible exchange rate system and the pricing of forward 
exchange which reflected covered interest parity. These 
recommendations were adopted. In 1983 restrictions on non-
residents were removed, thereby resulting in the effective 
abolition of South Africa's dual exchange rate system. 
There began a process of market liberalisation but this 
process was reversed and the dual exchange rate system 
reinstated with the declaration of the debt standstill in 
1985. 
At the present time, although South Africa has a flexible 
exchange rate system, there remains a system of extensive 
Exchange Controls in place which impact on the economic 
freedom of investors and traders to transact in foreign 
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- technical trading rules should not consistently 
outperform a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
professional forecasting services should not 
consistently outperform the forward rate in predicting 
the future spot exchange rate. 
- investors should not be able to earn abnormal returns 
from forecasts of the exchange rate based on publicly 
available information. 
This thesis involved testing the weak and semi-strong forms 
of market efficiency. This means that tests of market 
efficiency are relevant to the extent that exchange rates 
fully reflect the publicly available information set. 
Chapter 4 represents an examination and· review of empirical 
research studies on covered interest parity and wea.k and 
semi-strong forms of market efficiency. The majority of 
these studies were conducted on U.S. data and a few studies 
on U.K. data. 
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Chapter 5 consisted of tests of the first hypothesis. In 
an efficient market covered interest risk-free profit 
opportunities should· be quickly eliminated. Transaction 
costs result in boundaries around the covered interest 
parity line. Covered interest parity deviations will not 
imply that the foreign exchange market is inefficient 
unless these apparent risk-free profit opportunities ~xceed 
related,transaction costs. 
Chapter 5 presents the theory of covered interest parity 
and graphically depicts the covered interest parity 
relationship. The effect of deviations from interest 
parity on equilibrating capital flows is explained. 
Covered interest parity was studied for the period August 
1983 to February 1988 using South African and New York 
three month Bankers Acceptance rates. Covered interest 
parity was also tested using South African and United 
States monthly prime overdraft rates and the one-month 
forward dollar premium over the period January 1983 to 
October 1986. 
The quoted forward dollar premium is plotted against the 
expected interest parity value of the forward premium and 
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descriptive statistics are presented relating to mean 
deviations and standard deviations. Regression equations 
are estimated for the quoted dollar premium and covered 
interest parity relationship. Transaction costs are 
estimated and deviations from covered interest parity are 
evaluated in relation to the level of transaction costs. 
Chapter 5 concludes, based on empirical tests over the 
period August 1983 to February 1988, that although 
deviations from covered interest parity did occur over this 
period, these apparent risk-free covered interest profit 
opportunities did not exceed, except for a limited period, 
related transaction costs. These conclusions are valid for 
the securities tested. 
Deviations from covered interest parity increased over the 
period August 1985 to February 1988, reflecting the period 
subsequent to the debt standstill and the extension of 
direct controls. The deviations from covered interest 
parity over this period reflected consistently a quoted 
forward dollar premium which was less than its interest 
parity value. This would be expected to encourage capital 




Therefore, the results of Chapter 5 are generally 
consistent with market efficiency. In an efficient foreign 
exchange market, covered interest arbitrage opportunities 
are quickly eliminated. The study was unable to reject 
Hypothesis 1. 
The conclusions reached in Chapter 5 are in contrast with 
other overseas studies (see, for example, Aliber, 19.73 and 
Dooley and Isard, 1980). This thesis used securities 
issued in different political jurisdictions to predict the 
forward rate. 
Studies of developed economies have generally reported 
deviations from covered interest parity when using 
securities issued in different political jurisdictions, 
whereas deviations from covered interest parity are not 
sufficient to off set transaction costs when comparing 
securities issued in Euro-currency markets. 
It has been reported that deviations from covered interest 
parity are due to differences in ;political risk, capital 
controls and taxation (see, for example, Aliber, 1973 and 
Dooley and Isard, 1980). !I'o the extent that these factors 
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are relevant in South Africa, we would expect to report 
significant deviations from covered interest parity. 
However, the difference in the overall tax rate between 
South Africa and the U.S.A. does not appear to be material. 
Further, the system of exchange and capital controls may be 
ineffectual, and the large capital outflows reported in 
Chapter 3, provide support for this argument. 
In an efficient market covered interest arbitrage 
opportunities should be .. quickly eliminated and the 
empirical findings are consistent with the first 
hypothesis. However, as a suggestion for further research, 
covered interest parity should be empirically tested using 
Euro-currency interest securities. 
The second hypothesis and related conditions were tested in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 tested for market efficiency by ·examining the 
relationship between the spot rate and the forward rate. 
In an efficient market, assuming a zero risk premium, the 
forward rate should be a weak but unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate. 
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The following OLS regression equation was tested; 
S = a + bF + u 
t t-1 t 
This was tested for monthly and quarterly, data. The 
results are generally consistent with the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, in that the constant is not significantly 
different . from zero and the slope coefficient is not 
significantly different from unity. The error term is not 
serially correlated. 
Lagged values of the forward rate were added to the 
equation. As F includes all information; including t-1 
information implicit in the lagged forward rate, F , the 
t-2 
addition of the lagged forward rate should not result in an 
improvement in the goodness of fit nor in coefficients 
which are Significantly di£ferent from zero. Again, the 
empirical results are consistent with market efficiency. 
The forward premium (reflecting the expected change in the 
spot rate) was plotted against.realised changes in the spot 
rate, and was found to be a weak predictor of the future 
change in the spot rate. 
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If the current spot rate . and forward rate embody all 
current information, ·then new information which alters 
expectations regarding the future spot rate, should be 
immediately reflected in the spot and forward rates. 
Therefore, a high correlation between movements in the spot 
rate and movements in the contemporaneous forward rate is 
consistent with market efficiency. The empirical tests in 
Chapter 6 indicated a high correlation between movements in 
the spot rate and movements in the contemporaneous forward 
,exchange rate. 
Descriptive statistics reflecting the forecast ·errors of 
using the forward rate and the current spot rate to predict 
the future spot rate were produced. The mean deviations 
-
were found to be not significantly different from zero. 
The lagged spot rate was as good a predictor of the future 
spot rate as the forward rate. 
In an efficient market, the forward rate should be an 
unbiased predictor of the future sp~t rate if investors and 
traders are risk neutral. If the pricing of forward 
exchange includes a risk premium, then the. existence of 
bias in the forward exchange rate is consistent with market 
efficiency. The existence of a risk premium is tested in 
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Chapter 6 by examining the mean forecast error of using the 
forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate and 
testing for serial.correlation. 
In the South African foreign exchange market, the mean 
forward forecast error was found to be not significantly 
different from zero. This result is consistent with a zero 
risk premium but is also consistent with a risk premium 
that often changes sign but has a mean of zero. Therefore, 
to test for a time varying risk premium in the pricing of 
forward exchange, the autocorrelations bf the forward 
forecast errors were calculated, and were generally found 
to be not significant~. This is therefore not consistent 
with the existence of a time varying risk premium. 
As the results of these tests were consistent with a zero 
risk premium, this tended to validate earlier assumptions. 
Although the empirical results in Chapter 6 are generally 
consistent with market efficiency, it was found that the 
current spot rate may be as good a predictor of the future 
spot rate as the cor,responding ·forward rate. This is 
consistent with the results of other studies and valid 
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arguments have been propagated why this should be so (see, 
for example, Chrystal and Thornton, 1988). 
The market for interest securities may 
inefficiencies, so that although the forward rate may 
reflect covered interest parity, it may not reflect the 
market's expectations of the future spot rate. 
Arbitrage through _equilibrating capital flows would ensure 
that the forward rate reflects the market's expectations of 
the future spot rate. To the extent that inefficiencies in 
the form of exchange controls restrict these arbitrage 
transactions, this may indicate that the forward rate may 
not reflect the expected future spot rate but the absence 
of bias in the pricing of forward exchange · may not be 
consistent with this argument. 
Chapter 6 tested the second hypothesis by specifically 
testing the following conditions; 
- there should be a strong correlation between movements 
in the spot rate and movements in the contemporaneous 
forward rate, and 
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- the forward rate should be an unbiased predictor of 
the future spot rate. 
The results of the tests were generally consistent with 
market efficiency. 
Chapter 7 consisted of examining the second hypothesis by 
specifically testing for weak and semi-strong forms of 
market efficiency. Market efficiency is measured in terms 
of specified information sets. The specified information 
set under weak form efficiency tests is the past history of 
the spot exchange rate. 
Tests for weak form efficiency involved the application of 
various methodologies. Firstly, the spot rate was 
regressed against the lagged spot rate and found to follow 
a random walk. Further, the mean deviation of the spot 
rate minus the subsequently observed spot rate was not 
significantly different from zero. 
Tests for serial correlation were undertaken by examining 
the autocorrelation function for the rand/U.S. dollar rate 
for monthly returns, the rand/U.S. dollar, rand/sterling 
and rand/deutschemark rates for daily returns and the 
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rand/sterling, rand/lira and rand/U.S. dollar rate for · 
weekly returns .. 
Generally, the tests reflected autocorrelation coefficients, 
which were not significantly different from zero. These 
~esults are 6onsistent with market efficiency, as 'exchange 
rate movements are random and 'there are no linear trends in 
exchange rate changes. 
A further test of weak form efficiency involved testing the 
profitability of technical trading rules. If the .foreign 
exchange. market is eff·icient, then filter trading rul.es 
should not consistently outperform a simple . buy-and-hold 
policy. 
Filter trading rules were applied for a number of 
currencies over various time periods and for a number of 
. filters. The results of the tests on filter.trading rules 
are consistent with an efficient foreign. exchange market. 
Filter trading rules were not able to outperform a simple 
buy-and-hold policy once .·an adjustment was made for 
interest returns earned on securities quoted in each 
currency, and . once ·an adjustment was made for a ·minimum 
level of transaction costs. 
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This ·is in contrast to the results of such studies as 
Cornell and Dietrich (1978) who found that although 
autocorrelation tests indicated that exchange rat~ changes 
reflected "white noise", the use of filter trading rules 
reflected significantly greater returns than following a 
simple buy-and-hold policy. However, the methodology used 
in this thesis is more rigorous as an adjustment was made 
for interest returns earned for the specific pe~iods that 
traders were in each currency. As depreciating currencies 
usually reflect higher interest rates, this was considered 
important to this thesis. This is consistent with why 
Cornell and Dietrich may have reported significant returns 
from using filter trading rules. 
A foreign exchange market is semi-strong efficient if 
exchange rates reflect all publicly available information. 
Chapter 7 included tests on the forecasting accuracy of the 
Standard Bank foreign exchange advisory service. If the 
foreign exchange market is efficient then the Standard 
Bank's· forecasts should not be able to systematically 
outperform the forward rate as a predictor of the future 
spot exchange rate. 
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The measurement of forecasting accuracy was undertaken 
through the comparison of mean squared forecasting errors 
and the use of directional tests. The results · are no-t 
consistent with market efficiency. For the period tested~ 
traders who used the advisory service's forecasts would 
have reported significantly smaller mean squared 
forecasting errors. In addition, the advisory service 
outperformed the forward rate in predicting the directional 
change in the spot exchange rate. 
with market 
access to 
Although these results are not consistent 
efficiency, this may reflect monopolistic 
information as the Standard Bank is one of the major 
dealers in the foreign exchange market. 
test may reflect a test of the strong 
efficiency, and the results may indicate 





an absence of· 
In Chapter 7, market efficiency is further tested by 
analysing the relationship between changes in the spot rate 
and changes in selected macro-economic variables, including 
the Financial rand rate, the dollar gold price, changes in 
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foreign exchange reserves, money supply and relative money 
supplies and the balance on the current account. 
Tests indicated a statistically significant correlation 
between movements in the spot rate and movements in the 
current Financial rand rate, the current gold price and the 
Reserve Bank ' s foreign exchange reserves. Al though these 
represented statistically significant relationships, as 
these were contemporaneous changes, it is doubtful that 
traders would be able to use such relations~ips to improve 
their forecasts of the future spot exchange rate. 
The regressions were applied to lagged changes in the above 
variables and the estimates were not significantly 
2 different from zero, and the values of R were very close 
to zero. Traders would not be able to use past information 
on these variables to improve forecasts of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
Information on current and lagged money supply growth, 
relative money supplies and the balance on the current 
account were found to be not significant in explaining 
exchange rate movements. This is consistent with market 
efficiency as traders were not able to use publicly 
· .. _ 
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available information on these variables to impro".'e 
for~casts of the future spot rate . 
. Therefore, chapter 7 consisted of tests of the second 
hypothesis, and involved specific tests for weak form and 
semi-strong forms of efficiency. The following 
condi'tions, as specified in· Chapter 1 under Hypothesis 2, 
were tested; 
- . technical trading rules should not consistently 
outperform a simple buy-and-hold policy. 
-. professional forecasting services should· not 
consistently outperform the forward rate in predicting 
the future spot r'ate. 
- investors should no·t be able to earn ·abnormal returns 
from forecasts of the exchahge rate based on publicly 
available information. 
In. general, the results of the tests are consistent with 
the weak. form and semi-strong. forms of market effic:!-ency 
and the thesis was unable to rejec.t Hypothesis · 2. 
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This is surprising as the system of exchange controls in 
the South African foreign exchange market do not reflect 
conditions conducive to the free functioning of a market. 
However, the results of testing specific hypo'theses 
indicate that exchange rate movements are in line with what 
would be expected to occur in an efficient market. 
The existence of exchange controls and evidence of market 
efficiency may indicate that exchange controls have been 
ineffectual,. and that there are a sufficient number of 
traders/speculators . to ensure that the exchange rate 
reflects the market's expectations of the future spot 
exchange rate. 
A caveat to this conclusion is necessary. Firstly, there 
is no general test of overall market efficiency, and this 
thesis does not purport to test for overall efficiency. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence in this thesis which is 
consistent with market efficiency is limited to the results 
of testing specific hypotheses. 
Secondly, the results are limited to the sample periods 
tested and the limiting assumption (speci~ied in chapter 1) 
of a constant equilibrium return. 
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Although the results of the tests in this thesis are 
generally consistent with the weak and semi-strong forms of 
market efficiency, the thesis however found that the 
Standard Bank advisory forecasting service was able to 
consistently outperform the forward rate in predicting the_ 
f~ture spot rate. 
This is not consistent with market efficiency, but as this 
may reflect monopolistic access to information, this may 
indicate an absence of efficiency in the strong form sense. 
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8.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUR~HER RESEARCH 
It is appropriate to end this thesis by of feririg 
suggestions for possible future research. Firstly, this 
thesis concluded that the pricing of forward exchange 
reflected covered interest parity. This is based on the 
comparison of South African and U.S. interest secu~ities. 
It would be useful to expand this . avenue of research by 
using South African and Euro-currency interest· securities 
to test for covered interest parity. Further research 
. could take the form of testing. for deviations from c.overed 
. . . 
interest parity based on the after~~ax yields of selected 
interest s~duriti~s, This would require a period-by-period 
comparison of tax legislation in both countries. 
Another possible avenue for further research is to measure 
exchange. rate expectations by Using survey data and thereby 
prov.i:de another perspective for testing the existence of a 
risk premium in the pricing of forward exchange •. A further 
research area relates to the measure~ent o~ the forecasting 
accu.racy of relative interest rate based forecasts of the 
future spot exchange rate. Further, it would be useful to 
test the accuracy of ~6~posite forecasts. 
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South Africa follows a dual exchange rate system. The 
Financial rand market is.noted to be a very thin market. A 
useful avenue for further research would be to employ 
serial correlation tests and filter tradihg rules to 
measure the efficiency of the Financial rand market. 
Further research is required to measure the effectiveness 
of exchange controls and the impact that exchange contro1 
regulations have on the South African economy.· The role of 
"news" has become a key factor in explaining exchange rate 
movements. In an efficient market the predominant cause of 
exchange rate fluctuations is news which by definition 
could not have been anticipated. An avenue for further 
research may be to equate news to "unanticipated" changes 
in explanatory v~riables, such as money supply, and to test 
the relationship between movements in the exchange rate and 
unanticipated changes in the explanatory variables. 
This obviously necessitates the determination of "expected" 
changes in these variables. The res~l ts of such research 
may indicate that the relationship bet~een movements in the 
exchange rates and changes in an explanatory variable may 
be based on whether changes in a variable such as money 
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